Abstract
This article employs coercive distribution theory to examine authoritarian resilience in Angola from 1992 to 2002. The Angolan regime’s survival amid a civil war, domestic opposition, and external pressure to democratize challenges the assumption that authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile. Drawing from interviews with politicians and civil society actors during 18 months of fieldwork in five Angolan provinces of Luanda, Benguela, Bengo, Malanje, and Lunda Norte, the article argues that the government of the ruling party Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, responded to a vocal civil society during the civil war by sidelining rival nonstate actors, using provincial governments to provide social services to urban and peri-urban dwellers, often through non-governmental organizations, churches, and corporations. This strategy aimed to mitigate social unrest, foster dependence on the state, and sustain authoritarian rule.
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