Abstract
In mid-August 2021, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, under President Ashraf Ghani, collapsed. The Taliban seized power in Kabul in just over a week, despite the trillions of dollars spent by the United States and NATO over nearly twenty years in the effort to establish a strong state. The downfall of Ghani raises a critical question: Why was the Ghani government so weak that it could not survive for long, particularly in comparison to the Soviet-backed government in the early 1990s? Several factors contributed to the collapse of the Ghani government; this paper argues that both regional players, including Pakistan and Iran, as well as significant domestic factors, such as the Ghilzai-led Pashtunisation of the republic and the failures of the 2004 constitution, played a key role in Ghani's downfall. The data for this study were gathered from primary and secondary sources, including research papers, government documents, and media reports, such as newspapers, speeches, and interviews.
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