Deterrence or Coercion: Analyzing DPRK’s Nuclear Intentions with Its Propaganda Texts

Abstract

Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear program has been a challenge to international security for three decades, the world still knows little about its nuclear intentions. A recently available dataset of Korean Central News Agency’s English publications (1997–2018) provides a complete coverage of DPRK’s nuclear activities in the time span. Our study employs the Louvain method of community detection in large networks to detect patterns and trends in North Korea’s nuclear rhetoric. We have two findings: Pyongyang’s primary objective is deterrence, although it also utilizes nuclear development to boost regime legitimacy. This secondary intention of legitimization is more prominent under Kim Jong-un than under Kim Jong-il, but still not as salient as deterrence. Our results suggest a policy approach of engagement and deterrence.

Keywords

DPRK nuclear proliferation intentions deterrence regime legitimization

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