Abstract
International Relations scholars and foreign policy practitioners have both debated at length how nuclear weapons influence the foreign policy of states that acquire them. This debate is hardly new, with politicians in the 1960s expressing similar concerns about the emboldening of nuclear-armed China as those warning about potential Iranian aggression in the present. Similarly, states have expressed concern over allies choosing increased independence after developing their own nuclear arsenals—and potentially being less accommodating to their former partners in the process. However, existing theories have proven somewhat limited, often due to their exclusive focus on change in conventional military aggression. They fail to account for variation among states as a result. In Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, Mark S. Bell makes a compelling contribution to this debate by advancing a novel theory of how foreign policy is influenced by the possession of nuclear weapons, testing it with well-researched case studies.
Bell’s work immediately stands apart by accounting for historical variation from the outset. Rather than the one-size-fits-all approach of other theories, such as the nuclear relation argument that nuclear weapons promote peaceful behaviour, he uses historical evidence to show variation in the behavioural changes of nuclear states (4). Bell’s theory, dubbed “nuclear opportunism,” states that “nuclear weapons can facilitate a broad range of foreign policy behaviours that states may find attractive” (5). For a given state, the attractiveness of these behaviours—ranging from aggression and expansionism to bolstering alliances and steadfastness against coercion and revisionism—will vary according to its strategic circumstances and political priorities (5–7). In short, Bell argues that nuclear weapons do not change state preferences or goals, but instead serve as a means for advancing their existing objectives. To support this, he draws on archival research and interviews with retired political and military elites to study changes in foreign policy behaviour among three case studies: the United Kingdom (UK), South Africa, and the United States (US).
Bell makes a strong case for the explanatory power of nuclear opportunism in a variety of circumstances. He provides detailed explanations for (a) the mechanisms that allow foreign policy decisions to be influenced by nuclear weapons, such as their low cost relative to conventional force and the psychological significance attached to them; and (b) the ways that foreign policy is expected to shift as a result. Bell has also deliberately opted for difficult cases to test his theory’s rigour. South Africa, for example, was chosen for its conventional superiority over its neighbours, its non-announcement of its nuclear arsenal, and its preference for the status quo over revisionist aims. Beyond his three main cases, Bell also dedicates a chapter to applying the theory to other nuclear-weapon states, albeit in considerably less detail. The book convincingly demonstrates an alternative motivation for states pursuing nuclear weapons over the traditional view of the weak trying to strengthen themselves against powerful adversaries. As a theory, nuclear opportunism instead suggests that already-powerful states also have reason to develop nuclear weapons—namely, to further advance their existing foreign policy goals.
While Nuclear Reactions provides a strong case for nuclear opportunism, by Bell’s own admission it does not apply perfectly to all nuclear-weapon states, and some flaws are apparent. Some issues stem from Bell’s decision to demonstrate theoretical rigour with harder cases. For example, South Africa is noted to have become more aggressive while possessing nuclear weapons but did not demonstrate steadfastness as expected. However, Bell notes that the relative lack of available information on South African elite thinking on the country’s nuclear arsenal forced him to use conjecture based on their views on potential escalation and desire for greater aggression in Angola. Meanwhile, the final chapter’s discussion of other nuclear-weapon states has mixed findings, with the theory notably lacking an explanation for Israel and China. In the latter’s case, nuclear opportunism would suggest that China would use nuclear weapons to expand its international influence, become more steadfast, and bolster its allies, but it instead seems to have focused solely on remaining steadfast. Bell acknowledges other limitations in the book, such as his treatment of state attitudes as unitary at the expense of individual leaders’ views, not factoring in norms on nuclear weapons use, and potential strategic interactions being set aside.
The case selection is also open to some critique, both in terms of the focus on Western nuclear powers and the time periods studied. While the applicability of the theory to China, India, and Pakistan is briefly discussed in chapter five, the selection of the main three cases (the UK, US, and South Africa) would appear to limit nuclear opportunism’s explanatory power somewhat. This may be justified by comparative difficulties in finding sufficient primary sources due to recency and limited public access (particularly in the cases of China and Pakistan), given that these served as Bell’s main sources of data, though this is not discussed in the book. The studies of the UK and US also present issues, only covering the immediate post–Second World War period to the mid-1960s, with anything beyond this being only briefly discussed at most. More detail on the later parts of the Cold War would potentially have better illustrated the theory’s explanatory power for the foreign policy behaviour of those two states.
Even when considering these critiques, Nuclear Reactions remains an excellent scholarly work. Bell’s theory of nuclear opportunism is innovative and intuitive in explaining how nuclear weapons are used to further pre-existing strategic goals, rather than driving states to adopt new ones. The book is thorough, with Bell presenting convincing and highly detailed evidence in his case studies to support his theory while acknowledging potential pitfalls. It can easily be recommended to experts in the fields of nuclear deterrence and, more broadly, foreign policy, as well as to readers with a more casual interest in these areas.