Few studies have linked public corruption to the quality of public infrastructure, particularly in developed countries. This article examines how public corruption affects the quality of transportation infrastructure in the context of the US states. Using state panel data for the period from 2002 to 2008, we found that public corruption had a negative impact on the quality of state roads, as captured by the International Roughness Index and overall road condition scores. This study concludes that the prevention of corruption is crucial to improving infrastructure quality and suggests preventive policy tools.
Points for practitioners
Transportation is one of the more corruption-prone sectors. This sector allows public officials discretion, attracts rent-seeking activities, and conceals malfeasance through secretive transactions. Our study finds that public corruption diminishes the quality of transportation infrastructure. Strengthening good governance is a critical way to improve public infrastructure performance. A variety of key anti-corruption strategies and actions are worth pursuing in the context of infrastructure development.
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