Abstract
The franc CFA is a currency union composed of 15 sub-Saharan African countries, managed and led by France, the former colonizer. The main objective of this paper is to use the franc CFA as a case study to test the concept of authority, defined as rightful, and hence largely consensual, rule. ‘Authority’ makes a key testable prediction, namely that secondary states consent to their subordination, whether in global governance institutions, alliances or supranational organizations including currency unions, because the net benefits of membership outweigh the costs. It follows that two pieces of evidence can potentially falsify the theory: the lack of consent, or the demonstration of the absence of net benefits. The findings of the present work are that, in the franc CFA, there is little evidence of favourable economic outcomes, but that there is some evidence for net geopolitical benefits. Weaker states may gain from close ties to France, a relationship which can be strategically utilized especially in the context of a multipolar international system. France, meanwhile, gains because it preserves its zone of influence and hence strengthens its claim to Great Power status. These geopolitical dynamics help account for the franc CFA’s perpetuation.
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