Abstract
Increasingly, both China and the US frame the secure domestic supply of semiconductors as a national security issue. Yet it is difficult to differentiate between the securitization of semiconductors as a national security vulnerability or as an arena for geopolitical competition. This article leverages Barry Buzan's theory of the power-security dilemma to provide a framework for deciphering and decoupling the two countries’ efforts to reduce their semiconductor supply-chain vulnerabilities and related power struggle. First, the US's and China's supply-chain vulnerabilities are explored as a security struggle, with special attention paid to their dependencies on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Second, recent American efforts to restrict the flow of semiconductor technologies to China are explored as a power struggle. This article concludes by using Buzan's theory to draw conclusions about the origins and potential evolution of the US-China semiconductor power-security dilemma.
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