Scholars of Israeli politics have overestimated the role of the Israeli military generals in shaping Israel’s security policy and the peace process with the Palestinian Authority (PA). They also underestimated the role of the Knesset in the process. This article claims that not only the Knesset has a final say in ratifying any peace agreement with the PA but the Knesset has become a hindrance to peace. The structure of Israeli democratic system, that is, the proportional representation (PR) system, has boosted the power of small parties beyond their relative size, while the party primaries bestowed autonomy on the party candidates from their party leadership. Under these circumstances, the Israeli government has become a weak actor, where a small party could break down the governing coalition and topple the government. The article claims that the weak Israeli government operates within a strong State, both domestically vis-à-vis society and internationally. While the State security institutions are able to enforce the rule of law and dissolve settlements for the sake of peace, the government cannot guarantee that the legislative branch could approve such a decision.
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