Toward a Theory of Peace Agreement Implementation: The Case of Liberia

Abstract

The implementation of a peace agreement following a civil war is one of the most critical and uncertain processes of any post-war period. Many argue that promises of extensive power sharing arrangements in future governments and international intervention help advance the implementation of a peace process. While not doubting the importance of these factors, this paper argues that they do not sufficiently account for the incremental process of an implementation. Through an analysis of the numerous peace agreements of Liberia’s first civil war, from 1989-1996, this paper presents the theory that the implementation of a peace agreement will advance if the level of vulnerability during the implementation period is equally balanced among the faction leaders. In other words, given that the concessions offered in a peace agreement will bring some change in military, economic, or political vulnerability among the factions, the implementation process advances when the faction leaders feel mutually vulnerable. Liberia’s nearly decade-long conflict, interspersed with periods of fragile peace, provides an opportunity to observe the effects of changes in military and political vulnerability on the implementation process.