Abstract
Between November 2002 and December 2003 various Palestinian factions initiated the Cairo dialogue that was aimed at offering a limited and conditional ceasefire vis-à-vis Israel. Despite three rounds of talks, the exercise proved unsuccessful. Fatah and Hamas, the principal players, entered the process with deep misgivings about each other’s motives. Each side aspired to secure substantial concessions from the other. As both sides viewed the entire exercise in zero-sum-terms, even marginal concessions from one side would have meant substantial gains for the other. The differences between the two sides were unbridgeable. Despite the lack of progress, the Cairo dialogue served the interests of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its opponents as well as Egypt. Real progress towards a limited ceasefire, however, would depend upon the extent of external pressures upon all these parties as well as on Israel.
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