Abstract
In their efforts to make China their main foreign policy priority, the Trump and Biden administrations tried to push members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into adopting a tougher stance on China's trade practices and security policies. Although some European allies have advocated for a softer line on China, NATO language has hardened with time. The 2019 London Declaration noted simply that “China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges.” 1 The 2022 Strategic Concept is more strident, acknowledging that “[t]he PRC employs a broad range of political, economic, and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions, and military build-up.” 2
Whether NATO members will match this assessment with the appropriate policy changes and investments remains open to question. Washington, regardless of which political party holds the White House, will likely look to NATO members to step up their efforts to curb Beijing's political influence and power projection. Some NATO members—the United Kingdom being one—have enough of their own concerns about China that they might not need much prodding to make such efforts. Individual NATO members may be deepening their defense ties with US allies in East Asia as a result of these geopolitical developments, but enough disagreement still exists within the Alliance so as to hold up certain collective initiatives, as in the case of France's opposition to a NATO liaison office being opened in Tokyo.
Funded by the Department of National Defence's Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security Targeted Engagement Grant initiative, this forum brings together three policy briefs that address some of the issues involved with NATO and a globally assertive China. In his policy brief, Tim Rühlig notes that China's growing standardization capabilities could make NATO members vulnerable to information leakage and locked-in dependences. Still, because an aggressive approach to contain China could further fragment standard-developing organizations, Rühlig recommends that NATO should work hardest at holding China accountable to existing rules and practices. In their contribution, Jonas Vidhammer Berge and Liselotte Odgaard highlight that China has significantly expanded its space capabilities while NATO is hamstrung by the US's near-monopoly over such assets. They argue that NATO must strengthen its space force posture, not least through improved cooperation on dual-use space capabilities and information-sharing. Finally, in his policy brief, Michito Tsuruoka provides a much-needed, historically informed perspective from Japan. As much as Tokyo wants to see more robust engagement from its European partners, it is aware of their constraints. Nevertheless, Tsuruoka recommends that Tokyo should be proactive in its relations with the alliance. Put together, these policy briefs illuminate several key issues that defence planners across NATO must consider with respect to China and its growing international stature.