Leveraging history to reach Quantum 2030 goals: What policy makers need to know about the nuclear reactor at Chalk River,Ontario

Abstract

Canada's Quantum 2030 policy document—Quantum 2030—outlines the Canadian Government's path toward quantum science and technology (S&T) integration and places an emphasis on not completing these tasks alone. While not shocking to most policy experts, the importance of collaboration with international allies is something Canada has a long history of getting right—until very recently. This article argues that policy makers of today who want to best leverage international relationships in the field of quantum S&T should look to the past for examples of when this was done well. This article will use the nuclear reactor site in Chalk River, Ontario as a case study, and will highlight how the strength of the Canada-US relationship led to robust S&T innovation.

Canada has a long history of science and technology innovation. From the discovery of insulin and the invention of pacemakers, to the Avro Arrow, goalie mask, snowmobiles, and alkaline batteries, Canada's scientific contributions are diverse and span a variety of industries. In the twenty-first century, Canadian scientific interest has turned to the emerging field of quantum science. In 2023, the federal government released detailed plans in its Quantum 2030 policy document for how Canada aims to harness the opportunity presented by quantum science, and leverage all sectors—academia, industry, and government—to gain “quantum advantage” over non-allied states.

Here is where alliance politics come in. A key feature in nearly every Canadian foreign and defence policy document, alliance politics have been a focal point of Canada's global success for nearly a century. As Joel Sokolsky notes, Canada's alliance relationships “constitute nearly the sum total of Canada's defence policy,” and provide Canada with a way to voice its opinion on the global stage. ¹ Canada's quantum policy documents are no different: a section in each is dedicated to working with allies. After a period of deprioritization of the defence and security field under Justin Trudeau—when Canada seemed to struggle with its alliance relationships—Prime Minister Mark Carney has shifted the tone. Most of the angst under Trudeau was driven by Canada's failure to spend the appropriate figures on defence, with some commentators going so far as to call Trudeau a bigger threat to NATO than Donald Trump. ² If Canada wants to leverage quantum S&T to advance military preparedness and strengthen alliance relationships, it must learn from its own history. Carney appears to be doing just that. In June 2025, he committed to significantly increase Canadian defence spending by March 2026, and highlighted the importance of quantum S&T to Canadian defence and security goals. ³

This paper will explore Canada's S&T strategy as it can be extrapolated to other medium-sized nations. Canada's relationship with the United States (US), while unique, highlights the ways in which a smaller country can leverage a better position amongst allies with more resources. Perhaps most importantly, since the early Cold War, Canada's foreign policy has been built on collective action. Canadian leadership, beginning under Louis St. Laurent in 1948, understood that Canada's role in the world was best established as an ally who could be counted upon. By having failed to invest in its alliances in recent years, Canada is no longer adhering to its stalwart pillar of alliance loyalty. The Trump presidency is partly responsible for this, as will be explored at the end of this brief, but ultimately, Canada as a case study highlights a country that is, in some ways, a classic middle power with good resources, and which, up until recently, deployed a foreign policy that depended on others.

First, this policy brief will provide a breakdown of Canada's quantum and defence policy statements, followed by a discussion of Canada's current alliance partnerships. Finally, it will dive into the history of the Chalk River, Ontario nuclear site as an example of the importance of international relationships and partnerships, and the significance of Canada being a driver of new S&T. Ultimately, Canada can both strengthen its international relationships, increase defence spending numbers, and invest in its research community if it follows the blueprint offered by Chalk River. The article concludes with a discussion of the complications of the Trump presidency and offers insight into a possible path forward.

Quantum S&T Strategy, Quantum 2030, and Our North, Strong and Free

Before examining the relevant documents related to this study, a definition of quantum S&T is necessary. In general, S&T has always played a role in national and international defence, and the emergence of new technologies throughout history has often provided at least a temporary tactical advantage to those who mastered them (consider, for example, machine guns in the First World War). Quantum S&T “is the physics of the very small.” It “seeks to predict and explain the behaviour of atoms and molecules and involves the manipulation and control of systems at the atomic and subatomic levels.” ⁴ Understanding and harnessing this emerging technology is critical to future defence and security investment.

The Canadian government has recently released four documents related to defence and security. First, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) Quantum S&T Strategy, released in 2021, outlines DND's charted path to integrate and advance quantum S&T in CAF operations. ⁵ The three pillars of success described in this document are transitioning quantum technologies into defence capabilities, building strong partnerships both at home and abroad, and streamlining quantum S&T innovation across all of DND/CAF.

In 2022, the Canadian government released Canada's National Quantum Strategy, followed by Quantum 2030 in 2023. These documents are the government's roadmap for broadly incorporating quantum S&T and maintaining what they describe as Canada's leading role in quantum development. ⁶ Additionally, the second pillar of the “Current DND/CAF Quantum Efforts” section describes the importance of working closely with Canada's NATO and Five Eyes allies to pool resources, information, data, and research.

Michael Murphy has written on Canada's quantum policies through an alliance and partnership lens, through a defence and security lens, and with a GBA + analysis. ⁷ He recently published a piece that speaks to the goals outlined in the Canadian government's two quantum documents, highlighting how “increased public investment in quantum science and technology can help secure Canada's position within its alliance politics.” ⁸ He further explores the benefits of Canadian investment in quantum S&T, as it is set to provide solutions for some of the specific concerns that plague Canada and key alliance partners. ⁹ Specifically, such investment will mitigate allies’ concerns over Canada's defence spending, which is even more relevant with NATO countries having agreed on a goal of 5 percent of GDP for spending on defence and associated infrastructure.

Kristen Csenkey and Aniska Graver provide a detailed comment on Canada's overall quantum strategy, arguing that Canada is attempting to position itself as a world leader in quantum S&T but also that there are many non-government actors engaging in paradiplomacy. ¹⁰ Paradiplomacy is a critical concept today, and will continue to be so for as long as Trump remains in power in the US. Canada must build relationships with US-based actors outside of the political realm in an attempt to circumvent the chaos created by the president.

These examples of recent scholarship illustrate the significance of international alliances to the success of Canada's quantum project. Without a robust and loyal cohort of allies, Canada's quantum goals, and by extension our defence and security objectives, are at risk of failing.

Finally, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF), released in 2024, is the government's defence policy update to Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017). ONSF places emphasis on the Arctic and on improving interoperability with NORAD, pledges to spend more on defence capabilities, and reaffirms that maintaining alliance relationships is a cornerstone of Canadian defence policy—as it has been since 1951.

Alexander Salt contends that while this new update expands the discussion on emerging technologies, “there are serious questions about the practical integration of these capabilities within the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).” ¹¹ Thomas Hughes, James Fergusson, and Andrea Charron discuss the increased spotlight on Canada's Arctic and the differing levels of readiness between allies in this geographic region as threats begin to rise from non-traditional Arctic actors. ¹² The considerable concern regarding the implementation of these new defence goals is even more worrisome when coupled with the fact that Canada's defensive posture in the Arctic is weaker and less prepared than that of our American counterparts. What this foreshadows is not hopeful for DND/CAF's quantum S&T goals.

Canada's Alliances

Currently, Canada is a part of three major alliance networks: NATO, NORAD, and the Five Eyes. Each of these partnerships reflect Canada's values, commitment to democracy and freedom, belief in collective defence, and, for NATO and NORAD, geography.

NATO's history stretches back to 1949, when twelve countries in the North Atlantic region began pooling their resources in the name of collective defence against the Soviet Union. Born out of the failure of the United Nations (UN) to develop a military wing, NATO provided essential security and protection for member states against potential aggressors in a period of great instability and uncertainty. It has since grown to thirty-two member states—with the most recent inclusions of Finland and Sweden—and has, for the last seventy-five years, created a security bubble for Canadians. However, NATO's agreed-upon defence spending target of 2 percent of GDP brought the former Trudeau government into conflict with other NATO members. ¹³ By failing to meet this benchmark, Canada exhibited a posture that was not indicative of a nation that understood the importance of alliance support. Prime Minister Carney's 9 June 2025 announcement that Canada's defence spending will reach the 2 percent target by March 2026 signals a change in government thinking—a major shift to realign Canada's defence spending in step with its allies. Additionally, NATO has been challenged over the last three years by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Despite the war being between two non-NATO nations, its proximity to the alliance and the geopolitical implications of Ukrainian territory losses holds significant weight for the European community. This invasion snapped NATO into action, bolstered its belief in the importance of collective defence, and has seen NATO leaders advocate for a strong posture across all NATO states while delivering major financial and military aid to Ukraine. ¹⁴

NORAD's history follows NATO's closely, with the official signing of its globally unique binational agreement in 1957. Being the only binational military command in the world, ¹⁵ NORAD was designed to protect North American airspace from threats, ensure complete control of North American aerospace, and, following an addition in 2006, provide maritime warning for the continent. For Canada, which has enjoyed a largely peaceful relationship with the US since the Rush–Bagot Treaty in 1817, NORAD is significant for its cost-sharing agreements for continental defence and its ability to protect Canadian territory. Under NORAD, Canada and the US have worked together to invest in and bolster North American defence and security under one shared aerospace domain. Facilitated by a joint US Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force command, the integrated relationship between the two air forces has been, and will continue to be, integral to NORAD's success. This command has served Canada well and is perhaps the single most important international relationship in the Canadian foreign policy rolodex. The modernization of NORAD, a key piece of the ONSF policy update, was welcome news, but more needs to be done to maintain this relationship. In the second Trump presidency, the Canada–US relationship is at a critical inflection point. A minority government, the clamouring for Alberta separatism, and the chaos of tariffs wreaking havoc on the Canadian economy raises the stakes higher than they have ever been for Canadian decision makers.

The most recent partnership—the Five Eyes—highlights the rise of globalization. No longer based on geographic proximity, the Five Eyes, which includes Canada, the US, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, and New Zealand, was born out of the Second World War, but was codified in the 1970s to include Australia and New Zealand. This anglophone alliance shares intelligence and information, making it vital to Canadian and global security.

Together, these alliances make up a significant component of Canada's defence and security. Without them, Canada would be forced to contend with potential threat actors—namely Russia and China—with larger militaries and more resources at their disposal. Therefore, it is critical that Canada not only remain committed to its allies, but also provide valuable assets to the collective defence and continue to drive innovation and research in the quantum S&T field to stay ahead of non-allied states.

Background on Chalk River

Chalk River is a small town in Ontario, northwest of Ottawa. Currently it borders the Canadian Forces Base at Petawawa and the town of Deep River. Its historical relevance began during the Second World War when it was selected as the location of the first research facility operated by the National Research Council (NRC) and taken over by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) in 1952.

In August 1943, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King hosted a conference in Quebec City attended by both Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to discuss the targeted invasion of France. In this meeting, the US and British delegations also discussed atomic weapons. They later signed a binational agreement, the Quebec Agreement, to which Canada was a party but not a signatory (perhaps the ultimate middle power move). ¹⁶ Creating the Combined Policy Committee, which included representatives from Canada, the US, and Great Britain, the agreement called for the pooling of resources to develop nuclear weapons, along with unfettered information-sharing among the parties and the promise that the weapons would not be used against each other nor without each other's permission. This committee was significant for Canada, as it provided a seat at the table with the US and Britain and allowed Canada's scientific community to understand the needs of the emerging atomic industry. This is where Chalk River began to play a role.

The Quebec Agreement was not the first collaborative experience on nuclear weapons: Canada had already contributed to the Manhattan Project, supplying scientists (many of whom had fled Nazi-occupied Europe) and facilities in Montreal, and later in Chalk River. ¹⁷ Canada's geographic proximity to the US was beneficial to the project, as were its uranium deposits. In 1943, American general Leslie Groves, wary of international espionage, limited access for British and Canadian scientists to US-based sites to prioritize secrecy and security. ¹⁸ This move prompted the Canadian teams in Montreal to independently conduct research on heavy water and natural uranium, leading to an improved Canadian national nuclear operation. The Quebec Agreement reinstated collaboration amongst the British-American-Canadian allies—putting aside General Groves’ concerns—but taken together, it is clear that Canada's nuclear program was kickstarted by alliance collaboration and sustained through a period of alliance tension via the development of an independent nuclear sector.

The Chalk River research facility opened in 1944 under the leadership of the Canadian NRC and the management of Defence Industries Limited. The area was selected for its advantageous location: close enough to both Ottawa and Toronto, but far away from densely populated areas, as well as close to both a water source (the Ottawa River) and the railway for transportation needs. The land was purchased by the federal government, residents were compensated, and German POWs were brought in to help with the construction. Chalk River's Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP) reactor became operational in 1945—the first nuclear reactor outside the US. ¹⁹ The ZEEP design proved that “natural uranium and heavy water could be used to create and sustain nuclear fission” and showcased the “potential to generate plutonium—an artificially created fissile material that can be extracted chemically from irradiated uranium fuel—for the Allies’ military programs.” ²⁰ Its technological background was developed by Canadian, British, and French scientists during the Second World War, and over the next ten years, the Chalk River site served as a beacon of S&T innovation. ²¹

In 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Prime Minister Churchill, and Prime Minister King released a joint statement. It outlined the key priorities of their nations’ positions on nuclear weapons, stressing international cooperation and the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of humanity, and recognizing the international significance of atomic weapons—and therefore the importance of continued scientific research. ²² While not an official Canadian policy per se, this statement set the path for Canada and underscored the key role research was to play in the field. Building on this statement, in 1946, the Atomic Energy Control Act was passed between the governments of Canada, the US, and the UK. ²³ This sharing of information between allies was a continuation of the wartime pact, and of the fairly open dialogue that had characterized the international research community before the Second World War. ²⁴

In 1947, the world's first research reactor opened at Chalk River, producing isotopes that propelled Canada to global leadership in nuclear medicine. ²⁵ It was the only site in the world capable of conducting certain experiments, which gave Chalk River a significant international profile and generated major interest across the scientific community. By 1948, experts were arriving regularly to see how the Canadian nuclear reactor worked, and Canada was shipping the vast majority of its uranium to the US. That same year, Chalk River was featured in a CIA document on Canada. ²⁶ It was hailed for employing upwards of 500 scientists and other skilled workers, and for being a hub of innovation in the field. The ZEEP reactor was a key factor in the development of more refined and advanced reactors—including the NRX and NRU reactors—all of which were based in Chalk River. These S&T advancements were made in Canada, but their key takeaways were shared with the US and Britain. For example, in 1951, Canadian and American governments reached an agreement that confirmed nearly all the uranium mined in Canada was to be sold to the US for the production of atomic energy. ²⁷ This agreement remained in place until 1960.

In 1952, the Chalk River site saw its first major incident with a partial destruction of the reactor core. ²⁸ This incident severely damaged the NRX reactor and necessitated an urgent clean-up of irradiated water and other contaminants. ²⁹ DND sent in Canadian military personnel to help with the clean-up, which provided valuable experience for understanding what could go wrong in S&T innovation. ³⁰ This incident was not widely publicized at the time, but it recently made the news cycle following the death of former US president Jimmy Carter in December 2024. ³¹ Carter had been part of the US Navy team called to Chalk River to assist with the shutdown of the reactor. He was one of approximately 150 Americans who provided this aid while working on nuclear submarine capabilities in upstate New York under Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, a leader in nuclear submarine innovation. ³² Another example of cross-border S&T industry collaboration, the incident and its clean-up to prevent damage from radiation highlight the importance of working together. The Canadian NRC slowly began to rebuild, but help was required from allies. In a memorandum to President Dwight Eisenhower, the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington wrote:

In view of the valuable assistance received from Canada in the atomic energy field, including the supply of virtually all the uranium produced in Canada each year, the Commission desires to assist the Canadian Government in every way possible in acquiring this calandria ³³ with thermal shielding and desires to authorise its delivery by the Andale Company. ³⁴

This archival evidence is proof that Canada was providing valuable resources and intelligence to the US, so much so that the Atomic Energy Commission wrote to request financial aid from the American government to rebuild the site at Chalk River. This plea was successful, and the Americans helped the Canadians repair.

By 1954, nuclear research conducted at the re-built Chalk River site led to the construction of other reactors in Canada with new technology, including the building of the first nuclear power reactor in Rolphton, Ontario. ³⁵ Together, these innovations led to the prototype for CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactor technology, which has since been exported around the world. This example shows that the linkage between collaboration with allies on nuclear research and technology goes hand-in-hand with Canadian S&T innovation. It is also clear that, because of Chalk River's birth in wartime and its coming of age in the Cold War, the line between military and civilian research has often been blurred. Chalk River was under the control of AECL, a non-military organization, but continued to develop and supply uranium to the US to be used for nuclear weapons in the Cold War. What this historical example foregrounds for modern policy makers is the importance of breaking down silos and working together across industries within Canada and with Canada's international partners.

Chalk River continued to function with only a few other incidents in 1958 and between 2007 and 2009. These concerns were addressed, and the technology used has been a constant source of innovative research projects. The outputs of Chalk River continue to have national and international significance, and the site continues to be operated by AECL.

Chalk River is a good example of S&T innovation and industry working in concert with defence and security goals and alliance politics. Cutting-edge S&T continues to be an export that supports defence and security agendas—as well as other civilian sectors, such as medical technology in Canada—and is useful to Canada's alliance partners. This blueprint should be leveraged for the emerging quantum S&T industry and should serve as a reminder to Canada's governments (both provincial and federal) of the importance of investing and engaging in S&T as a way to bolster international alliance cooperation.

How can we learn from this history?

The lesson of this past example is straightforward: Canada must invest in joint quantum S&T projects with allies in order to achieve its declared Quantum 2030 goals. From the successes of Chalk River, we know there is strength in playing a leading role within a specific subset of scientific research. As a result, the government should focus on one or two areas in which Canada has the right expertise and personnel to excel and provide helpful research, outputs, and/or technologies to its allies. Moreover, having a key asset like uranium—or, as in the Chalk River case study, a successful and globally unique nuclear reactor space—is a helpful advantage when it comes to pooling resources. The Canadian S&T industry should zero in on what is lacking in allied circles and work to become the best exporter of that technology.

Additionally, tapping into spaces where industry can serve a dual military-civilian purpose, as in Chalk River, is paramount to ensuring cost effectiveness and mitigating the duplication that results from siloing sectors. As Quantum 2030 makes clear, breaking down the barriers between industry and academia is vital to the project's success, and leveraging Canada's civilian talent in the quantum S&T sector is “up to DND/CAF.” ³⁶ Chalk River, run by the civilian AECL, was able to produce outputs that supported Canada's military relationship with the US. Investment in quantum S&T today could be leveraged in a similar manner, generating beneficial military and civilian outputs.

Building on this foundation, Canada must return to pooling resources and sharing information and results with allies. It cannot—and should not—gatekeep materials, technology, or ideas from a wider network of likeminded nations. As a middle-power country, Canada's strength in the latter half of the twentieth century came not from its individual power, but from strength in numbers, as a member of powerful alliances committed to collective defence and deterrence. This outlook on the importance of alliances remains a shared goal across the government and DND/CAF's strategy plans for quantum S&T.

Canada's interest in promoting quantum S&T for alliances purposes has, unfortunately, been complicated by the Trump presidency. With the chaos of his on-again, off-again tariffs of varying percentage points, it is clear that the Trump trade war will continue to loom large over the next four years, souring Canadian attitudes toward the United States. Policy makers are generally in agreement that Canada must respond firmly to this brazen attack on its economy and sovereignty—and rightly so. However, I would challenge Canadian industry leaders to find ways to continue to work with their American counterparts through the discomfort of the next four years. The “Buy Canadian” movement is admirable, and supporting Canadian businesses is paramount, but finding ways to continue to strengthen cross-border relationships where possible will help to undermine Trumpian policies aimed at sowing division. It may feel tempting to withhold information from the Americans, as they are threatening to do to their allies around the world, but Canada must not stoop to this level. Of course, precautions are necessary, particularly given the recent warming of US–Russia relations, but exploring avenues for paradiplomacy beyond the government-to-government angle is vital to continued success.

Moreover, it would serve the interest of Canadian S&T industry leaders to continue developing resources and products of value for the American market during the next few tumultuous years. Based on Trump's behaviour thus far, it can be assumed that he has a vested interest in technology companies, with Elon Musk (SpaceX, Tesla), Mark Zuckerberg (Meta), and Jeff Bezos (Amazon) all having front-row seats to the dramatically scaled-down indoor inauguration. Despite Musk and Trump's very public falling-out in June 2025, the Trump administration continues to indicate a strong interest in S&T, and potentially even an interest in quantum. While these individuals are not necessarily easier to work with than Trump, their industries suggest potential partnership avenues and potential networks to his inner circle.

Beyond Trump, important organizations such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) continue to serve as touchpoints for the Canada–US defence relationship. As Nicholas Glesby argues, the PJBD still provides advice and consultation for both governments on defence and security issues facing the North American continent, and, despite only meeting once annually, has the mechanisms in place to engage in a productive relationship. ³⁷ Leveraging bodies like the PJBD is critical to navigating the uncertainty of the Trump presidency.

Ultimately, Canada's S&T ecosystem benefits from a deeply symbiotic relationship with allies, so building those bridges, even during Trump's presidency, will set it up for success when saner minds return to the halls of power in Washington.

Conclusion

Canada's S&T industry and history of innovation are filled with great milestones. The Chalk River nuclear reactor site is one such case study, offering insight into the importance of allies collaborating on complex new technologies for the safety and security of all alliance members. Canada must continue to find valuable niches within its S&T industry—specifically the emerging quantum S&T sector—to advance expertise which can be developed at home and then shared abroad, ensuring the NATO and Five Eyes communities stay ahead of potential threat actors in these domains. This dual approach has served Canada well in the past and will continue do so in the future. While the Trump presidency poses a problem, it is not an insurmountable one so long as industry leaders work together outside of the political sphere on shared goals.