Regional Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: A Case of CANWFZ Treaty

Abstract

Nuclear weapons are highly potent and devastating instruments found in the military stockpiles of contemporary nations. The immense magnitude and pace of devastation that nuclear weapons may cause, coupled with the relative ease with which governments can acquire these offensive capabilities and the inability to effectively defend against a nuclear assault, render nuclear weapons highly valuable. Against this true but bitter reality of the present world order, the author posits that creating nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) on a regional scale can serve as a beacon of hope and a significant catalyst in the global effort to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. To further analyse this idea, the author explores NWFZ and their relevance to regional denuclearization by focusing on the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone (CANWFZ) treaty. The article is divided into four sections. The first section includes a review of contemporary literature about disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The second section examines the development of the CANWFZ and its commitment to the objectives of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The third section involves assessing the barriers to this regional cooperation that impede its full implementation. Section four explores the potential reformative strategies that can improve the effectiveness of CANWFZ and elevate it to a model for other regional groupings in achieving a nuclear-free world.

Keywords

Central Asian nuclear weapons free zone disarmament non-proliferation regional cooperation participatory framework

Introduction

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation have been a prominent subject of academic discussion and a fundamental aspect of nuclear governance since its inception. Both concepts are closely interconnected; disarmament is impossible without confidence in non-proliferation, and undermining the non-proliferation regime serves no one’s interests. The primary goal of non-proliferation is to hinder states from acquiring nuclear weapons, while disarmament refers to a state voluntarily giving up its existing nuclear weapons and the associated military nuclear programme (Carlson, 2019, p. 97). Indeed, the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the attainability of worldwide nuclear disarmament. Developed to win World War II, the atomic bomb quickly became a weapon of mass destruction. With the ability to cause far more damage than conventional explosives, nuclear bombs changed the nature of warfare and seemingly gave man the capability to destroy himself. Due to this destructive potential, disarmament treaties both at the global and regional level became an increasingly important means of preventing the development and proliferation of nuclear bombs.

The concepts of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were presented at the dawn of the nuclear era. Agreeing on a standard, all-inclusive definition of these concepts is challenging. This section brings forth different perspectives that fall within the scope of these notions.

Nuclear disarmament, in essence, refers to the deliberate reduction or elimination of specific or all types of weapons to put an end to the competition in the production and possession of arms. An alternative interpretation of disarmament, stating that it reflects the power dynamics between nations, similar to the arms race, was presented by Morgenthau (1965, p. 375). He claims that the escalation of armaments worsens the political situation by instilling fear and imposing burdens, whereas disarmament enhances the political situation by reducing political tensions. Disarmament thus entails the voluntary adoption of agreements aimed at reducing the means and tools used in warfare. Morgenthau’s definition is rooted in the fundamental principles of classical disarmament theory, which posits that war is the central issue in international affairs and that it is an unjust and uncivilized means of pursuing policy objectives. To completely eradicate war, it is imperative to destroy the weapons that are employed in its execution (Sheehan, 1983, p. 186). Another lucid explanation of the concept was laid down by Harrington (2001, p. 579), who defined nuclear disarmament as a mutual agreement among parties to: first, actively decrease the number of delivery systems and warheads; second, establish international verification procedures; third, strive for the reduction or prohibition of fissile material; fourth, eliminate stockpiles of materials that can be used for proliferation; and fifth, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The origin of nuclear disarmament movements during the Cold War period has been traced by Wittner (2015, p. 636) in his work, ‘Nuclear Disarmament Movements’. Wittner argues that public awareness of nuclear weapons was first acquired after the US atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945. The bombing revealed the immense danger nuclear weapons posed to the survival of world civilization. But this nuclear disarmament campaign soon faded from visibility in the early 1950s, and it was not until the development of the H-bomb in the late 1950s that the second wave began to resurface. This second round of nuclear weapons protests also faded after the early 1960s, but in the late 1970s, a new and stronger uprising erupted, which lasted until the mid-1980s. But, in the late 1980s, the mass movement again declined. Since then, hundreds of organizations have advocated for nuclear disarmament in the post-Cold War period. Nevertheless, despite this vocalism, three key challenges remain. The first and most important challenge is verification. Currently, there is no established standard to accurately assess the level of uncertainty associated with verification. Moreover, what may be considered an unacceptable level of uncertainty in one situation may be deemed acceptable in another. The second challenge lies in the complex task of dismantling nuclear weapons while ensuring modern safety and security standards are met. This is a difficult process that requires careful attention to detail. The third challenge involves the search for concealed nuclear warheads or materials that are not included in a state’s declared stockpiles. This requires thorough investigation and monitoring beyond what is officially reported (Ford, 2010, pp. 4–9).

In this background, achieving a consensus on nuclear disarmament is contingent upon the collaborative efforts of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), focusing on three key characteristics. The first step is to implement a verification process to ensure that weapons have been reduced and dismantled. As a second step, a system of enforcement should be established to ensure the implementation of cuts and to deal with non-compliance. Lastly, there must be a secure and stable environment that allows countries to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This can be achieved through the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ) (Billiard & Wing, 2010, p. 14). Further, several alternative policy choices can be pursued to expedite nuclear disarmament, including unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral actions. Some of these measures include: first, utilizing the existing disarmament efforts within the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the Conference on Disarmament Forum, and the establishment of NWFZ within regions; second, reducing the significance of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; third, implementing a moratorium on the modernization of nuclear weapons; fourth, implementation of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) to proscribe the manufacturing of fissile materials; and finally, increasing transparency by mandating that nuclear-weapon states (NWS) disclose their fissile material stockpiles, policies, and nuclear weapons inventories to the public (Meer, 2016, pp. 3–9).

Nuclear proliferation, on the other hand, refers to a situation where a state initiates a project that has the potential to produce functional nuclear weapons. It also refers to the scenario in which a state obtains weapons produced by another state. In the present scenario, states are considered ‘proliferant’ if they possess a military nuclear programme but are not signatories to the Treaty on the NPT or if they are signatories to the treaty but are classified as non-nuclear states (Tertrais et al., 2003, p. 37). Comprehending the psychological factors driving nuclear proliferation and its contagious nature is straightforward: While nuclear weapon nations persist in seeing greater security with their possession, other non-nuclear states are likely to seek membership in the nuclear club. Proliferation begets proliferation. Whenever a state acquires nuclear weapons to counterbalance its primary adversary, it simultaneously poses a nuclear threat to another state in the area. Consequently, the latter state is compelled to commence its own nuclear weapons programme to safeguard its national security. From this viewpoint, the history of nuclear proliferation can be seen as a strategic cascade of events (Shultz, 1984, p. 18).

Initiations on both a global and regional scale established the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the late 1950s. These efforts led to the creation of a global system centred around the NPT and the development of regional frameworks known as NWFZ. One of these zones, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was established before the NPT (Epstein, 2001, p. 155). NWFZ are regional pacts established by numerous countries to declare specific areas in the world as free from nuclear weapons. Since the NPT does not require the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a country’s borders, it also does not explicitly prohibit NWS from placing nuclear weapons on the territory of NNWS. NWFZ, on the other hand, goes beyond the NPT’s provisions by effectively removing nuclear weapons from an entire region (Müller et al., 2016, p. 7).

In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 1975) passed Resolution 3472, which urged a comprehensive review of the topic of nuclear-weapon-free zones from all perspectives and defined a NWFZ as

any zone, recognised as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of states, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by a treaty or convention whereby first, the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined, and second, an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute. (UNGA Resolution 3472).

The genesis of the NWFZ concept and strategy took place in 1957, during the early stages of the Cold War. In response to the nuclearization of West Germany and the possibility of Soviet nuclear weapons being stationed in Poland, the Polish government introduced a proposal called the Rapacki Plan, named after the Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki. The plan aimed to establish a NWFZ in Central Europe (Goldblat, 1997, p. 18). The zone was intended to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. However, the UK and the USA rejected this proposal (despite its positive reception by Belgium, Canada, Norway, and Sweden) primarily because they believed that nuclear weapons should be stationed in Central Europe as a deterrent against the larger conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact stationed in that area (UNIDIR, 2011, p. 4).

Despite being rejected, Rapacki’s innovative concept showcased its relevance to several domains and garnered support in other international forums, particularly within the United Nations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the nuclear arms race of the Cold War became more intense, more ideas for NWFZ were put forward for various locations, such as Africa, East Asia, and Europe. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which was the first NWFZ, became effective in 1969 and encompassed Latin America and the Caribbean. Subsequently, four additional NWFZ have been established through negotiation and have become legally binding: ‘the Treaty of Rarotonga (1986, encompassing the South Pacific, Australia, and New Zealand), the Treaty of Bangkok (1997, covering Southeast Asia), the Treaty of Pelindaba (2009, about Africa), and the Treaty on a NWFZ in Central Asia (2009)’ (Goldblat, 1997, p. 18). Additional accords addressing the denuclearization of specific regions include ‘the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Agreement, and the Seabed Treaty’. Article VII of the NPT additionally confirmed the entitlement of nations to create NWFZ inside their boundaries.

In brief, NWFZ aims to attain the following common attributes: First, to avert the emergence of new states or the advancement of their capabilities in the field of nuclear armament inside their respective regions, measures should be taken to prohibit the production, testing, usage, or any other means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Second, the objective is to prevent the presence of nuclear weapons within the designated area (or, in certain instances, to grant governments the authority to make independent determinations regarding the transit of nuclear materials via their territory). Third, the objective is to deter NWS from employing or posing a threat of using nuclear weapons against nations within the specified area. Fourth, the aim is to obligate the parties to refrain from engaging in or endorsing, either directly or indirectly, the experimentation, use, construction, manufacturing, possession, or regulation of any nuclear weapons, or to partake in such activities in any manner. Fifth, it is required that the parties engaged are explicitly prohibited from acquiring, retaining, implementing, deploying, or owning any nuclear weapons, whether through direct or indirect channels, as instructed by external entities, or by any alternative approach. Sixth, it is recommended that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conduct thorough inspections of all nuclear sites in the vicinity. Additionally, the assurances made by the NWS about non-aggression should be reinforced by adhering to the regulations outlined in the NWFZ treaty (Billiard & Wing, 2010, p. 24).

Amidst the challenges and obstacles faced by broader negotiations on weapons control and disarmament, the NWFZ strategy emerges as a notable achievement. This method has proven to be effective not only throughout the Cold War (1945–1989) but also in the intricate politics and conflicts of the post-Cold War era. The CANWFZ Treaty, which was opened for signing on 8 September 2006, and entered into force on 21 March 2009, is a significant development in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

CANWFZ

From a historical perspective, the concept of CANWFZ emerged in 1992, when Mongolia proclaimed itself a NWFZ. Uzbek President Islam Karimov presented the initial formal proposal for CANWFZ in 1993 during the 48th session of the UNGA. However, the crucial event took place on 27 February 1997, when the presidents of the five Central Asian Republics (CARs) issued the Almaty Declaration, officially approving the establishment of a CANWFZ. Representatives from all five countries successfully negotiated and agreed upon the exact wording of the CANWFZ treaty during a meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, held from 25 September 2002 to 27 September 2002 (Inventory of International Non-Proliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2009, p. 335). Consensus was reached following 5 years of negotiations that commenced in 1997.

The five CARs ratified the CANWFZ on 8 September 2006, in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, thus earning the treaty the informal title of ‘Semipalatinsk Treaty’. Russia and China expressed their approval of the treaty, while the United States, Great Britain, and France rejected it. The opposition was based on the provision in Article 12 of CANWFZ, which stated that the signatories’ rights and obligations under previous international accords would not be impacted. The P-3 (US, Great Britain, and France) further expressed specific concerns about Russia’s potential ability to transport nuclear weapons across Central Asia or station them in the region in the years ahead, as delineated in the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty (CST) (Ibragimova, 2015). Washington strongly advocated for the removal of Article 12, a decision that Russia and the Central Asian governments found unacceptable. However, Moscow considered it essential to preserve its influence in the region, while the Central Asian republics insisted on keeping Article 12 to ensure their ability to seek assistance from Moscow, either through the CSTO or through bilateral channels, in case of a major security threat. Despite the P-3’s objections, ‘the UNGA First Committee approved draft resolution A/C.1/61/L.54/Rev.1 on 30 October 2006, regarding the creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia’ (UNGA Resolution, 2006, p. 158).

Kyrgyzstan was the first country to submit the instrument of ratification for the CANWFZ on 22 March 2007. Following this were Uzbekistan in 2007, Turkmenistan in 2008, Tajikistan in 2008, and Kazakhstan in 2009. The CANWFZ came into operation on 21 March 2009, as specified in Article 15 of the treaty. This article states that the pact will become effective 30 days after the fifth instrument of ratification is deposited and that it will remain in force indefinitely. Under Article 10 of the treaty, the state parties agreed to convene yearly meetings to monitor and assess compliance and implementation. The inaugural consultative meeting occurred in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, within 2 months following the implementation of the treaty (NTI CANWFZ Report n.d.). The CANWFZ encompasses the terrestrial area as well as all bodies of water (including harbours, lakes, rivers, and streams) and the airspace that falls under the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Caspian Sea, despite its location in the Central Asian region, has not been incorporated into the NWFZ because only two out of the five countries bordering the sea (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) fall within the jurisdiction of the zone.

The CANWFZ Treaty fulfils all the conditions set by the United Nations for endorsing any suggested NWFZ. It encompasses the following fundamental provisions: first, it prohibits any activities related to nuclear explosive devices within the designated zone. Second, it permits the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as long as it is subject to enhanced safeguards by the IAEA. Third, it mandates parties to adhere to international security standards for nuclear facilities, aiming to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in the region. Fourth, it requires signatories to fully comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear test explosions. The fifth includes an environmental aspect that specifically deals with issues specific to the Central Asian region. Each of the five states currently house outdated Soviet nuclear weapons infrastructure and has experienced similar difficulties in cleaning up the environment and repairing damage resulting from the development and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons (IAEA Report, 2009).

Akin to earlier treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the CANWFZ treaty includes a protocol that is available for signature by the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. On 6 May 2014, all five states signed the Protocol in New York. Russia, Great Britain, and France, who initially endorsed the concept of a nuclear-free zone for Central Asia in 1997, did not demand any modifications while approving the CANWFZ Treaty Protocol. Nevertheless, during the third session of the NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee in May 2014, these three countries issued interpretative declarations to eliminate any uncertainty. Russia stated that it would withdraw from the deal if there is a military assault on its territory or that of its allies or if ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons enter the ports and airports of Central Asian republics. The concerns raised by Great Britain and France also indicated that they expect strict adherence to Articles 3 and 4 of the CANWFZ Treaty, which prohibits Central Asian countries from engaging in the development, production, and storage of nuclear weapons. However, they also emphasized that Article 12, which states that the treaty should not affect the rights and obligations of the republics under other agreements, should not be used as a justification for deploying Russian nuclear missiles under the Collective Security Treaty (CST). Beijing opted to join the deal unconditionally to emphasize its endorsement of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia (Ibragimova, 2015). On 17 November 2014, France became the first P-5 country to formally approve the treaty, with the United Kingdom following on 30 January 2015, Russia on 22 June 2015, and China on 17 August 2015.

The CANWFZ Treaty Stands Out for Several Reasons

First, it was the first non-nuclear region in the Northern Hemisphere to be used as a site for the active deployment and experimentation of nuclear armaments. CANWFZ was also the first treaty to incorporate provisions for compensation for harm from previous nuclear tests and uranium tailings dumps, which contain toxic by-products of uranium mining and are a major issue for almost all countries in the region. Furthermore, the treaty explicitly forbids the disposal of radioactive material originating from foreign states within the territory of a state that has signed the pact. The only other NWFZ treaty that prohibits the disposal of radioactive materials at sea is the Rarotonga Treaty, which also addresses environmental security. Moreover, it is mandatory for all parties involved to affix their signatures to the IAEA Additional Protocol and adhere strictly to the NPT for the first eighteen months following the treaty’s entry into force (Ibragimova, 2015). Second, CANWFZ functions as a nuclear-free zone transitioning between two nuclear-armed states—Russia and China—and two others—India and Pakistan—are not acknowledged by the NPT. Also, the Protocol on Negative Guarantees, which the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia all support, is a significant component of the Semipalatinsk Treaty. All of the five nuclear nations, excluding the United States, have ratified the Protocol as of right now.

Third, the parties involved in the Semipalatinsk Treaty also play a crucial role in enhancing the control system that ensures compliance with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To mitigate the risk of this energy being misappropriated for the fabrication of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, signatory nations are obligated to adhere to rigorous nuclear safeguards that are supervised by the IAEA. All non-nuclear-weapon nations that are parties to the NPT have safeguards in place for their nuclear operations. Further, the governments of the CANWFZ have also committed to joining the Additional Protocol, which enhances these safeguards. Providing nuclear material or equipment to countries that do not possess nuclear weapons and refuse to sign the Additional Protocol is prohibited. However, providing such materials or equipment to countries that possess nuclear weapons are not prohibited (Goldblat, 2006, p. 28). Fourth, another notable feature of the Semipalatinsk Treaty is its unique provision that directly deals with the issue of land transit. This provision gives parties the authority to decide whether or not to allow transit rights. For the treaty, ‘stationing’ is defined as including implantation, emplacement, stockpile, storage, installation, and deployment. The performance of nuclear test detonation by non-combatant states within a location that falls within the parties’ jurisdiction or control is also strictly prohibited. The majority of the remaining obligations are consistent with those that were previously agreed upon under the NPT. These obligations state that no nation may acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices, nor may it seek to do so (Müller et al. 2016).

Fifth, to further strengthen the prospects of the CANWFZ treaty, the IAEA inaugurated the only Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank in the world at Oskemen, Kazakhstan, on 29 August 2017 (IAEA, 2019). It commenced operations in 2019. The bank functions as a physical reserve of LEU for IAEA Member States that qualify, in case the delivery of LEU to a nuclear power plant is disrupted due to exceptional circumstances that hinder the procurement of fuel from the commercial market or any other supply agreement.

Issues to be Resolved

While the establishment of the CANWFZ is undeniably a step in the right direction towards ensuring that regional denuclearization measures remain an integral part of global non-proliferation strategies, the treaty itself still contains formidable issues that remain unresolved and thus impede its effective implementation. First, in contrast to other NWFZ treaties, the Semipalatinsk Treaty does not establish a mechanism to safeguard Central Asia’s denuclearization status, nor does it utilize any pre-existing regional cooperation institutions or mechanisms that could function as a secretariat for CANWFZ administrative affairs. The depositary state, Kyrgyzstan, assumes responsibility for all communications about consultative meetings (UNIDR Report of 2007). The second significant concern is that Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan continue to confront severe ecological issues associated with uranium tailing dumps that contain buried radioactive, poisonous, and non-recyclable waste. These dumps are a lasting consequence of uranium mining during the Soviet era. Although the CANWFZ Treaty acknowledges the nation’s commitment to restoring polluted areas, a viable resolution has not yet been discovered. In the event of an environmental disaster related to these tailings, especially in locations that cross borders, it has the potential to impact the well-being, economic, and natural surroundings of the entire region (NTI Report, 2009).

The third concern pertains to the potential security risks that these sites may pose. Terrorism, domestic instability, and organized crime jeopardize the security and integrity of nuclear installations in Central Asia. A multitude of secessionist disputes exacerbate the fragility of the nation, foster corruption, and pose difficulties in effectively securing borders. Foremost among these are terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq, and al-Sham. Terrorist groups may take advantage of weaknesses in physical security measures and leverage illicit trafficking networks to clandestinely transport radioactive items (NTI and CENESS Report, 2018). The fourth significant challenge is the region’s growing susceptibility to the illicit trafficking of nuclear fissile material, which presents a potential menace to global security. Central Asia is strategically located as a transit route for countries with poorly protected fissile material, particularly those in the former Soviet Union, and those seeking it, such as groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Syria. In 2015, there were media allegations of Moldovan criminal organizations that tried to illegally transport radioactive substances to Daesh (commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). From January to June 2016, three instances occurred in Georgia where groups made attempts to smuggle radioactive substances, specifically Caesium 137, Uranium 235, and Uranium 238, with the presumed destination being Turkey (Henderson, 2017).

The fifth matter that requires resolution pertains to the provision of negative security assurances by NWS to the parties within the zone. The protocols for the NWS attached to the treaties contain guarantees, but not all of these protocols have received official NWS approval. The delayed approval by the NWS of the protocols demonstrate the intricate nature of this issue. However, it seems that achieving legally enforceable negative security assurances at a regional level is more feasible than at a global level (Müller et al., 2016, p. 8).

Addressing Concerns

Addressing the aforementioned problems is crucial for ensuring a successful implementation of the CANWFZ treaty. This necessitates consistent coordination through frequent regional dialogues with all relevant parties. Further, the need for the hour is an interactive framework to address various issues, such as establishing an effective regional organization for negotiating cooperative security arrangements, overcoming challenges in obtaining negative security guarantees from NWS, strengthening regional counter-terrorism structures to mitigate transnational terrorism threats that affect the security of nuclear sites, and enhance national and regional capacity to prevent and intercept illicit trafficking of radioactive sources. Thus, to establish CANWFZ as a paradigm for other regional blocs endeavouring to achieve a nuclear-free world, the subsequent reforms ought to be executed.

First, to address the issue of nuclear contraband and proliferation in the region in an efficient manner, all CARs must reassert their commitment and collaborate. Initially, all Central Asian republics must become signatories of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention on Nuclear Safety, as presently only Kazakhstan is a party to the agreement. Furthermore, it is important to promote and encourage the reporting of nuclear material seizures or losses to the Incident and Trafficking Database of the IAEA (Henderson, 2017). Second, it is recommended that the 2016 agreement between the IAEA and the Regional Education and Training Network in Nuclear Technology, commonly referred to as STAR-NET, which comprises 13 prestigious universities from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, be expanded to include Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, as well. The primary aim of the network is to facilitate the dissemination, administration, and conservation of nuclear knowledge while also striving to ensure its inclusiveness (IAEA Report, 2016).

Third, all CARs should sign the 2016 Europe and Central Asia Safety (EuCAS) network agreement, which sets forth IAEA Safety Standards to strengthen the regional nuclear and radiation safety infrastructure. The safety guidelines include, first, the exchange of information, expertise, and optimal practices; second, the coordination and advancement of initiatives, including capacity building; and third, collaboration on matters of particular significance and the development of shared comprehension. Currently, the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Network (GNSSN) has only admitted Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. To promote a more cohesive and improved nuclear safety culture, it is advisable for Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the remaining three states in Central Asia, to join this framework. This will assist in the implementation of future initiatives. Fourth, the Central Asian Region must prioritize the efficient execution and adherence to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The resolution mandates that all member states of the United Nations must create and implement suitable legal and regulatory measures to combat the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, as well as their methods of transportation. Its primary objective is to prevent the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction to non-state entities. The implementation of threat reduction and security assistance programmes by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 will be crucial in preventing the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, it is recommended to incorporate a proactive initiative for border management support into the current programmes focused on site and material security (UN Resolution, 1540).

Fifth, to ensure the effective execution of the CANWFZ treaty, it is advantageous to encourage the participation of regional organizations affiliated with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), such as the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS). Facilitating an array of counterterrorism endeavours in the region, the SCO is instrumental in this regard through its participation in conferences, seminars, and the sharing of best practices. Moreover, it aids in the development of consensuses and collective policies about counter-terrorism tactics (Rehman & Qazi, 2019). Sixth, to further strengthen the ongoing communication among relevant stakeholders in the region, including regulatory, customs, border security, and energy authorities, as well as international partners, to ensure the security of radioactive sources in Central Asia, the NTI-CENESS Report (2018) recommends the following precautionary measures: First, complete the necessary legal and regulatory paperwork about the safeguarding of radioactive sources during their use, storage, and transportation. Second, monitor the movement of these sources throughout their entire lifespan and keep the national source-tracking registries up-to-date. Report events related to unregulated radioactive sources to the IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database and INTERPOL’s Project Geiger Database. Third, it is crucial to create mutually agreed-upon agreements with surrounding or originating countries to facilitate the return of unused radioactive sources or radioactive sources in transit. Fourth, it is imperative to develop a comprehensive national policy for the management of unused, sealed radioactive sources.

In brief, the aforementioned reforms, in addition to subsequent initiatives such as incorporating regional studies on the economic, climatic, and human consequences of nuclear war, endorsing NWS for negative security assurances, and adopting a new United Nations Experts’ Study on NWFZ, has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in Central Asia.

Conclusion

Considering the above arguments, it is reasonable to conclude that the CANWFZ treaty serves as a compelling case study of a successful NWFZ, representing a significant accomplishment in a region that has traditionally lacked collaboration about global peace, security, and environmental preservation. If the NPT were to decline, the verification methods outlined in the NWFZ treaties would still be in effect, thus maintaining a crucial aspect of regional confidence-building and security. Thus, it can be asserted that the establishment of NWFZ, such as the CANWFZ treaty can be regarded as a series of micro steps that, when implemented within a citizen participatory framework, can effectively generate tangible outcomes and serve as a significant catalyst in the global effort to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Aashriti Gautam

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