Cross-Culture Comparison of Tax Morale and Tax Compliance: Evidence from Costa Rica and Switzerland

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of internal and external social norms on tax morale and tax compliance behavior. Field data and data derived from laboratory experiments are used to examine tax morale and tax compliance behavior in Costa Rica and Switzerland. The results indicate that internal and external social norms have a significant effect on tax morale and tax compliance.

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