The primitive stuff of institutions is the individuals who staff them. This is seen in the plasticity of relations between leaders and followers. In this article, it is argued that excessive managerial control was a critical factor in determining the Challenger launch decision-making process. Specifically, it is shown that NASA’s Flight Readiness Review was ritualized through the aesthetic techniques of visualization, expectation, and repetition that intensified dependency relations. Aesthetic instruments as tools of power are a common but mostly unrecognized problem for organizational cooperation and communications. At NASA, a culture of conformity developed, characterized by the exaggerated centrality of the leader. Conflicts existed both between groups and within individuals, but these conflicts were suppressed. Recommendations are made for resolving these types of cultural problems.
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