Contracting back-in has received growing scholarly attention, but there is little empirical consensus in the literature as to what drives governments to bring previously contracted work back in-house and to what extent. This study performs a meta-analysis to synthesize 332 effect sizes from 16 existing studies concerning the antecedents of contracting back-in across different countries. The analysis indicates that contracting back-in is a market management strategy driven by low levels of market competition, high proportions of for-profit contractors, insufficient cost savings, and inadequate contract management. Meanwhile, contracting back-in is a political move shaped by left-wing political ideology and employee opposition to outsourcing. Environmental factors including unemployment rate, population size, and population density also play a role. This study provides empirical generalizations of previous results and contributes a more coherent knowledge base for future studies.
Points for practitioners
Our analysis indicates that contracting back-in is driven by a mix of both pragmatic and political factors, but pragmatic factors related to contracting management complexity shape contracting back-in in a more forceful way. Our findings also suggest that factors pushing governments to contract out do not necessarily have an impact on contracting back-in. Government decisions to contract out and contract back-in may be based on different considerations.
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