Placing Some Trinitarian Locutions

Ian Ramsey , Religious Language (London: SCM Press, 1967) 90.

Ibid. 77.

I see my project as distinct from philosophers of religion like M. Durrant, Theology and Intelligibility [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973], S. Davis , Logic and the Nature oj God [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983], A.P. Martinich , "Identity and Trinity", Journal oj Religion 58 (1978) 169-181, and W. Power , "Symbolic Logic and the Doctrine of the Trinity", Iliff Review 32/1 (1975) 35-43, who translate trinitarian statements into symbolic logical form and then submit them to the scrutiny of first-order logic. Cf. my essay, "Philosophers and Theologians on the Trinity", forthcoming in Modern Theology.

Ramsey , op. cit 91.

Of course since the economic trinity "is" the immanent trinity (according to K. Rahner's axiom, in The Trinity [New York: Herder & Herder, 1970] 22), in the process of speaking of God's relations to us ad extra we are referring also to God's being as such (ad intra). But trinitarian theology is not simply a speculation on God's being considered apart from the economy of salvation.

D. Burrell , Analogy and Philosophical Language (Yale University Press , 1963) 196. 7. Cf. W. Pannenberg , "Analogy and Doxology" in Basic Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970) 212-238, and E. Jüngel , God as the Mystery of the World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans , 1983).

Burrell , op. cit 226.

Ibid. 199.

P. Ricoeur , "Existence and Hermeneutics" in C. E. Reagan and D. Stewart. eds.. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978) 98. See also Ricoeur , Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning ( Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976) 54f., and The Symbolism of Evil, trans. by E. Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press , 1978).

Ricoeur , Interpretation Theory, 57.

Ibid. 55.

R. Scharlemann , The Being of God (New York : Seabury Press, 1981) 80.

Ibid. 84. The main symbol of God's being in Scharlemann's book is reflexivity: thinking about the thinking of being. "The connection between (the thinking-being) process itself and the being of God is the connection between a symbol and the referent of the symbol ... If the thinking-being process is a symbol of the being of God, then it shows what it means for God to be God. It is, as such, other than God. What it means to be God (the one in the many) is to be able to relate oneself to one's other. But to be God is to be other than the process of relating oneself to one's other, which is the being of thinking." (ibid. 88). This view has a corollary in Burrell's proposal that "analogous expressions are set apart as a group of terms that play a role within a language as well as make reference to that language's functioning" (Burrell, op. cit. 263).

In addition to reflexivity Scharlemann develops "negating" as a symbol of God. To say "God is God means he is not this-thing-here or any other thing or person or idea; the being of God is shown by our power to negate anything and everything" (ibid. 90). 16. Ricoeur attempts to clarify the nature of symbolic reference through metaphor theory. He says: "the concept "symbol" brings together two dimensions, we might even say, two universes of discourse, one linguistic and the other of a non-linguistic order. The linguistic character of symbols is attested to by the fact that it is indeed possible to construct a semantics of symbols, i.e., a theory that would account for their structure in terms of meaning or signification ... (since) a symbol always refers its linguistic element to something else" (Interpretation Theory 54). Thus is begun the enterprise of the "archaeology" of symbols in their rootedness in the cosmos. Ricoeur continues: "Metaphor occurs in the already purified universe of the logos, while the symbol hesitates on the dividing line between bios and logos' (ibid. 59).

See R. Funk , Language, Hermeneutlc and Word of God. The Problem of Language in the New Testament and Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); S. McFague , Metaphorical Theology ( Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982 ); I. Barbour , Myths, Afodels and Paradigms ( New York: Harper & Row, 1974 ); M. Black , Afodels and Metaphors ( Cornell Univ. Press, 1962).

Black argues against this "substitution" view of metaphor, according to which metaphor is seen as a species of catachresis, as a plug for the gap in literal language. He notes that such a view leaves quite unexplained why anyone would employ catachresis if a literal expression will do better. If metaphor serves a genuine need (because adequate literal usage is lacking), "the new sense introduced will quickly become part of the literal sense ... Osculating curves do not kiss for long, and quickly revert to a more prosaic mathematical contact ... It is the fate of catachresis to disappear when it is successful" (Black, op. cit. 33f.). See also Ricoeur , "Biblical Hermeneutics", Semeia 4 (1975) 85 ff.

Black terms this the "comparison" view of metaphor, op. clt. 35 ff. See also Ricoeur , The Rule of Metaphor, trans. by R. Czerny (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1977) 239 ff.

Ibid. 40ff. This is called the "interaction" view of metaphor; see also Black's seven axioms governing this view, p. 44. Philosophical terms (being; accident; form; et at.) fit under this type, as do many theological terms (person; relation; substance as predicated of God; et al.). See also Burrell, op. cit., chap. 4.

Ibid. 46.

McFague, op. cit. l3ff. Ricoeur discusses the inadequacy of interpretation "that gives in to ontological naivete in the evaluation of metaphorical truth because it ignores the implicit 'is not'," as well as the inverse interpretation that "under the critical pressure of the 'is not', loses the 'is' by reducing it to the 'as-if of a reflective judgment" — in The Rule oJ Afetaphor 247ff.

Black , op. cit 142.; also Barbour , op. cit 14.

Ibid. 45.

R. Funk contrasts them this way: the logic of predication is narrowing, restricting; it identifies an "attribute" and handles it by abstraction. "Discursive speech reduces the intentionality of language as near to explicit reference as possible"; this logic arrests the phenomenon and makes it timeless. The logic of metaphor, in contrast, resists reduction and specificity. What it says is minimal, what it intends, maximal. It concentrates a "world" in this narrative; it is open-ended temporally, it uses tensive language; it lets the audience see in its own way. Op. cit. 142ff.

McFague , op. cit.: this is the project of her book.

A. Jülicher , Die Gleichnisreden Jesu, 2 vols. ( TObingen: Mohr; vol. I, 2nd ed., 1899 [ 1 st ed., 1886]; vol. II, 2nd ed., 1910 [1st ed., 18991). See the discussion of Jülicher in M. Boucher , The Mysterious Parable. A Literary Study. The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Mono graph Series No. 6 ( Washington, D.C., 1977).

C.H. Dodd , The Parables of the Kingdom (New York: Scribner's, 1961).

Ibid. 5. See also J. Donahue , "Jesus as the Parable of God in the Gospel of Mark", Interpretation 33 ( 1978) 369-386.

J. Jeremias , The Parables of Jesus ( New York: Scribner's, 1963) 12, also 19-23.

Ibid. 227-229. See also Donahue , op. cit 382.

Funk , op. cit 149f., also 236ff.

Ibid. 152.

L. Keck. A Future for the Historical Jesus: The Place of Jesus in Preaching and Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981) 244. McFague draws out some of the implications of this; for her, a parabolic Christology and a metaphorical theology do "not involve acceptance of a canon or the Bible as 'the Word of God'." Op. cit. 18ff., 54-66.

Keck , op. cit 246.

Ibid. 245.

See Donahue , op. cit 379, also D.O. Via , The Parables. Their Literary and Existential Dimension ( Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967 ); M.A. Tolbert , Perspectives on the Parables ( Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979 ); A. Wilder , Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel, rev. ed. (Harvard Univ. Press, 1971); J.D. Crossan , In Parables: The Challenge of the Historical Jesus (New York: Harper & Row , 1973); N. Perrin , Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976); S. TeSelle , Speaking in Parables (Philadelphia : Fortress Press , 1975).

Scharlemann , op. cit. 48f.

Ramsey , op. cit 166.

Cf. R. Ruether , Sexism and God-Talk (Boston : Beacon Press, 1983); P. Wilson-Kastner , Faith, Feminism and the Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983): P. Trible. God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978); God as Father?, Concilium, Vol. 143, ed. by J. Metz and E. Schillebeeckx (New York: Seabury, 1981). 41. It is true that in antiquity, especially in Greek theology, "Father" is used as the name of God. But it is not always clear whether this title refers to God in the sense of "God the Father of Jesus Christ", or God in the sense of "the first hypostasis".

Cf. Reuther , op. cit, especially chap. 2.

Abba is used only twice besides the Markan reference, in Rom. 8:15 and Gal. 4:6; in both Pauline texts we become sons and daughters in Christ. The burgeoning use of pater (used in Mk 4 times, 15 in Lk, 42 in Mt, 109 in Jn) displays the theological use which was made of what surely must be regarded as Jesus' characteristic address to God.

Jeremias points out that Mt 23:9 ought to be explained in terms of its jewish meaning, which he interprets as "an oriental periphrasis for a mutual relationship." Thus we might take the phrase "God is the Father" to mean, "God is the one who is related to Jesus the way a Jewish Abba is related to a Jewish son."

There are theologians who incorporate the feminine into God by making the Holy Spirit feminine. For example, D. Gelpi , The Divine Mother: A Trinitarian Theology of the Holy Spirit (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1984); J. Schaup . Woman: Image of the Holy Spirit ( Denville, New Jersey, 1975). But a two-thirds male trinity is not a real theological solution.

I am in disagreement with R. Jenson when he writes: "Within the metaphysical tradition the notion of a subsistent relation — that is, of a relation that can be and do things — is of course sheer nonsense. The scholastics laboured mightily to mitigate the offence of the notion to what they accepted as natural truth, producing ever more refined distinctions and analyses ... the trinitarian doctrine identifies the substantiality of the related terms with the internality of the relations between them: there is, for example, the Father only because 'Father' and 'begets' are inseparable. Even the classification of the personal properties to which the scholastics are driven — that they are both 'relative' and yet 'eternal and immutable' — is a defiance of all Hellenic common sense" (The Triune Identity Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982], p. 123). In my view the doctrine of subsistent relations is a consequence of upholding Rahner's axiom that the economic trinity is the immanent trinity.

Ricoeur , The Rule of Metaphor 297.

Idem , " Biblical Hermeneutics" 35.

McFague. op. cit 67, 103; Black , op. cit 236; Ricoeur. The Rule of Metaphor 239ff.

F. Ferre , "Mapping the Logic of Models in Science and Theology" in D. M. High , ed., New Essays on Religious Language (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969) 75.

Cf. Barbour , op. cit 29f.; Black , op. cit 219ff.

Black , op. cit 229.

Ferré , op. cit Also R. Scharlemann , "Theological Models and Their Construction ", Journal of Religion ( 1973) 66.

McFague , op. cit 95.

Ibid. 84.

Black , op. cit 238.

McFague. op. cit 104.

Barbour (op. cit. 155ff.) proposes four fundamental types of models of God: monarchial (king and kingdom); deistic (clockmaker and clock); dialogic (one person and another person); agent (agent and his actions). These models make the point that we know God always pro nobis. See also his Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Prentice. Hall, 1966).

The example is Ferre's. See also Scharlemann , "Theological Models" 65-82.

In "Theological Models" 81. He also sees models as an alternative to biblicistic theology ("which always seems to end either in an authoritarian theology or in a tolerant nontheology") and to theology reduced to religious thought ("which runs the risk of ignoring secular consciousness in the same way that uncritical metaphysics might try to ignore historical consciousness').