Insecurity,Counterterrorism and the Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Nigeria: A Qualitative Study

Abstract

Insecurity and terrorism pose significant concerns in Nigeria. Yet, there is a paucity of research on citizens’ and private security providers’ (PSP) perceptions of Nigeria’s response to insecurity and the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). The study adopts a qualitative approach, and data was collected using semi-structured interviews with 63 participants, including PSP, non-governmental organisations and lay participants from the public and private sectors in Nigeria. Thematic analysis from a social constructionist theoretical lens was used to analyse the data. The study found a lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, scepticism towards the perceived government’s insincere politicisation of military victory, positive reinforcement of the use of private military companies devoid of identity, ‘othering’, and perceived short-term use of private military security. It also found a perceived mistrust for government approaches in handling insecurity and a positive outlook towards involving PMSCs and mercenaries in combating terrorism regardless of the participants’ identities as Nigerians. In conclusion, the study recommends the need for policies to strengthen Nigerian security agencies to avoid a perceived trust for PMSCs instead of state security.

Introduction

Insecurity and terrorism have led to the significant loss of lives and properties. Data from the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2023) Global Terrorism Index report suggest that approximately 6701 deaths could be attributed to terrorism in 2022 alone, and terrorist attacks have become more deadly, with the lethality rising by 26%. In Nigeria, the emergence of Boko Haram (a group which rejects the Western style of government and education) has also led to the death of over 2000 people (Amao, 2023) and the displacement of approximately 2 million others in Nigeria’s northeast region (Ike et al., 2022). This raises concern about the efficacy of the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism approach and the long-standing debate on the morality and justification for governments’ use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) in addressing conflict, terrorism, and insecurity. Of significant concern is the perceived government’s unwillingness to openly resort to the use of private military for fear of its citizen’s criticism and revulsion against the use of private military companies (Varin, 2018). This is further coupled with the fact that the bulk of the discussion on PMSCs focuses on elites and legal standpoints to its use (Casiraghi and Cusumano, 2023; Pattison, 2014; Sorensen, 2017). As such, it highlights a major gap in the literature, especially relating to the vernacular (everyday narrative) of lay members of the public, including private security providers and how they understand the government counterterrorism response, state security forces legitimacy and the implication for using PMSCs.

Concerning the non-justification for using PMSCs, Liu (2010) argues that PMSC defies state conceptualisation, especially within the Westphalia definition of what constitutes a nation-state. Weber (1964) argues that historically, the concentration of the use of the monopoly of force into states’ control is relatively modern and occurred after the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Part of the abhorrence of PMSCs is also associated with its perceived link with mercenaries, which often conjures negativity. Singer (2004) contends that such contemporary abhorrence of mercenaries is partly to do with its reputation between the period 1950 to the 1960s in the decolonisation period, where individuals such as Bob Denard and Mike Hoare were hired to hinder the self-determination of the newly independent states. This is also coupled with the perceived link between the apartheid regime and mercenaries in South Africa, thus accounting for a strict stance against private military activities. While PMSCs may differ slightly from mercenaries, Musah contends that ‘private military companies are nothing but the old poison of vagabond mercenaries in new designer bottles’ (as quoted in Singer 2004: 44). Thus, highlighting a long-standing ethical and morally dubious connotation associated with using mercenaries.

Other scholars have proffered several justifications for the emergence and growing proliferation of private security. This includes the fact that the neoliberalist market economy undermines an array of African states’ sovereignty, and thus, sovereignty merely reflects a convenient myth (Clapham, 1996). Harvey (2007) contends that neoliberalism has triggered an increased reliance on marketisation logic, which makes a gradual shift from the public to the private sphere, even on issues concerning security, more acceptable. Leander (2005) further argues that neoliberalism-driven globalisation has transformed security into marketable goods, hence, determining the demand and supply of the market of force.

In addition, macro-dynamics such as the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ at the origin of private security represent a crucial angle to its emergence. In terms of supply, the downsizing of the military determined a massive availability of military personnel and arms, especially due to the end of the Cold War and other conflicts in Eastern Europe and South Africa. Concerning the issue of demand, several factors could be used to explain its growing use. This includes the decay of Africa’s nation-state due to perceived failure or incomplete nation-building process triggering new wars, which also occur as a result of socio-political and economic hardship (e.g. rising religious and ethnic tensions), leading to widespread insecurity, asymmetric conflict and terrorism (Van Creveld, 1991). It also includes the loss of strategic interest, which further exacerbated the failure of some peacekeeping operations by the United Nations (e.g. the United Nations operation in Somalia and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda), caused a rethinking of Western power’s direct military operations in African scenarios (Adamo, 2021).

Such demand has seen major PMSCs’ involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past (i.e. Executive Outcomes in Angola or Sierra Leone). This is also compounded by the growing dynamism of modern-day conflict, including issues of terrorism and weakened state security forces, especially in third-world countries, which makes resorting to private military companies appear as an alternative option. As Adamo (2020) argues, within the African context, private security needs to be viewed within the ‘wider context of nation-state conflict and the progressive loss of control over the major features of state power’ (p. 341). Issues such as corruption within the state police and the national armed forces have often effectively curtailed donor efforts to mitigate conflict (Singh, 2019). State capacity to effectively control, monitor and subsequently monopolise the effective use of coercion is fundamental to states’ ability to suppress armed conflict. Kaldor (1999) argues that ‘new wars’ entail the rise of non-state actors and asymmetric warfare from militias, including terrorists, to contemporary states. Such threats, coupled with weak state security forces, appear to have often informed some states secret resort to PMSCs as an alternative. For example, in Mozambique, the Russian Wagner Group facing Mozambique’s Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah (ASWJ) represent a moment where the government’s resort to the private military was considered an alternative.

While initially in denial, the Mozambique government, in March 2018, collaborated with Russia with the aim of addressing the ASWJ threat in its northern region (Nhamire, 2018). Wagner, Russia’s private military company, deployed 203 soldiers to Cabo Delgado (Fabricius, 2019). The involvement of the Wagner soldiers has been a subject of criticism on the ground that they were poorly equipped and ill-trained to engage with the Mozambique terrain. As such, it led to the death and injury of some of its soldiers (Bekoe and Burchard, 2020). As initially indicated, discussions on insecurity, counterterrorism, and states’ use of PMSCs often tend to be dominated by elite discussion. In the next section, we engage in some key findings from the literature on counterterrorism and the use of PMSCs.

Public perspectives of counterterrorism and PMSCs: the gap and the case for Nigeria

Most studies on perspectives on the use of private military companies have often focused on elite and state-/legal-level discourses to explain why PMSCs are abhorred and highlight a gap in public perspectives (Adamo, 2020; Liu, 2010; Olsen, 2022). For example, Olsen’s (2022) study focuses on British parliamentarian attitudes towards mercenaries and the use of German soldiers. Adamo (2020) compared executive outcomes and Economic Community of West African Stats Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Sierra Leone to determine whether they are peacekeepers or mercenaries. Even when the public is involved, it usually focuses on attitudes towards privatising US military operations and not their perceptions of it (Ramirez and Wood, 2019). As such, it highlights a taken-for-granted gap in the significance of vernacular and public perceptions of its use.

The importance of vernacular in everyday security appears debated, especially within the context of terrorism. Jackson and Hall (2016) argue that vernacular allows enriching opinions about issues of terrorism. However, within the context of Nigeria, there still remains a gap in the literature on how laypersons perceive government counterterrorism and the resort to alternative sources such as PMSCs. Previous literature on this area has often tended to focus on Nigerian responses to counterinsurgency from the lens of the military as it relates to the use of military force (Omeni, 2018), Joint Task Force (JTF; Thurston, 2018), Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF; Varin, 2016), Vigilante groups, Deradicalisation or reintegration of former terrorist (Clubb and Tapley, 2018; Ike et al., 2021b; Varin, 2016) and other security actors (Adamo, 2020). While these literature provides significant insight, there remains a gap in the importance of exploring public perspectives, especially considering the harm caused by Boko Haram to the community and the growing insecurity in Nigeria. For example, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace Global Terrorism Index Report, Boko Haram ranks as one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world (IEP, 2022). The IEP (2022) also suggests that between 2020 and 2021, Boko Haram accounted for 178 deaths. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2020) report also suggests that Boko Haram accounts for the displacement of over 2 million people in Nigeria and approximately 2.4 million people around neighbouring countries, including the Lake Chad Basin. While Boko Haram remains a challenge, other insecurity issues, as demonstrated in the train attack in Kaduna, which led to the death of eight persons and a further 168 others missing, also remain an issue (Ewokor, 2022). This highlights the need to understand how the public perceives the government response and use of alternative approaches, such as PMSCs, given that they are directly affected by insecurity and terrorism in one form or another.

This article thus makes an original contribution to the literature on vernacular and security, which relates to how laypersons, including private individuals, perceive state response to terrorism and the use of private military companies as an alternative in addressing insecurity and terrorism. It also contributes to the literature on laypersons’ perceptions of the legitimacy and trust in a state’s security apparatus. Our study makes an original and significant contribution through an in-depth analysis of lay discourse using the social constructionist theoretical lens. Our approach to understanding public perceptions is important because it can help enrich our understanding of what lay citizens know and think about the government counterterrorism approach, why they emphasise the need to resort to private militaries and the embedded collective system of meaning within such perceptions. In turn, our analysis could also help provide further evidence and inform policies about the political and social consequences of states’ responses and how they can be improved. In essence, the present study’s research question is:

• What are lay participants (from the public and private sectors), including private security providers perceptions of Nigeria government’s response to insecurity and the use of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)?

To address the research question, the paper commences with an overview of Boko Haram’s emergence, Nigerian governmental responses to the group, and the subsequent rise of private security in combating the group. This is followed by the methodology and an analysis of the results from the semi-structured interviews. A discussion of the findings with implications for existing knowledge and policies to effectively counterterrorism in Nigeria is also reported.

Boko Haram emergence

The emergence of Boko Haram is a subject of debate. While Gray and Adeakin (2015) argue that the group emerged in 1995, Popoola (2012) suggests that it emerged in 2002. A central point remains that the group was formed by Mohammed Yusuf (Ike, 2018). The official name of Boko Haram is Jama at yul Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, which is translated to mean people committed to the prophet’s teachings and jihad. The group is commonly referred to as Boko Haram due to the perceived belief concerning its disapproval of Western education (Ike et al., 2023b). Varin (2016) argues that Boko Haram was initially a group composed of nonviolent Muslims exhibiting radical beliefs. However, the dynamism of Boko Haram’s ideologies has somehow altered into the use of violence.

The central ideologies developed by Mohammed Yusuf were the upholding of Islam and the denouncement of any influences, including Western innovations, perceived to constitute a distraction to the teachings of Allah (Varin, 2016). Boko Haram also upholds Salafist–jihadist ideology (Thurston, 2018). While Salafism relates to the return of Islam to those practised by the pious predecessors of the prophet Muhammad, it is worth clarifying that not all Salafists resort to violence to achieve their objectives (Maher, 2016). Boko Haram asserts a strict interpretation of Islam and a quest to uphold its goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate governed by Sharia law and the adoption of jihad with violent means of achieving its aims (Ike et al., 2021b).

Several reasons have been adduced for the group’s emergence. Some argue that Boko Haram was partly driven by the harsh socio-economic conditions of the north, engulfed with high levels of illiteracy, poverty and unemployment (Ayegba, 2015; Varin, 2016). Others argue that political motivation and the radical misinterpretation of the Quran fuelled its emergence (Akinola, 2015; Onapajo, 2017). Zenn et al. (2013) argue that the international dimension enabling Boko Haram’s emergence also includes the return of its nucleus to Nigeria after being trained abroad (in Libya after the Qaddafi regime’s collapse), as well as the merger with further terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Other scholars emphasise the radicalisation following the 1979 Iranian revolution, as well as the implementation of Sharia Law in 12 northern states since 1999, along with socio-economic aspects: deficiencies of the Nigerian state, local cleavages, greed and grievances (Otoghile and Igbafe, 2014; Iyekekpolo, 2016; Onapajo and Uzodike, 2012).

Another prevailing argument is the Nigerian security forces’ perceived heavy-handedness, which collectively triggers public resentment towards the security forces and a surge in Boko Haram’s activities (Varin, 2016). Amnesty International (2015) found that issues of widespread human rights abuses, enforced disappearances and torture form part of public resentment towards the security forces and their handling of the Boko Haram insurgency. Amnesty International (2015) also suggests that since March 2011, over 7000 young men and boys have died in military detention, and 1200 people have been unlawfully killed since 2012. Human Rights Watch (2012) found that issues of human rights abuses attributed to the reasons why some youths joined Boko Haram. While the emergence of Boko Haram is important in understanding the group, of central importance is Nigerian governmental responses to Boko Haram and how it transformed from a nonviolent, radical preaching group to a violent group that at some point held territories within the country.

Nigerian government responses

Historically, Nigerian governmental responses to the insurgency involve resorting to brutal force to suppress armed opposition, insurgency groups and the 1967 civil war (Arize and James, 2023). In the 1980s, the emergence of Maitatsine – a group that decried Western innovation with a leader, Mohammed Marwa, who claimed to be a prophet – was met with violent responses from the Nigerian security forces (Isichei, 1987). Faced with a gloomy prospect of anarchy in Kano state, President Shehu Shagari mandated the armed forces to restore order and destroy the Maitatsine group. As a result, approximately 4000 people were killed within 2 days, alongside the detention of 1000 members of the group (Williams and Guttschuss, 2012). Even the ongoing agitation for secessionism by the Indigenous People of Biafra has also been met with the use of military repression (Abba et al., 2023). Similarly, the Niger Delta militants were also subjected to harsh responses even though their grievances revolved around the unequal distribution of resources, marginalisation and environmental degradation (Etemike, 2009). This approach to dissent implies that it often aggravates the conflict, as seen in the use of amnesty to quell the vandalism and destruction of government facilities by the Niger Delta militants.

Notwithstanding the limited success of the coercive use of the Nigerian security forces for quelling dissent, this still seems to constitute the default response employed in addressing Boko Haram. For instance, the 2009 uprising between the Boko Haram leader and the security forces represents one such moment in which the punitive use of force prevailed (Varin, 2018). Yusuf, in response to the perceived previous heavy-handedness meted out by the security forces on its members, resorted to the use of violence against the former. Yusuf’s resort to violence was met with repression by the Nigerian security forces. The incident led to the capture of Yusuf, who later died in police custody (Onuoha, 2012). Thurston (2018) argues that Yusuf’s death constituted a turning point for Boko Haram as Yusuf’s predecessor, Abubakar Shekau, was able to use his death as a tool for mobilising further recruitment to the group.

The lethal transformation of Boko Haram began in the wake of 2011 (Thurston, 2018). Under the leadership of Shekau, there was increased sophistication and frequency of attacks. It was also followed by the transformations within the Boko Haram group and the emergence of the ISIS-linked Islamic State of the West African Province (ISWAP), which further exacerbated the group’s violent transformation and attacks against the Nigerian state (Varin, 2016). Boko Haram’s use of improvised explosive devices quadrupled between 2010 and 2011, with approximately 196 confirmed cases compared to 52 incidents the previous year (Straziuso, 2012). Moreover, in 2011, the first use of suicide bombing by Boko Haram occurred, an alien act to Nigerian culture and the previous cycles of warfare. Other high-profile attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram included the bombing of the United Nations (UN) headquarters, which resulted in the death of 23 people and the injury of 100 others (Varin, 2016). In April 2014, the Chibok schoolgirls’ kidnapping of 276 female students also spurred international attention, considering the magnitude and sophistication of the group to carry out such large-scale kidnapping.

In addition, a media campaign was developed. The distribution of leaflets and videos that centred around Yusuf’s martyrdom radicalised and mobilised members in the perceived war declared against the secular enemies of Boko Haram. The enemies included religious leaders, security personnel, politicians and dissenting members of Muslim communities (Thurston, 2018).

Despite counterinsurgency efforts by the Nigerian government under President Jonathan’s administration, Boko Haram was still able to respond to the changing dynamics, as seen in its ability to hold territories. Counterinsurgency operations such as the Joint Task Force (JTF) – Operation Restore Order, which President Jonathan launched, did little to suppress Boko Haram. Serrano and Pieri (2014) observed that the actions of the JTF undermined public support, as denoted in a public protest in Maiduguri. It is further contended that the entire mishandling of the northeast security situation by the Jonathan-led administration increased the terror attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram, poor leadership coupled with the state’s fragility (Amao and Maiangwa, 2017; Bappah, 2016; Fasakin, 2017; Serrano and Pieri, 2014; Tonwe and Eke, 2013). Onuoha (2014) further argues that the coercive approach perpetrated by the JTF to attain intelligence on perceived members of Boko Haram or their hideouts, including the military, undermines public support. Moreover, Operation BOYONA was hampered by poor weapons, the lack of adequate training of the military in counterinsurgency and issues of human rights abuses (Omeni, 2018). The extensive concentration of the military in counterinsurgency and its limited role in achieving success highlights this pitfall, as contained in previous research in the Israeli context (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994). For instance, Enders and Sandler’s (1993) study suggested that punitive, retaliatory raids often result in short rather than long-term gains to deter terrorism. In Nigeria, the poorly planned counterinsurgency strategies proved counterproductive. Consequently, under President Jonathan’s auspices, the Nigerian government panicked by adapting its strategies with the discreet use of mercenaries.

Poor counterinsurgency and the rise of PMSCs in Nigeria

The use of private military and security companies alongside national security forces is not new. It is worth emphasising that PMSCs comprise private companies registered within a state and companies that offer military and security services through a legitimate contract signed with a state recognised under international law. Moreover, ‘mercenaries’ refers to those not necessarily under any state’s legal framework but carry out freelance work. In 2003, western democracies – including the United States – reportedly contracted several PMSCs to support the country’s armed forces operation in Iraq (Altamimi and Ajeel, 2012). However, Blackwater guards have been scrutinised – and sometimes pardoned by the US administration – for gross human rights violations and excessive force resulting in the killings of Iraqi civilians (Khouri, 2020).

The recent rise in the use of PMSCs within the African continent, especially in Nigeria, has similarly conjured negative perceptions. Despite the positive image of private military agencies as legitimate organisations within Africa, several incidents might have accounted for the negative labelling of ‘mercenaries’ rendered to such organisations (Varin, 2018). These incidents comprised Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s recruitment of African mercenaries in 2011 to support the regime’s troops against supported rebels in Libya (Maru, 2012).

Furthermore, President Jonathan’s alleged move to have hired mercenaries to change the Nigerian conflict course in 2015 held negative perceptions (Varin, 2018). This was partly in a bid to win the hearts and minds of the population, even though President Jonathan’s security policy was met with public and media criticism of his handling of Boko Haram and endemic corruption that marred the administration. A united opposition criticised Jonathan’s leadership that allegedly failed to counter Boko Haram (Varin, 2018). These negative perceptions appear to further lead to Jonathan’s eventual defeat in the 2015 presidential election.

Faced with such continuums, namely insecurity, President Jonathan promised to restore security to the northeast by defeating Boko Haram before the presidential election. Boko Haram was gaining significant ground and began claiming territories. It seemed President Jonathan had little choice concerning the solution to the problem and thus attempted to counter them with excessive coercion that included assistance from appointed mercenaries. Omeni (2018) argues that such choices may be partly limited due to the institutional isomorphism already present in the Nigerian army, and the campaign was slowly adapted due to poor equipment. Thurston (2018), Deckard and Pieri (2017) and Varin (2018) contend that a decade of corruption and poor investment within the Nigerian security sector played a role in restraining its abilities to effectively combat Boko Haram, which meant that President Jonathan either had to seek support from allies or the private sector.

The reputation of the Nigerian armed forces and the police did little to present Jonathan’s administration in a positive light before the international community. Reports of flagrant human rights abuses perpetrated by the Nigerian security forces were documented as it relates to forced arrests and torture (Amnesty International, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2012). These negative perceptions resulted in Jonathan’s failed attempt to purchase weapons from allies such as the United States. Under President Barack Obama’s administration, the United States was reluctant to assist the Nigerian military due to the poor reputation associated with the country’s armed forces (Siegel, 2015). The 2008 Leahy Law explicitly prohibited the US government from providing training or equipment to foreign troops perceived to have been engaged in human rights abuses. Due to Nigeria’s track record of human rights violations, President Obama was instrumental in the blockade of the Israeli government’s sale of Cobra helicopters to Nigeria in 2015 (Abdullahi, 2021). The limited support from the United States, alongside the United Kingdom’s inadequate role in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, arguably seems to leave the Jonathan administration with few alternatives to contract the services of PMSCs such as Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP).

STTEP intervened in January to March 2015 (Varin, 2018). Chaired by Eeben Barlow, STTEP provided services, including training the Nigerian soldiers (Varin, 2016). STTEP comprised a group of highly trained, experienced, and skilled soldiers who had been engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the African continent since the 1980s. Adamo (2020) argues that the initial mandate was to secure the release of the kidnapped Chibok girls. However, Barlow (2018) highlights that their mission later changed into an offensive role to prevent Boko Haram’s rapid advancement while enabling the Nigerian government to hold elections. STTEP provided the aerial capacity to supply, transport and evacuate troops and the air powers engaged in direct combat (Freeman, 2015; O’Grady and Groll, 2015). Moreover, STTEP gathered intelligence and conducted air-to-ground combat missions (Adamo, 2020).

The role of STTEP and other private securities, including Pilgrims, seemed helpful to improve counterinsurgency efforts and erstwhile demoralised military forces whose efforts were limited due to poor weaponry and a lack of investment. The intervention of STTEP and other PMSCs saw the drastic repossession of territories once held sieged by Boko Haram (Varin, 2018). Despite criticism of a heavy-handed approach, the overall outcome of PMSCs and mercenaries could arguably be construed as positive. The positive result from their use was aptly summarised by Varin (2018) as follows:

The apparent overhaul of the Nigerian armed forces is also important in terms of psychological warfare. Boko Haram has enjoyed a reputation of ruthlessness and was perceived to be better armed than the Nigerian troops – an image upheld by media reports. As a result, some soldiers have fled rather than facing such an invincible foe, undermining the population’s faith in their supposed protectors. The presence of mercenaries – with their reputed expertise in bush war and counterinsurgency and their supply of modern weaponry and air support – boosted the morale and performance of the Nigerian troops and equally played on the psychology of the militants, who were finding that the tables had turned. (pp. 151–152)

These optimistic manifestations of PMSCs during Jonathan’s administration raised an important debate as to how the public perceived mercenaries and why this counterinsurgency strategy failed to improve confidence in the government. It could be argued that Jonathan’s attitude and approach to counterterrorism already shaped public perceptions of his administration. Another argument may include civilian resistance towards the use of PMSCs, including mercenaries, which may pose a negative outlook on the strength and capabilities of Nigerian security forces. The 1999 Constitution (as amended) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in section 217, provides for the military, whose roles are to maintain the territorial integrity of the country, defend Nigeria from external aggression, suppress insurrection and defend its borders, among others (Eghoikhunu and Kayode, 2023). Hence, the Constitution and Nigerian civilians may arguably feel patriotism towards the security forces that would conjure negative outlook towards private security agencies and its use.

Even during the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and the revitalisation of the MNJTF, including the introduction of deradicalisation strategies, very little seems to have been achieved concerning gaining public confidence in the security forces. In fact, widespread kidnapping as evidenced in the over 100 Dapchi schoolgirls of 2018; the kidnapping of 279 female schoolgirls in February 2021 in Jangebe Zamfara and the kidnap of 39 students from the Federal College of Forestry Mechanisation in Mando, Kaduna state in March 2021 have tended to bring to the fore some of the shortcomings of the Nigerian security forces failure to foil such attacks. Even in 2022, the bombing of a train with almost 400 passengers enroute to Kaduna represent yet another security challenge. The increasing attacks by armed bandits across Nigeria represent yet another limitation associated with the Buhari administration and even the current administration under the leadership of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. Hence, the growing agitation for alternatives to addressing the ongoing insecurity and terrorism in the country. For example, there is an ongoing debate on the national assembly and even by states governor, including Nasir el-Rufai, the governor of Kaduna state, Nigeria’s most military fortified state with the defence academy situated there, calling for the use of mercenaries due to the failing security forces (Akinrefon, 2022).

Methods

The study is underpinned by a qualitative method, case study design and an interpretivist epistemology. The use of interpretivism allows for examining participants perspective based on the assumption that reality is subjective, socially constructed and diverse (Bryman, 2016). Case study design also allows for the in-depth examination of a single case study while also adopting a qualitative approach that helped provide rich insight into the participants’ perspectives on counterterrorism and the use of private military and security companies.

In terms of sampling, the study adopts a purposive and snowball sampling strategy to recruit 63 participants across Lagos (n = 56) and Plateau States (n = 7). Participants’ recruitment stopped following data saturation and when no new findings emerged (Braun and Clarke, 2013). The participants were between the age of 18 and 61. In terms of gender, of the 63 participants, 47 were male while 16 were females. The participants include private security representatives, heads of non-governmental organizations, clerics, self-employed citizens, and other lay public sector workers from Lagos and Plateau States in Nigeria. Widespread insecurity and terrorism are issues of concern that threaten Nigeria’s peace and security regardless of the State’s location or ethnicity. The study specifically chooses Lagos because it is cosmopolitan with diverse ethnicities from across Nigeria and religious demographics composed of Muslims, Christians and other religions. Some participants recruited in the study had firsthand experience of insecurity and terrorism, having relocated from the north due to widespread insecurity. In addition, the massive #EndSARs protest against Nigerian security forces, including the police, which climaxed in Lagos, also highlights the importance of exploring perspectives from Lagos state (Ike and Jidong, 2023a; Ike et al., 2023b, 2024). Plateau State was also chosen due to its geographical location in the Northern region. Plateau State have also experienced Boko Haram series of attacks in Jos, including bombings and the destruction of mosques, churches, and other facilities to incite chaos among religious and ethnic adherents (Higazi, 2016; Saleh et al., 2016).

Ethical approval was granted by the first author university (University of East London, United Kingdom). It is pertinent to note that this study is part of a broader study, and only data relating to this article are reported. In essence, there are other data and themes not included. In order to comply with informed consent, all participants were briefed about the study’s aims before voluntarily deciding to take part and append their signatures to the consent form. All real names have been removed and replaced with anonymised names and non-traceable job titles devoid of specific organisations or other identifiable details to conform with confidentiality for this study.

A semi-structured interview schedule was developed and used for data collection and thematic analysis. The adopted interview schedule was also informed by the review of existing literature and designed iteratively to capture the aims and objectives of the study. Open-ended and non-leading questions were asked to unveil opinions concerning the provision of private security agencies to curtail Boko Haram. Each interview lasted approximately 30 minutes, and all interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcribed interviews were inputted into NVivo version 11-QSR computer-assisted data management software, which aided data organisation, coding and subsequent categorisation into themes. Thematic analysis from a social constructionist theoretical perspective was adopted in line with the six-stage process enunciated by Braun and Clarke (2013).

A social constructionist thematic analysis allows for the identification of a shared sense of identity, social space and perceptions and identifies patterns of meaning which reflect accounts of wider social, political and historical contexts that might have influenced and informed their views. The thematic component comprised familiarisation with the dataset, complete coding of the entire data, generation of themes, definition and naming and writing up the study’s findings. As Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) stressed, the coding and development of themes were also informed and conducted by the adoption of both deductive and inductive analysis of the transcribed data. Inductive and deductive findings emerged from the analysed data. Inductive findings comprised data primarily driven by participant perceptions and defined meanings ascribed to the topic rather than specifically tailored to existing concepts and theories. The analysed data also unveiled deductive findings, which were potentially influenced by the literature review that informed the semi-structured interview guide and questions adopted.

Findings

The analysed data based on thematic analysis from a social constructionist theoretical lens yielded the following themes: lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, scepticism towards the government’s insincere politicisation of military victory, positive reinforcement of the use of private military companies devoid of identity, ‘othering’ and perceived short-term use of private military security. These themes will now be analysed in turn.

Lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces

A common pattern in the dataset was the perceived lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces. Several reasons were presented, including poor funding of the security agencies and the lack of motivation from the security forces to dispense their duties effectively. Concerning these issues, one civil servant specifically stated that

You cannot be talking about security and a police force when you cannot pay police officers as at when due. You cannot be talking about effective policing when a policeman is not earning up to Nigerian Naira ₦100,000 [equivalent to £186 Great British Pounds or $253 US Dollars] in an inflated economy of ours. If you cannot pay a policeman ₦40,000 a month, what makes you think that a policeman would not stand on the way begging for money or be distracted from his legitimate duty. Go back to the army; how many army officers do we have? Do we have enough to cope with our population? Are they literate enough to move along with the latest technological age which we are? By the time they answer all these questions, you can now see the seriousness in the act of fighting. As I am talking to you, our country is like a banana republic where nothing works! Insecurity will continue to remain a challenge as we can see with Boko Haram where, as it is, we as people have no trust in our security agencies.

The sets of questions posed by the participant emphasised a lack of confidence in the Nigerian security agencies. The identity highlighted in the participant’s extract was one of ‘negativity’, which positioned the Nigerian security forces with limited ability to combat Boko Haram effectively. This concern echoes similar findings in a systematic review concerning the reintegration of repentant Boko Haram members. Ike et al. (2022) specifically found that affected communal members expressed concern that the Nigerian security agencies had a limited ability to deliver reintegration, and this hampered communal trust in the reintegration programme.

The participants also expressed a problem with the Nigerian government. These notions blame the government for the poor performance of the security forces to render a sympathetic stance on why the forces are failing. The perceived governmental failure to address the welfare of the security forces spurs a negative reaction to the latter. As one security practitioner commented,

I doubt if it is really effective in the sense that initially, those at the warfront lack both motivation and 100 per cent motivation. There was a certain time when they were picking up [conflicting] against their own selves because there was a shortage of amenities in their camp. There was no good water, no food and no good medical aids for them as well.

The excerpt highlights the important role of ‘motivation’. The causal relationship between the security agencies to effectively defend the country and the participant’s identity is unlikely due to the perceived lack of provision of basic needs. The effect of a lack of motivation is a decline in counterterrorism efforts, which yields limited success. A possible explanation that might have informed the participants’ perception may be their experience with the security agencies and how poor munition hampers their ability to combat Boko Haram effectively. This finding resonates with previous studies, highlighting similar concerns (Omeni, 2018; Thurston, 2018).

Scepticism towards the government’s insincere politicisation of military victory

The dataset revealed a recurrent pattern that infers scepticism towards governmental policies of curbing Boko Haram. The perceived ‘defeat’ of Boko Haram by the Nigerian government was met with disbelief by a civil servant:

Since this president [Muhammadu Buhari] came in, the military has been trying their best to counter the terrorist activities in the northeast. The military has done more of propaganda than really fighting Boko Haram. They have killed two hundred. You won’t see the picture of the two hundred. They have completely eliminated Boko Haram. They have over run them in the Sambisa forest. Yet, every day you will hear of one attack or the other. So, what I am seeing in this country is more of propaganda than the real war and the real military victory of success. Either they are lying to us [or] I feel they are wasting more of their time on propaganda.

This extract reveals a sense of lack of trust and a ‘negative identity’ ascribed to the Nigerian security forces and government. Terms such as ‘propaganda’ were seen to influence the participant’s views. A potential explanation for such a view could be related to the participant’s experience with insecurity issues coupled with the media’s role. Previous literature has highlighted the media’s important role in shaping perceptions (Varin, 2018). The media representation of Boko Haram and its frequent attacks was positioned as more credible than those represented by Nigerian security forces. The agenda behind the media outlet does not necessarily resonate with the level of trust in the media but rather infers a lack of confidence and trust in the Nigerian government and its agencies. A registered nurse further reflects this postulation when she commented that

I blame the leaders of the Nigerian government. They are all lying to us. For instance, you hear one thing from the information minister and another person is saying a different thing. We want to believe our government, but they are not fair to us. They are not telling us the truth. When the government say they are sorting out things, I do not believe them because things are not getting better. They will tell us they captured a particular territory. The next minute you hear Boko Haram have killed people and some soldiers and then we saw their dead bodies drowned. Yet, they will tell us the Nigerian government has everything under control and they have captured here and there. Everything is just a cock and bull story.

The extract highlights frustration and scepticism of the government’s defeat over Boko Haram. The participant’s experience with insecurity and (mis)information from the media influenced the perceived lack of trust in the government. The implication is the alienation of the public from the government and the sense that its reporting of victory seems devoid of the perceived reality. A negative identity of ‘lying’ also represents a perceived lack of trust in the government and its waning approach to counterinsurgency. Based on the data, it appears that a modest reporting of the successes and limitations of the Nigerian counterinsurgency approach might prove helpful in winning the hearts and minds of the populace.

Positive reinforcement of the use of private military companies devoid of identity

A common pattern in the dataset was the perceived positive reinforcement and legitimisation of private military and security companies in combating Boko Haram and insecurity in Nigeria. The alleged limitations informed the positive outlook in favour of the private military companies in comparison with the approaches adopted by the Nigerian government in combating insecurity and terrorism in the country. A self-employed citizen specifically highlighted that

[T]he federal government cannot be fighting and failing to defeat one particular group. Since they [federal government] cannot defeat them [Boko Haram] whilst citizens are being killed, the government has to invite an outsider to come and help them to defeat. This is so the country will have peace because they [Boko Haram] are destroying the country. They are killing citizens. Since the army cannot defend citizens, private military security is invited to come and defend them.

Moreover, the head of a private security firm commented that

Boko Haram is an unhealthy situation with us. So many people have been killed, maimed and eh the first approach of government to Boko Haram should have been taken care of immediately they kidnapped the Chibok girls. The federal government relaxed so much, and that gave them the grounds to even expand their tentacles and cover so many local government [. . .] so I think involving private securities to help combat the group is not a bad idea. It is about the result which saves lives!

The loss of lives and the government’s inability to put a decisive end to Boko Haram’s menace were central to the insight into the use of private military companies. The participant extract also positions private military companies in a position of ‘strength’ and positive light. PMSCs are conferred with the identity of being a saviour with the capabilities to fill the void of the federal government’s perceived failure to counter Boko Haram effectively. This manifestation is significant insofar as protecting lives and property is considered important and thus needs preservation. Whether in the form of a private military company, the invitation of an external body is immaterial if curbing Boko Haram could aid the preservation of peace.

Another interesting point raised in the extract was that the participant’s identity as a ‘Nigerian’ played a limited role in influencing their view concerning using private military companies. This finding represents a shift from a social identity theoretical position. Social identity highlights a person’s sense of belonging and their membership(s) in a group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that the groups (e.g. social class and nationality) to which a person or group of people belong play an important role concerning their self-esteem and source of pride. Being part of a group gives one a sense of social identity and belonging to the social world. However, the participants’ perceptions revealed that being a proud Nigerian and the country retaining control of its security forces and territorial integrity did little to prevent their legitimisation of the use of mercenaries. The finding runs contrary to previous studies, including Percy (2007) and Varin (2018), concerning the use of private military security agencies within the context of Africa due to the negative labels attributed to them by the public. Another civil servant had no problems with the use of private military companies and presented some positive aspects of their services:

I feel private militaries, including mercenaries, will be independent from politics and any interference from the government. Even in the western world like the United States, they engage with private military to support their military in the war in Iraq and other contexts. We as a country [Nigeria] can also engage private military personnel to fight. I do not think there is an issue with engaging them alongside the Nigerian military. The best they can do is that they can both work hand in hand, sharing information and dealing head along with the problem at hand. I think that is the best thing. There should be a synergy between the Nigerian military and private military security.

The participant’s perception proffers a sense of normalisation and comparison with the approaches adopted by the United States, such as the Blackwater guards in Iraq. The perception highlights a sense of trust and perceived independence of the private military from politics and as an important body in working with the Nigerian military. However, the excerpt also reveals a lack of confidence in the ability of the Nigerian military to combat Boko Haram independently. In contrast, confidence seems bestowed on the PMSCs and mercenaries whom conventional international standards might not regulate. Such confidence appears to explain why the participant believed that the PMSCs could work in tandem with the country’s security forces.

‘Othering’ and perceived short-term use of private military security

A major theme across the dataset was the perceived sense that private military and security companies were not a long-term panacea to Nigerian insecurity. Instead, as stressed by another self-employed citizen, their role should be subject to clear terms and conditions concerning the completion of tasks and their departure upon its achievement to avoid abuse:

Since the federal government cannot tackle Boko Haram menace, there is nothing wrong with inviting outsiders to come and tackle this problem. We need peace and development because without peace, development will not come. You cannot go to the farm and you cannot drive on the highway due to the fear of armed banditry, so it is better to bring private security to come and help us. You hire people to come and fight for you but do not hire people to come and stay with you. When you give them that upper hand, you appear weak and they will take the advantage over your country. However, if you tell them to just do your work and go back to where you came from then that’s it. It depends on how you handle your security because if you take your security as your oga [boss], the security will take you as a boy [servant].

A ‘business-like’ relationship is highlighted as a feasible approach to dealing with private military security. Retaining control is essential to dealing with private securities because a shift in this relationship might have negative consequences. This finding highlights some of the fears associated with the use of mercenaries in Africa, including the perceived military takeover or unnecessary prolonging of a conflict, as seen in the Biafran civil war in Nigeria (Varin, 2018). While using a private military agency might come with some advantages, the relationship requires careful consideration to ensure boundaries are not overstepped by overstaying once duties have been accomplished.

Another notable point from the dataset can be addressed. Despite the perceived positive role ascribed to private security forces, there was a sense of ‘othering’ and an ‘us and them’ stance that asserted that mercenaries were present to merely perform their duties. In other words, private military companies are not construed as part of the country or its aftermath with the training of the country’s armed forces. This seems to reflect some of the concerns associated with the use of private military companies, including mercenaries, whom an international code of conduct might not regulate. For instance, within the context of the United Kingdom, Percy (2007) noted that one of the criticisms of using mercenaries is the perceived sense that they lack the right motives to fight against the American forces as they were not necessarily British and only fighting for monetary gain. This lack of nationalism might have influenced the participant’s manifestations of the use of private military companies as a means to an end and as one that is meant to serve a strategic goal devoid of any long-term relationship.

Discussion and implications for future studies

The purpose of our study was to explore lay participants from both the public and private sector, including private security providers perceptions of Nigeria’s government response to insecurity, and the use of private military companies to combat the Boko Haram insurgency effectively. Four major themes emerged from the dataset and were informed by thematic analysis from a social constructionist theory. This includes a lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, scepticism towards governmental insincere politicisation of military victory, positive reinforcement on the use of private military companies devoid of identity, ‘othering’ and the perceived short-term use of mercenaries. The findings of these themes will be discussed in relation to existing literature and its implication for informing policy advancement.

First, our study found that there was a perceived lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces. This postulation was mainly spurred by underfunding of the security forces, including their poor welfare. Similarly, other studies have found that poor munitions were instrumental to the poor performance of the Nigerian security forces in combatting Boko Haram effectively (Omeni, 2018; Thurston, 2018). Varin (2016) addresses the limited effort of the international community, including the United States, to endorse the purchase of the necessary weapons within which Nigeria can better contest Boko Haram. A practical implication of the findings from the participants was based on the lack of motivation within the Nigerian security forces due to poor remuneration. Low pay can result in a half-hearted response to counterterrorism strategies fighting Boko Haram, which is unproductive. Hence, the better provision of economic security for security agencies can be suggested as a policy initiative.

Second, the doubt about an alleged insincere governmental politicisation of military victory reverberated across the dataset. This implication forms distrust and further alienates the public from the Nigerian government. The findings from our study also echo previous literature. Clubb and Tapley (2018) note that the Buhari administration has declared that Boko Haram has been defeated. The disconnection between the ‘perceived reality’ as informed by the media with the reporting on a series of Boko Haram atrocities with those declared by the government and its agencies portrays an inconsistent pronouncement of government success. A further insinuation is that the public is wary of what is construed as a victory in the face of increasing strikes from the Boko Haram insurgency.

Third, our study found that there was a shift towards the positive endorsement of PMSCs. A lack of confidence in the Nigerian security forces, alongside the disruption of peace and the loss of lives and property damage, promoted the legitimisation of utilising PMSCs. This finding represents an original and significant contribution that runs contrary to previous studies. For instance, existing literature suggests that the use of PMSCs within the context of Africa is fraught with resistance by the populace, who perceive it from a negative perspective (Varin, 2018). Potential explanations for such studies are based on the historical role of private military companies negatively labelled as ‘mercenaries’. Mercenaries have been involved in attempted coups against the Seychelles and Comoros Islands governments in 1978 orchestrated by Mike Hoare, Bob Denard, and Simon Mann. Within the context of Nigeria, the use of foreign militaries during the 1967–1970 Biafra civil war involved foreign mercenaries – including a colonel, captain, major and pilot – who were employed by Biafra that allegedly protracted the conflict.

It is important to note that the participants’ identity as ‘Nigerian’ played a limited role in dissuading their perceptions of the legitimisation of mercenaries. Rather, the well-being of the citizens and peace for future developmental purposes were perceived as the most important factors. This runs contrary to the provision of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which enjoins the use of the Nigerian military for the purpose of protecting citizens and Nigerian territorial boundaries. Our findings also run contrary to Tajfel and Turner (1979) theory on social identity, which asserts that people will often conform to the in-group identity by perceiving others as an out-group. Our findings imply that identity appears lost in shaping perceptions concerning the use of PMSCs. Hence, existing policies aimed at counterterrorism to improve public trust and confidence in the Nigerian security forces can resurge positive social identity and national pride in the country’s forces to combat the Boko Haram insurgency.

Fourth, the ‘othering’ of PMSCs was a final finding of our study. Even though participants perceived that private security companies could play a key role in reducing the threat presented by Boko Haram, they do not and will not form part of the security apparatus, infrastructure or training. The participants suggest a ‘business-like’ relationship where the PMSCs perform their short-term duties by undermining Boko Haram terrorism but leave the country in the aftermath. This finding implies that PMSCs are only viewed as assistance to augment the poor state of Nigerian security, after which the services are expected to be terminated upon the achievement of the purpose for which they were hired.

Our study has made an original contribution to the existing body of literature concerning the perceived legitimisation and use of PMSCs in Nigeria to counter the Boko Haram insurgency. This study recommends the need for trust-building and improvement of public confidence in the Nigerian security forces. A more modest reporting of the success of the Nigerian government concerning its counterinsurgency against Boko Haram is also encouraged. It is partly because government reports are inconsistent with the daily reporting of Boko Haram attacks, which alienates the public and intensifies a loss of confidence in governmental security forces. These repercussions result in the perceived legitimisation of the use of mercenaries. Such a positive outlook on PMSCs appears to result in citizens’ perceived lack of pride and patriotism in their national security forces.

It is worth identifying the limitations of our study, which are related to a segment of the population and the location of data collection. This might limit the generalisability of the data and transferability to other nationwide settings or contexts. Notwithstanding this potential pitfall to the study, theoretical generalisability may be made to other case studies sharing similar scenarios of insecurity and national and private strategies to combat an insurgency. Furthermore, future studies may adopt a quantitative approach, such as a survey, to envisage differences among religious adherents in geopolitical zones that our study did not capture. Despite this limitation, our study highlights originality and rigour in the methodology by drawing on social constructionist theory and thematic analysis to provide a rich insight into participants’ perspectives on the use of private military and security companies in combating terrorism and insecurity within the context of Nigeria. The findings are significant in contributing to the literature and informing policies to improve counterterrorism in Nigeria.