Why AUKUS and not CAUKUS? It's a Potluck,not a Party

Abstract

In September 2021, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia announced a new security arrangement, dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines. This caused anxiety in Canada, especially as it emerged that Canadian officials had been caught unaware. In this paper, we argue that AUKUS 1.0 (now increasingly referred to as the first pillar) is not a problem for Canada, despite this early concern: Canada may need to renew its aging submarine fleet, but it is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the foreseeable future. That said, there are broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclusion from AUKUS is illustrative of its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy more generally. Moreover, as the pact evolves into AUKUS 2.0 (or the second pillar) and broadens its remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada's absence from its proliferating working groups risks imposing serious costs.

In September 2021, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced a new security arrangement to enhance Indo-Pacific security. The arrangement, which was quickly dubbed AUKUS, focused on helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines. The surprise announcement caused significant consternation and frustration in France, which immediately lost its contract to sell submarines to Australia. ¹ It also caused anxiety and hand-wringing in Canada, especially when it emerged that Canadian officials were unaware of the agreement or negotiations leading up to it. ²

In this paper we argue that AUKUS as it was originally conceived (“AUKUS 1.0,” as referred to by one of our interviewees, and now increasingly called the “first pillar”) is not a problem for Canada, despite these early concerns. Canada may need to renew its aging submarines, but is unlikely to acquire nuclear submarines in the foreseeable future. That said, there are broader reasons for Canada to be worried: its exclusion from AUKUS is illustrative of its neglect of foreign, defence, and national security policy and of its exclusion from or marginalization in other fora. Moreover, as the pact evolves into what we call “AUKUS 2.0” (or the “second pillar”) and broadens its remit to cooperation on emerging defence technologies, Canada's absence from AUKUS's proliferating working groups may have serious costs.

Methodology

This paper is based on two sets of interviews that we conducted in 2018­–2019 and 2022–2023 as part of a larger ongoing project on the Canadian intelligence and national security community. In the first set, we spoke to about seventy interviewees (including ten non-Canadians) who over the course of their career had produced and/or consumed intelligence products. We conducted the second set of ten interviews (including five with non-Canadians) specifically to address AUKUS and its impact on Canada's foreign and defence policy as well as its intelligence-sharing relationships. We selected interviewees based on our contacts, snowball sampling, and cold-call emails. The rank of these individuals ranged from desk officer and analyst through to deputy minister (DM; equivalent to deputy secretary in the American context) or head of agency level. Some were still in service at the time of the interview, while others were retired. Interviews were semi-structured and about sixty to ninety minutes long. We promised strict anonymity to each interviewee; when we use a direct quote, we use the label “an interviewee,” without reference to nationality or function.

Background: how Canada benefits from the five eyes

To analyze Canada's initial anxious reaction to the creation of AUKUS, it is essential to understand the country's place in the Five Eyes partnership. Overall, Canada is a net receiver of intelligence in the Five Eyes: it receives much more than it gives. This is, of course, impossible to quantify precisely. Nevertheless, our interviews on AUKUS, as well as our prior research and the limited literature on the topic, leave no doubt: Canada receives significant and various types of intelligence and information through its membership in the Five Eyes. ³ This is not to say that Canada is a complete free rider: it contributes to the partnership, and its contributions are appreciated by other members.

That said, membership is not cost-free. In particular, Canada's intelligence community must remain interoperable with those of the other four members. It also means that Canada, like the other four countries, must respect security standards that are de facto imposed by the US. This is costly, as it means acquiring and maintaining complex and secure information systems. It also means that Canada is perpetually dependent on the intelligence tap remaining open; although there is, as of early 2023, no serious threat of it closing or being significantly reduced, this remains a potential vulnerability. In addition, the sheer volume of intelligence being shared exposes members to risks of operational security failure, for example, through leaks or espionage among other members. For smaller members like Canada, the constant fear of security breaches—and the American backlash that would follow—causes much anxiety. ⁴

Nevertheless, the costs of membership, in the words of one interviewee, are less than the costs of exclusion and, moreover, less than those incurred in a more traditional alliance. As we discuss in the next section, the Five Eyes’ simple  structure and informal culture avoid the costs associated with a more deeply integrated alliance, such as the risks of entrapment in unwanted conflict and the weight of heavy and complex decision-making processes.

In sum, membership in the Five Eyes provides Canada with a tremendous return on a limited investment. As such, it is understandable that the initial reaction to AUKUS's reveal was one of concern. In the absence of more information at the time, the perception that AUKUS could presage Canada's marginalization within the Five Eyes was understandable, as this outcome would severely damage the country's national security.

AUKUS and the flexible structure of the Five Eyes

The second background element to the Five Eyes that is essential to understanding what AUKUS can mean for Canada is the partnership's loose structure. There is no permanent secretariat for the Five Eyes, and its work is not based on a binding treaty. It is, instead, based on a series of agreements and informal understandings. ⁵ This allows the partnership to maintain a high degree of flexibility. The Five Eyes, for example, can set up ad hoc meetings to discuss a specific emerging issue.

Crucially, and of relevance here, this built-in flexibility also allows sub-groups to form within the Five Eyes to deal with specific issues when only some members are interested and able to contribute. This allows members to adjust and adapt to changing circumstances, for example, by creating new committees or working groups if a new threat or problem emerges. According to our interviews, for example, in the context of the war in Ukraine, the US, UK, and Canada have been working together informally and in an ad hoc way, often in the absence of the other two Five Eyes members, to share intelligence. Such sub-groupings are not necessarily indicative of a problem for the members who are not included; it may simply be due to different levels of interest or capabilities. In the case of Ukraine, it is understandable that Australia and New Zealand are less involved; it does not mean they are being marginalized, but simply signifies the two nations’ respective specializations and resources.

That said, in some cases, the formation of a sub-group can indicate the marginalization of one or two members. This was certainly the case in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Canada and New Zealand were largely, but temporarily, shut out of intelligence related to the war. ⁶ And moreover, in practice, the Five Eyes often operates as the Four Eyes (or, perhaps more generously, as the “Four and a Half Eyes”), with New Zealand absent or marginal. This is, to some extent, inevitable, given the country's small size and limited intelligence capacity; sometimes it simply does not have enough staff to send representatives to meetings (or it sends a smaller delegation compared to others). ⁷ That said, it is also, partly, the result of American frustration with what Washington often views as Wellington's too close relations with China.

AUKUS 1.0 is not a problem for Canada…

There was much criticism and anxiety in Canada when AUKUS was announced in September 2021. Canadian officials were surprised by the agreement and, according to one interviewee, the initial reaction was one of dismay and concern. More specifically, the worry was that it could presage a two-tiered system within the Five Eyes, with those in the second tier—Canada and New Zealand—losing access to at least some intelligence relative to those in the first tier. Critics linked Canada's exclusion from this new trilateral pact to its marginal presence in the Indo-Pacific and its lax stance on China and, more generally, to its shy foreign policy and limited defence budget. ⁸

Our interviews showed, however, that officials quickly realized that this was, to some extent, the wrong reaction. AUKUS is—or, as we elaborate below, initially was—a defence cooperation pact between three countries, and as such is distinct from the Five Eyes. To simplify the story of its origins, Australia was dissatisfied with its planned acquisition of submarines from France. It therefore made an agreement with the US to procure nuclear submarines, which the UK then joined. Yet Canada is not interested in nuclear submarines. ⁹ Its allies knew this; there was, therefore, no reason on their part to involve Canada, and no reason on Canada's part to seek membership. As one interviewee noted, it is possible to criticize the three members of AUKUS for bungling the communications dimension of AUKUS's roll-out, especially towards France (which was surprised and furious) ¹⁰ and Canada (which, as interviewees agreed, would have appreciated more advance notice). This issue, however, is minor, and since then has been mostly forgotten.

In theory, it is possible to make a case that Canada needs nuclear submarines, as one interviewee noted. Realistically, however, this is simply not going to happen in the foreseeable future: the list of Canada's military requirements is long, and nuclear submarines are not anywhere near the top. Viewed in those narrow terms, Canada's exclusion from AUKUS 1.0 is not a problem.

…But AUKUS 2.0+ is a problem

What is AUKUS 2.0?

While the original AUKUS may have been a nuclear submarine agreement, recent developments, confirmed by our interviews, make it clear that the three members are moving well beyond what was originally envisioned. It is now generally accepted that AUKUS is evolving into a technology sharing agreement—although what that means precisely is not always clear to countries inside or outside the agreement. In the absence of a concrete public plan or statement, there have been several interpretations of what “AUKUS 2.0” may become.

First, given that the promised nuclear submarines are years away, the most obvious interpretation is that AUKUS creates “opportunities for promoting deeper information and technology sharing, integrating security- and defence-related science and technology, and building industrial bases and supply chains.” ¹¹ This seems to have been confirmed in a follow-up announcement by the Biden administration in April 2022, following a meeting of the three members. The document notes that there are two lines to the AUKUS partnership: 1. submarines; and 2. “advanced capabilities” that will “develop and provide joint advanced military capabilities to promote security and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.” ¹² Advanced military capabilities include undersea capabilities; quantum technologies; artificial intelligence and autonomy; advanced cyber, hypersonic, and counter-hypersonic capabilities; electronic warfare; innovation; and information sharing. Of note, at least one of our interviewees said that “information sharing” in this context did not necessarily refer to intelligence, but more broadly to classified information related to the design, capabilities, and manufacturing of emerging technologies.

AUKUS 2.0 may evolve to include other areas, like developing and strengthening legal processes for defence co-operation. Shayan Karbassi notes that AUKUS builds on prior defence trade co-operation treaties (DTCT) with Australia and the UK dating back to the George W. Bush administration that “envisioned a similar convergence of military and geostrategic needs.” ¹³ In this way, AUKUS 2.0 could lead to further arrangements to facilitate the sharing of sensitive technology.

Third, some note that the agreement is also about cost savings, even as billions are being invested. The idea there is that through sharing platforms and the costs of innovation, Australia and the UK would be able to save money in terms of technological developments. Further, this would enhance the three countries’ ability to set technical standards for the development of future technologies, leading to a competitive advantage. ¹⁴

Finally, AUKUS 2.0 is about geopolitics. Along with acquiring the nuclear submarines, Australia has committed to building a large naval base, which would provide the US with advantageous basing options as it looks to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. This will place Australia at the centre of the American presence in the region, which will further the interests of AUKUS countries, but also the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) in their efforts to counter China.

From submarines to subpar

As explained above, every interviewee we spoke to for this project confirmed our hypothesis that AUKUS 1.0 is not a problem for Canada in terms of foreign policy or defence. ¹⁵ As we have noted, it is unlikely that Canada will procure nuclear submarines anytime soon (although the government soon will have to make a decision about what to do with its aging submarine fleet.) ¹⁶ Moreover, while it has now produced an Indo-Pacific Strategy, it is unlikely that Canada will have a truly augmented presence in the region for some time. As one interviewee noted, Canada “would have said no to AUKUS 1.0” had it been formally asked.

However, the fact that the arrangement appears to be moving rapidly towards other areas of cooperation is of greater concern, for several reasons. First, while Canada may not seek to procure nuclear submarine technology, it has an interest in other developments in cooperation and information sharing on emerging technologies, including quantum, AI/autonomous, advanced cyber, and electronic forms of warfare. Therefore, there is a significant risk that Canada will not be a part of those conversations on the development of some of the military technologies that will dominate the twenty-first century, or the standards upon which they are designed and operated. And while Canada may not use all the technologies under consideration for inclusion in AUKUS 2.0, the fact that the country is under pressure to remain interoperable with its more advanced allies means that it will be taking notes from afar rather than contributing to and shaping these discussions. Canada may not want nuclear submarines, but it does need many of the other items on this list.

A second area of concern relates to the relationship between defence and intelligence, reflecting the anxieties noted above. Several interviewees emphasized that in the AUKUS agreement, “information sharing” has more to do with classified information (weapons designs, operations, etc.) rather than “intelligence” per se. In other words, AUKUS remains very much a defence-technology sharing arrangement and does not signify a trend towards “Three Eyes” within the traditional, intelligence-focused Five Eyes partnership. The information sharing arrangements as they presently stand allow for technology transfers (mostly from the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, to Australia). This emphasis on military technology will come as a relief to those concerned that AUKUS 2.0 represents an immediate devolution of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing relationship that would be unfavourable to Canada. So long as Ottawa's Five Eyes partners are differentiating between the “defence” relationship (especially where it is specific to their needs in the Indo-Pacific) from the “intelligence” relationship, Canada's access to the Five Eyes, and thus its most vital intelligence-sharing relationship, is likely to stay intact.

However, some are less sanguine. Both Canadian and non-Canadian interviewees expressed the view that it was very possible that the arrangement to share intelligence within the Five Eyes could soon start to mirror trends in the defence technology relationship. In other words, Canada's absence from AUKUS could mean that it might be increasingly left behind within the Five Eyes as well—to the detriment of Canada's national security. While it is extremely unlikely that the Five Eyes relationship will end anytime soon, a Three Eyes club emerging within (or even outside of) the partnership would damage Canada's position. As one interviewee argued, if the lack of defence capabilities means that Canada is seen as not sufficiently interoperable, relevant, or credible, the possibility of an “AUKUS–Three Eyes” becomes greater.

Australidealizing? ¹⁷

We assess that a small, but real and growing, bifurcation within the Five Eyes already exists due to a series of Australian actions and Canadian inactions with significant respective implications. ¹⁸ The most straightforward explanation for Australia's relative success is the degree of effort the country puts into its intelligence and national security architecture and capabilities. ¹⁹ Despite its smaller population, Australia has a larger intelligence enterprise than Canada. It has both an internal security service (the Australian Security and Intelligence Organization) and a foreign human intelligence agency (the Australian Secret Intelligence Service), as well as a signals intelligence agency (Australian Signals Directorate). In this sense, it simply has more intelligence to provide to the Five Eyes, particularly the granular, tactical foreign intelligence that US officials tend to value. Australia's investment in national security is clearly driven by geography—its proximity to China and place in the Indo-Pacific give Australia a geopolitical significance that is growing in importance as Western powers address increasing rivalries with China. As such, countries like the US and the UK are looking to Australia to strengthen their presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia's proximity to China also means that its threat environment is different from Canada's. As such, its intelligence and national security culture is more advanced in a variety of ways. Interviewees from our current and prior research argue that Australia has a more successful model of integrating intelligence with policy-making. This includes a constant updating of its national security architecture and the legal authorities that sustain it. Moreover, in supporting its intelligence enterprise, Australia demonstrates a greater willingness to engage in reflection and critical assessment of existing policies and strategies to determine whether it is meeting current challenges. ²⁰

Our interviewees also noted that the Australians excel at looking at security issues through an Australian lens, framing problems and challenges through their own national interests. Australian representatives then take these insights and make them clearly known in meetings with allies and partners, constructively challenging ideas and bringing new perspectives to Five Eyes conversations. ²¹ Our prior research also indicates that Australia is very proactive in cultivating its relationships, especially with the US. Australia also has a large and dynamic diplomatic, defence, and intelligence presence in Washington, DC, and in US national security and defence institutions.

Our current and prior findings suggest that Canada lags Australia on many of these fronts. First and foremost, geography insulates Canada from a comparable sense of threat. Surrounded by three oceans and bordering the (normally) friendly US to the south, Canadians have been insulated from the wars of the twentieth century. Given this position in the world, policy-makers have been able to make mistakes in major foreign and national security policy decisions, or neglect these matters, and suffer little to no cost. ²² As a result, selling large investments in defence and security or expansions of the intelligence enterprise to a Canadian public that feels secure has been difficult. Military procurement often becomes fodder for political debates, and politicians are seldom rewarded for engaging with foreign policy, defence, or national security issues. ²³ As such, these institutions have largely remained neglected. For example, many of the authorities to collect intelligence on national security threats have not been updated since 1984, when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act took effect. ²⁴ This means that the Service has struggled to adapt to an era where information is more likely to be stored on iPhones rather than paper. ²⁵

Second, while the salience of intelligence has become more central to decision-making in Canada in recent years, it is still not systematically integrated into the decision- or policy-making process. ²⁶ Findings from our previous research reveal that there remains a significant divide between policymakers and intelligence analysts, with too much misunderstanding of the other's roles and responsibilities. ²⁷ In this sense, Canada faces more of a challenge in formulating policy-related ideas, views, and responses to bring to allied discussions. Several interviewees from our previous research, for example, noted that in Five Eyes meetings, Canadian officials often would stay silent, not providing points for discussion or challenging consensus views. One interviewee noted that in Washington, Canadians are “nowhere to be seen,” even as the US increasingly values its allies and partners through their contributions.

Third, given Canada's limited capabilities of collecting intelligence, there are fewer meaningful contributions that Canadian officials can bring to the table. As noted above, Americans tend to value granular, tactical, and actionable intelligence. However, Canada often brings more high-level strategic analysis to the discussion. This reality reflects Canada's position as a net consumer, rather than a net producer, of intelligence—Canada imports far more intelligence from its allies than it provides in exchange. Moreover, its efforts at engaging allies on intelligence are not well coordinated, with its defence, foreign policy, and intelligence liaison functions in capitals such as Washington divided among different posts in the embassy.

It's a potluck, not a party

Canada's status in intelligence sharing arrangements may be strong for now, and AUKUS is still an agreement to share defence technology. This, however, may not always be the case. Canada's relatively low defence and intelligence capacities mean that AUKUS should be seen as part of a broader trend of growing Canadian irrelevance, caused by the latter's neglect of its foreign, defence, and national security policies. Canada may have niche areas of excellence, but its allies increasingly see it as a free rider, not contributing to the larger project of Western security while benefiting from the sacrifices of others. As one interviewee noted, Canada often says it is punching above its weight, but when one looks at the contributions of countries that are not even in the Five Eyes, such as Latvia or the Netherlands, this claim rings hollow.

Yet despite this decline in Canadian capabilities, it seems clear that Canada still expects to be invited to the table, with AUKUS, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and other institutional arrangements. This era of multilateralism, however, is over: countries are increasingly invited to international coalitions because they are willing and able to bring something to the table, not because of who they are or what they represent. In an era of resurgent great power competition, this material factor is likely to dominate the creation of international coalitions going forward. As one of our interviewees stated, where Canada does not contribute, it is more likely to be seen as an inconvenient extra coordination piece rather than as a valued ally. Multilateralism in the twenty-first century will be more like a potluck than a party: one must bring something to be invited.

In other words, Canada needs to get used to stating up front what contributions it can make if it wants to work with its larger partners. Previously it has been able to join coalitions and then wait to be cajoled before offering something to its allies. This is no longer the case. Doing so will require a nimbler foreign and defence policy response and more forward thinking—and, inevitably, it will require larger investments. Given uncertainties around issues such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Taiwan, it may also require a greater appetite for risk-taking and uncertainty. But the era where Canada can be a wallflower, enjoying the material and ideational contributions of other states at the party while remaining silent, or vexed about its contributions, is over.

The way ahead for Canada

Canada's threat environment remains relatively benign, at least compared to many other countries, but it is deteriorating. Given this context, in this last section we offer recommendations on the way ahead for Canada.

The future of the Five Eyes

Our interviewees agreed that the fundamentals of the Five Eyes remain solid and the partnership is not at risk of formally evolving into the Three Eyes. This finding is also consistent with our prior research. There are, however, caveats to this finding. The first, as discussed above, is that if Canada continues its current trend of neglecting foreign, defence, and national security matters, its status in the view of its allies will continue to decline. In this scenario, Canada would remain a member of and contributor to the Five Eyes. It would, however, be at risk of seeing more informal Three Eyes arrangements from which it would be excluded, especially as they pertain to the Indo-Pacific.

The other, and potentially more significant, concern for Canada is the future of domestic politics in the US. It is true that Canada survived the Trump years relatively unscathed. From a security and intelligence perspective, close relations continued largely independently from the turmoil at the political level. There is, however, no guarantee that Canada's close, and very beneficial, relationship with its southern neighbour will continue indefinitely, especially if Donald Trump or a like-minded Republican wins the presidency in 2024 (or beyond). Should the US take a serious turn towards unilateralism and start to dismiss its traditional partnerships and alliances such as the Five Eyes and NATO, Canada would be left alone. This anxiety in the Canadian intelligence community came out clearly in some of our research. In the words of one interviewee, “we cannot take for granted that future administrations will believe in the value of alliances.”

This raises the question of the eventual enlargement of the Five Eyes. Is it likely to happen, and would it benefit Canada? The simple, straightforward answer to both questions is no. Our interviewees—and our broader research—make it clear that there is no support inside the Five Eyes for a permanent enlargement into the Six (or more) Eyes, with new members either from Europe (with France, Germany, and the Netherlands usually mentioned as possible candidates) or Asia (Japan or South Korea). ²⁸ From Canada's perspective, the hypothetical enlargement of the Five Eyes likely would dilute its privileged access to the US; that is reason enough to oppose the prospect. In any case, there seems to be no support for enlargement in the US, which renders the views of the other members mostly irrelevant.

That said, what is likely to happen—indeed, what already is happening—is the broadening and deepening of various “Five Eyes Plus” agreements, whereby the Five Eyes have informal agreements to share intelligence and to coordinate on national security matters with European and Asian partners. These arrangements are clearly in Canada's interest, as they provide it with access to other partners with which it has, at most, only limited relations outside the Five Eyes framework.

Canada and AUKUS

Canada will not seek to acquire nuclear submarines for the foreseeable future; there is, as such, no possibility of or desirability to its eventual membership in AUKUS 1.0. The first and most pressing question moving forward is, therefore, obvious: should Canada seek to join AUKUS 2.0? There is no simple “yes” or “no” answer to this question, as it depends on multiple factors. Canada could conceivably stay out of AUKUS in the formal sense (i.e., not acquiring nuclear submarines), but it could seek to join some of the working groups created out of AUKUS 2.0.

The first issue this raises concerns the invitation: the three countries that form AUKUS—and, realistically, mostly the US—first need to invite and be ready to welcome Canada in those working groups. Our interviews suggest that, in theory, such invitations could be forthcoming, in the sense that the US and the two other AUKUS members are not rigidly opposed, as a matter of principle, to Canada's participation. But the key caveat here is that such invitations would be conditional on the Canadians “bringing something to the table”—a prospect on which our interviewees, including some Canadians, expressed skepticism.

The next issue, then, is whether Canada should seek to join these working groups. It is difficult to answer this question precisely as the answer very much depends on context. The easy answer, in a sense, is yes: not participating in the working groups would be damaging to Canada given the increasing importance of technology to national security and intelligence and Canada's dependence on external sources of information. Canada would then be shut out of important discussions. ²⁹ But if Canada merely asks to join without specifying what would be its concrete contributions, it is likely to fail, at least in some cases. At minimum, Canada should do its homework before asking, and identify those working groups in which it has expertise and capabilities, and would be a valuable contributor. Canada would also need to prepare for what seems to be an emerging reality—that AUKUS working groups are likely to involve other, non-Five Eyes partners, including possibly Japan and South Korea. These working groups would then resemble the Five Eyes Plus arrangements that already exist, but would be based around AUKUS instead.

Recommendations

Finally, we offer three categories of recommendations for the way ahead for Canada: on its Indo-Pacific strategy, on better leveraging and developing its niche capabilities and contributions, and on what we call “Canadianization.”

The first step for Canada, especially if it wants to find itself in a position to be invited to join AUKUS working groups, is—at a minimum—to implement its Indo-Pacific strategy, announced in late 2022. ³⁰ Until the release of the strategy, Canada had been widely criticized for its neglect of the region, despite the government's rhetoric on its growing importance. ³¹ The strategy, which laid out modest commitments in the diplomatic, defence, security, and trade realms, was “long overdue.” ³² But the strategy still disappointed many observers because of its limited investments. A “glass half-full” reading of the strategy would describe it as a necessary first step; a more skeptical interviewee labelled it as the “bare minimum,” and another as “better than nothing.” To position itself in the region—on AUKUS and more generally—Canada will therefore need to view the new strategy as a first step and stepping stone to further action. ³³

A second recommendation for Canada is to better leverage the informal division of labour within the Five Eyes. One interviewee cautioned that this should not be “overanalyzed”: there is no formal and structured plan to divide the collection and analysis of intelligence. Nevertheless, interviewees agreed that, informally, each Five Eyes member has niches, often based on geography or history, on which it focuses more than others; even with its formidable capacities, the US cannot cover every issue. By concentrating on further developing these niche assets and contributions, as opposed to sprinkling new resources thinly (as it often does), Canada would achieve a greater impact.

Canada has several niches within the Five Eyes, and even those interviewees critical of Canada's overall contributions agreed that these are real and genuinely appreciated by the US and other partners. Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the national cryptologic agency, is widely viewed internationally as elite. ³⁴ Also, in the words of one interviewee, Canada frequently gets asked at Five Eyes meetings to provide updates on the Arctic; its expertise is viewed as essential, in an area on which other members (except the US) have limited to no visibility. Interviewees, moreover, agreed that Five Eyes partners (and, more broadly, NATO allies) would look highly favourably on Canada doing and sharing significantly more on the Arctic region. Other niches valued by partners include coverage of some parts of Latin America and the Caribbean as well as some elements of its geospatial intelligence capabilities. One interviewee also observed that Canada has certain small, but important, human intelligence collection programs that are useful. Moreover, with regards to the Ukraine conflict, the Americans value Canada taking its first steps at pre-bunking and countering Russian disinformation online while they still lack the authorization to do so. ³⁵

Finally, Canada would benefit from making further progress in Canadianizing its intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. By “Canadianization,” we refer to efforts to shift collection and analysis efforts towards the pursuit of more properly Canadian interests. Canada suffers from a heavy reliance on imported foreign intelligence, including through the Five Eyes. This is beneficial in multiple ways, but it does imply that a large proportion of its intelligence has been collected and analyzed through another national lens. Canada shares many interests with its Five Eyes partners, but they are not always completely aligned. Canada, moreover, does not have its own foreign human intelligence service. As we have written elsewhere, collection and analysis units in the Canadian intelligence community would gain from further developing their own lens through which they view the world, define their priorities, plan and execute operations and activities, and prepare analysis and assessments in a way that more strongly reflects Canada's interests. ³⁶

Greater Canadianization would not be in opposition to Canada's major commitment to the Five Eyes—to the contrary. Instead, it would better position Canada to leverage its partnerships more optimally by allowing it to contribute a more specifically Canadian perspective. Where Canada is perceived—often rightly—as not contributing enough to the Five Eyes, as well as in other partnerships, good intelligence, raw or finished, is a currency that can be traded. By positioning itself to give more, Canada can also receive more.

To conclude

Canada is marginal in the US Indo-Pacific strategy. This prevents Ottawa from pursuing key interests in the region and, more broadly, hinders its ability to pursue what remains by far its most important foreign policy priority—managing its complex relations with its southern neighbour. Its initial exclusion from AUKUS was not, on its own, problematic. But Canada's growing inability to pursue its interests in the Indo-Pacific and its declining standing with its close allies and partners risks marginalizing it from the working groups being spun out of the initial AUKUS agreement. Unlike AUKUS 1.0, this outcome would be more damaging.