This article seeks to discuss Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine and its significance for strategic stability in South Asia which is challenged by complex interactions between different players in political, military, and technological dynamics. In particular, India’s easy access to technology and the challenges for Pakistan associated with fears of low-intensity conflicts due to Indian offensive strategies have resulted in dangerous instabilities. The Indian technological advancement has inevitably brought revolutionary changes in the strategic thought process thus continuously forcing Pakistan to modify or upgrade its nuclear doctrine. We argue that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, and the changing contours of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine are within the framework of how technological advancement navigates strategic stability in the South Asian region.
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