Communications satellites in Canadian security policy: History and prospects

Abstract

This article traces Canada’s early interest in space, before turning to its late 1960s decision to focus on a domestic, commercial/civilian communications satellite system in geostationary orbit and the subsequent decline in Canada’s military space efforts. It then highlights the wake-up call of the 1991 Gulf War, which demonstrated the critical importance of military communications satellites to future operations, and the steps Canada has taken to gain assured access to such satellites in the decades since. The final section outlines recent advances in low Earth orbit satellite communications (LEO satcom) and the ways in which these systems can address shortfalls in their geostationary cousins. Drawing reference to a new international security environment, it concludes that Canada should move expeditiously to incorporate LEO satcom into efforts to address the growing imperative of military satellite communications in the Canadian Arctic.

Canada entered the space age on 28 September 1962 when an American rocket lifted its Alouette satellite into orbit from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. It was a tremendous technological achievement for Canada, at most a middle power on the international stage, to become the third country in space after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in October 1957, and the United States (US) its scientific satellite, Explorer 1, in early 1958. But thoughts of prestige did not figure into Canada’s decision in the late 1950s to develop, build, and launch a satellite. Rather, the immediate driver behind the Alouette project was a military one and the strategic considerations of the Cold War.

Alouette was a scientific satellite with an information-gathering mission central to communications: to study the ionosphere with a view to improving radio transmission in Canada’s high north. As such, its launch opened minds in Canada to the role communications satellites (i.e., those that relay information between two points on Earth via a transponder) could play in tying together a geographically vast and sparsely populated country, a sort of “orbital CN Rail.” In the decades since Alouette’s launch, the place of communications satellites in Canadian security policy has waxed and waned. Political choice, cost, technological and physical limitations, and the availability of other options have all been factors. Today, we are on the cusp of a revolution in communications satellite technology that promises to significantly increase the role communications satellites play in Canadian security policy.

This article traces Canada’s early interest in space, before turning to its late 1960s decision to focus on a domestic, commercial/civilian communications satellite system in geostationary orbit. ¹ Satellites placed in this orbit, lying about 36,000 kilometres above the equator, have a 24-hour orbital period and therefore appear fixed above Earth. The article then highlights the wake-up call of the 1991 Gulf War, which demonstrated the critical importance of military communications satellites to future operations, and the steps that Canada has taken since then to gain assured access to military communications satellites. The final section outlines recent advances in low Earth orbit satellite communications (LEO satcom) and the ways in which these new systems, orbiting between 300 and 2000 kilometres above Earth, can address shortfalls in the capabilities of their geostationary cousins. It concludes that Canada should move expeditiously to incorporate LEO satcom, particularly the system offered by Telesat, Canada’s original domestic satellite communications company, into efforts to address the growing imperative of guaranteed military access to satellite communications in the Canadian Arctic.

Canadian interests in space: The early years

Canada’s geographical position in the world during the Cold War is key to explaining its rapid ascendance as a spacefaring nation. Geographically, Canada lies directly between the Soviet Union and the US over the pole, which gave it a central role in Cold War deterrence against a Soviet attack on the North American continent. ² In the early 1950s, the US and Canada built a series of radar lines at progressively higher latitudes designed to detect the nuclear-armed Soviet bombers that could strike North America over the pole. ³ By 1957, the lines and accompanying interceptors (fighter aircraft and surface-to-air missiles) were tied together into the North American Air (now Aerospace) Defence Command. After the launch of Sputnik, which portended the intercontinental ballistic missile threat to North America, the US also established ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars in Alaska, Greenland, and the United Kingdom. The challenge lay in the ability of military commanders in the mainland US and in southern Canada, sitting well below the 50th parallel, to communicate effectively with the Distant Early Warning radar line at the 70th parallel and the BMEWS sites at or above the Arctic Circle. This, in turn, depended on understanding the impact of the ionosphere on radio communication.

The idea that the ionosphere, a layer of ions or electrically charged particles lying 60 to 1000 kilometres above Earth, was conductive was first put forward in the late nineteenth century by Nicola Tesla. ⁴ By the early 1920s experiments confirmed that radio transmissions could go beyond line of sight by bouncing radio waves off the ionosphere. The problem was and is that the ionosphere is made up of several layers, each of which has a reflective potential that changes with the seasons, the time of day, and the presence of sun spots, making radio transmission inconsistent and unpredictable. Significantly for Canada and its Arctic region, radio communication is especially impacted by the ionosphere at high latitudes, in large part because of the effect of the aurora borealis, the “northern lights.” ⁵

As early as the 1930s, Canadian scientists were studying the upper atmosphere using ground-based instruments. ⁶ Disrupted radio communications between North America and its European allies later became a critical problem during the Second World War, leading to systematic study of the ionosphere during the war and expanded rocket and balloon observations following the war. ⁷ Although much information was gathered, it was thought that “topside” ionospheric measurements could assist considerably. Alouette was thus conceived as a low Earth orbit satellite that would carry a topside ionosphere sounder to gather the scientific information needed to provide more reliable communications with, in, and through the polar region. Prompted by Cold War imperatives and the need to enhance capabilities of the radar and BMEWS sites, Alouette was the “direct product of the Canadian military and the over-the-pole Cold War threat that preoccupied it in the 1950s and 1960s.” ⁸ As such, it was built entirely within the labs of a government defence organization, the Defence Research Board, and its telecommunications arm.

During this period, ionospheric studies were also important for Canadian domestic reasons. As a country that stretches about 5000 kilometres from east to west and 4000 kilometres from north to south, Canada has always faced communications challenges. In the early twentieth century, Canada’s northern communities depended on radio for communications among themselves and with southern Canada. Thus, as noted, Canada’s original atmospheric studies well predated the Cold War, the superpower standoff, and even the Second World War.

Although the behaviour of the ionosphere could be predicted to some extent, it became increasingly clear that reliable radio communication could be guaranteed only with the use of satellites. Canada was closely watching developments in the US, where commercial enterprises and government organizations were experimenting with communications by satellite. In an effort led by AT&T and Bell Telephone Laboratories, the US launched two experimental satellites, Telstar 1 and Telstar 2, in 1962 and 1963, respectively. Designed to enhance communications between North America and Europe, these small satellites in non-geosynchronous orbit demonstrated that television, telephone calls, and data could be relayed over great distance by a communications satellite. ⁹ But the satellites circled Earth roughly every two hours and, in that timeframe, could only transmit for the 20 minutes or so that they were passing over the Atlantic. Clearly the geostationary orbit, giving continuous rather than intermittent service, would be much more attractive. Soon thereafter America’s newly established National Aeronautics and Space Administration launched three experimental communications satellites into geostationary orbit, finally establishing the feasibility of geostationary satellites.

The success of the geostationary orbit concept, first foreseen by the science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke in 1945, ¹⁰ captured the Western world’s imagination. ¹¹ Although satellite-based ionospheric studies continued for some time, Canada turned its sights to communications satellites in geostationary orbit. ¹² A study commissioned by the Canadian government in 1966 and led by Dr. John Chapman, who also spearheaded the Alouette program, recommended Canada shift its space-based emphasis from scientific endeavours to a domestic satellite communications system. ¹³ “In the second century of Confederation,” Chapman argued in his early 1967 report, “the fabric of Canadian society will be held together by strands in space just as strongly as the railway and telegraph held together the scattered provinces in the last century.” ¹⁴

Canada and commercial communications satellites

The Chapman Report was the first to explicitly articulate the link between satellite communications and Canadian sovereignty. It argued that, in the interests of survival, Canada must identify those technologies central to maintaining its independence and sovereignty, and space technology was directly relevant because it could meet the needs of a large, sparsely populated country. The Science Council of Canada similarly stressed the geographical size and location of Canada meant the development of space-based communication system was central to its political and economic future. ¹⁵ In 1968 the minister of industry released an official white paper stating that a domestic satellite communications was necessary for “the growth, prosperity and unity of Canada.” ¹⁶ In the face of the challenging physical and social characteristics of Canadian territory, it would help tie the country together economically and politically, connecting remote communities in the north and elsewhere to the more populated areas of the country, further connecting eastern and central Canada to the west, and enabling the simultaneous transmission of television programs in both official languages across the country. ¹⁷ For all these reasons, the white paper stated, “the relationship between domestic communication satellites and the national interest is of vital and unique importance.” ¹⁸

The white paper argued for a national undertaking that would see satellite coverage stretch across Canada from coast to coast and north to Ellesmere Island, operating under the jurisdiction of the Canadian government. It envisioned two synchronous satellites in stationary orbit over the equator, each with a beam covering the whole of Canada with the exception of the northern-most islands of the Arctic Archipelago (geostationary satellites have a maximum line of sight to roughly 70 degrees north and south on the planet). One satellite would provide the actual transmission and the other would be held in reserve. Critically, it was important for Canada to act quickly to secure a geostationary orbit “parking space” in the North American corridor. As vast as space is, the geostationary orbit—being highly desirable—could quickly fill up. ¹⁹ The white paper also called for the establishment of Earth stations, to which the satellites would relay their signals before being retransmitted through the terrestrial microwave tower system to the end user. Only at a later stage would the technology exist for satellite transmission directly into homes. ²⁰

By the late 1960s it was government policy to transfer the design and construction technologies for future space programs to Canadian industry. ²¹ There was no thought, therefore, of building a domestic satellite communications system in a government laboratory, as had been the case with Alouette. An Act of Parliament created Telesat Canada as a Canadian Crown corporation on 1 September 1969, with a mandate to provide satellite communications for Canada. The subsequent launch of Anik A1 (“little brother” in Inuktut) in 1972 marked a historic milestone for Telesat and the world because this was the first geostationary domestic communications satellite system. Anik A2 and A3 followed in 1973 and 1975, and, since then, Telesat has launched a whole series of Anik satellites, from A to G, with between one and four satellites in each series. Originally designed to provide communications between points in Canada, and using the C band radio-frequency portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, satellites within the Anik series expanded to include those that cover all of North and South America, and to use not just C band but also the Ku band and the much higher frequency Ka band, portions of the spectrum that allow greater capacity. ²² Today there are five Anik satellites in operation, four F series satellites and the most recent Anik G1, which, notably, also carries an X band payload, a frequency band typically used to support military operations and with coverage throughout parts of the Pacific.

In 1998 Telesat was privatized and sold to Bell Canada. About a decade later, Bell sold the company to Loral Space & Communications of New Jersey and the Public Sector Pension Investment Board of Canada, the latter retaining the majority of the voting shares. ²³ “Once Telesat had an American [part] owner,” points out one longstanding Telesat official, “their civilian satellite communications history became our history.” ²⁴ This explains the naming of the next series of Telesat satellites, the Telstar series. Telstar 1 and 2, the original low Earth orbit communications satellites of the early 1960s, share only their name with the series of Telstar geostationary satellites launched by the US in the decades after, and under the Telesat banner starting in 2009. Located above the equator over the Americas (three satellites); West Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic (two satellites); and South Asia (one satellite), Telesat’s Telstar satellite fleet, launched between 2009 and 2018, provides Ku-band geostationary communications service to almost the entire world.

Canada and military communications satellites

The trajectory for Canadian military satellite communications has been far different than for civilian satellite communications. By 1964 the Space Defence Program had started to take shape, at least on paper, involving Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) participation in the rapidly evolving US space program, including satellite communications. ²⁵ But differing perspectives between the Defence Research Board and the RCAF about the focus of future space efforts, and new national security priorities after the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson was elected in 1963, combined to prevent a policy from crystallizing. A prevailing sense of increased international stability after the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a desire to strengthen civilian control of the military in the wake of that crisis, brought cuts to the military budget and significant changes within the defence department in the years immediately following the release of the 1964 White Paper on Defence.

By the mid-1960s the course was set that Canada would pursue a civilian, but not military, satellite communications system. The Chapman Report, upon which much of Canada’s future space policy was based, stressed that creating a military satellite communications capability would be far more difficult than a civilian/commercial one because of the stringent military requirements with respect to security, reaction time, and survivability. ²⁶ Moreover, it was considered unlikely there would be sufficient Canadian military needs to justify the deployment of a communications satellite network exclusively for military use, and that any “limited requirement” could be met through agreements with other countries to access their military satellites. ²⁷ Subsequent Canadian military intelligence reports confirmed this opinion, and the archival record shows little interest in a military space program after 1969. ²⁸

After it came to power in 1968, the government of Pierre Trudeau maintained and accelerated the direction set by its predecessor. Despite the release of a new defence white paper in 1971 that centred on the Arctic, sovereignty, and continental defence, the Trudeau government oversaw a steady decline in military space investments throughout the 1970s and even during the “Second Cold War” of the early 1980s. When the Canadian Space Program was finally released by the Mulroney government in 1986 the centrepiece was the creation of the Canadian Space Agency, a civilian organization with few ties to the military or to National Defence. ²⁹ A House of Commons report released the following year recommended the government decrease funding for satellite communications and focus on fielding an Earth imaging satellite, Radarsat, to be operated by the Canadian Space Agency. ³⁰

Meanwhile, during the Cold War the US developed and launched a geosynchronous military satellite communications system designed for a very specific purpose: to guarantee the nuclear deterrent. It needed (and continues to need) to ensure that, in the event of nuclear war, the White House would be able to communicate with the US military’s submarines, intercontinental ballistic missile sites, and bombers so that they could, if necessary, launch a nuclear weapon. The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) of satellites, which became operational in 1968, was therefore designed to be a very robust, survivable communications medium. By robust it meant the ability to get a small tactical message to a submarine, missile site or bomber, and the most reliable way of doing so was with a low data rate system. Satellites in this system, launched between 1966 and 2003, carried transponders in super high frequency band and were designed to last about 10 years.

US military satellite communications in the post-Cold War era

The 1991 Gulf War propelled military satellite communications to centre stage. It is difficult to fathom now, but, until that time, it was not the norm for communications by satellite to figure centrally in a war effort. During the height of the Gulf War, often referred to as the “first space war,” some 85 per cent of communications within the Gulf theatre was done by US military satellite, severely stretching America’s existing satellite communications capacity. ³¹ The Gulf War also revealed the need to be able to transmit real-time data and images. During the conflict, military forces used commercial satellites to retrieve live video from CNN. It was clear that America’s planned Milstar series of satellites, launched between 1994 and 2003, would have to move from being “a robust bare bones communications system, to a faster data rate [and] higher bandwidth system,” ³² while at the same time continuing to be protected against electronic warfare, including jamming and interception. With transponders in the extremely high frequency (EHF) band and using a medium data rate, Milstar is a robust protected system of five satellites that can be used both in the event of nuclear conflict and also for high-capacity applications.

Even this new fleet of Milstar dedicated military satellites could only meet a small portion of the soaring bandwidth demand. The 1990s advent of unmanned aerial vehicles that could stream video images, combined with network conceptions of warfare that envisaged ground forces dispersed across the battlefield and connected with one another and with navy and air platforms, created a voracious demand for satellite capacity that continues to grow. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s, the US military had to rely heavily on bandwidth rented from commercial satellite operators, with some 80 per cent of satellite traffic transmitted via commercial satellites. ³³ Indeed, in retrospect, every new American concept of warfighting over the past 40 years, from the Offset Strategy of the 1980s, designed to use advanced military technologies to “offset” the Soviet Union’s numerical advantage in troops, to the Military Technical Revolution and the Revolution in Military Affairs of the 1990s, to Military Transformation in the 2000s, has been utterly dependant on exponentially growing bandwidth requirements. ³⁴

In 2001 Lockheed Martin was contracted to develop and deploy an “Advanced” EHF (AEHF) constellation. Like the Milstar system before it, AEHF would be a protected satellite communications system, designed to withstand electronic warfare and guarantee the nuclear deterrent. At the same time, it would add higher data rate modes, enabling transmission of tactical military communications, such as real-time video battlefield maps, and targeting data. ³⁵ Originally planned for initial deployment in 2006, the system experienced delays, with the first satellite launched in 2010 and the sixth and final one in 2020. The constellation provides 10 times the bandwidth of the Milstar system it was designed to replace; indeed, a single AEHF satellite has greater capacity than the entire legacy five-satellite Milstar system. ³⁶ Located in geostationary orbit, AEHF satellites provide global communications coverage from 65 degrees north latitude to 65 degrees south latitude.

While AEHF operates primarily at the strategic communications level, providing worldwide connectivity to deployed troops, a second US system focuses on the tactical level, providing data transfer, photos, and video between and among troops on the battlefield for tactical command and control, battle management, and combat support. The Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system of geostationary satellites operates in the X and Ka bands, providing global connectivity between 70 degrees north and 70 degrees south. Although encrypted, its satellites’ signals are not as well protected from jamming or intercept as those of the AEHF system. ³⁷ Boeing was awarded the WGS contract back in 2001 to launch a system that could provide high-frequency bandwidth to US forces as a sort of “gap-filler” until such time as the AEHF system could be deployed. But at some point “the constellation originally designed as a gap-filler to augment the DSCS [came to be] known as the ‘backbone’ of the US military’s global satellite communications.” ³⁸ One factor was delays in the deployment of the AEHF system, but another was the escalating demand, in the years after 9/11, for bandwidth at lower and lower levels of the battlefield, in some cases right down to the company level. ³⁹ The WGS system, no longer an interim system, has expanded to almost double the original number of satellites, with the eleventh planned for deployment in 2023.

Canada’s post-Cold War military satellite communications

It was the Mulroney government of the 1980s that first sparked the idea of a dedicated military satellite communications capability for the Canadian Forces. As noted, Canada had released a national space policy in 1986 that was almost exclusively civilian in nature. Yet America’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced in 1983 and involving invitations to allies to participate, had served to underscore that, when it came to military space, Canada’s cupboard was all but bare. Although strongly opposed in Canada, SDI had a positive impact on its military space policy: “Essentially, SDI initiated a strong policy debate that eventually led to the re-establishment of a defence space program in Canada.” ⁴⁰ In 1987 National Defence issued a space policy that included a modestly stated space interest in, among other things, communications. ⁴¹ The following year, Canada launched a research project centred on future military satellite communications needs in the EHF band.

The experience of the Gulf War prompted Canada to operationalize its research interest. In spring 1993, the Department of National Defence established a Canadian military satellite communications project with the specific goal of giving Canada an assured global communications capability. But work proceeded slowly. The change in federal government in fall 1993 and a new set of priorities influenced by the end of the Cold War, high government debt, and hopes of a peace dividend, brought large cuts to the defence budget over the next five years. Yet the cuts were not met by a decline in military activity. To the contrary, the operational tempo of the Canadian Forces dramatically increased as Canada committed troops to missions in Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—all without an assured, secure military satellite communications capability between troops overseas and commanders in Ottawa. America’s announcement in the late 1990s that it would be contracting for an Advanced EHF system therefore sparked interest in Canada, which sought to pay into the system for guaranteed bandwidth. Under a now renamed Protected Military Satellite Communications project Canada negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the US Department of Defense to be involved in developing and fielding America’s AEHF military satellite communications system. ⁴²

In providing guaranteed, protected satellite communications to its troops Canada did not consider launching its own satellite. Rather, it sought access to capacity on a US system by owning a Canadian payload on one of the constellation’s satellites. Canada later signed a further MOU that would give it access to the AEHF system as soon as it was deployed and operational, and still another giving system access until 2024. ⁴³ A large part of the project was to establish the ground terminals, which Canada had in place by the late 2000s as it waited for the satellites to be launched. When, in 2013, Canada placed a call using the AEHF system, the event marked the first time in Canada’s history that it had a dedicated, protected military satellite communications capability. AEHF, defence officials have noted, is “unlike any other satellite communications system: Canada directly controls a portion of the constellation and has guaranteed access and control over apportioned satellite resources.” ⁴⁴

Canada’s experience in Afghanistan in the 2000s, followed by its participation in the NATO operation in Libya in 2011, underscored the critical importance of satellite communications for the exchange of information among units and formations and with headquarters. To this end, under what is known internally in the Canadian government as the Mercury Global project, Canada signed an MOU with the Pentagon in 2012 giving it access to America’s Wideband Global SATCOM system. In exchange for contributing C$340 million to fund a portion of the ninth satellite in the WGS system (launched in 2017), Canada was granted access to the WGS system of satellites for about 20 years. The system gives Canada rapid, secure communications with its troops deployed on domestic or international operations.

A critical shortfall for Canada when it comes to the AEHF and WGS systems is that their communications satellites (being geostationary) do not provide coverage above 65 and 70 degrees latitude, respectively. A significant portion of Canadian territory and territorial waters, which extends well above 80 degrees, has no connectivity with geostationary satellites. The region includes not only sparsely populated land areas but also the most direct route through the Northwest Passage, which lies roughly along the 74th latitude. Shipping along the Northern Sea Route above Russia has gone up significantly in recent years; ⁴⁵ as the Arctic continues to melt, traffic in and around the generally more ice-bound Canadian northern waters will also increase. As a result, even as it was negotiating access to WGS, National Defence was looking to put into orbit a constellation of satellites that would provide communication for the Arctic. ⁴⁶

Through the Enhanced Satellite Communication Project–Polar, Canada seeks to establish military satellite communications with coverage from 65 to 90 degrees north latitude. The project calls for two military satellites in highly elliptical polar orbit, providing wideband communications using the X and Ka band frequencies, as well as ultra high frequency narrow band communications over the North Pole. Designed to work with the satellites of America’s AEHF system, deployment of the highly elliptical satellites would complete Canada’s global satcom access. ⁴⁷ It would also mark the first time in its history that Canada has its own military communications satellite. Yet the project’s future is arguably uncertain; it is moving slowly, is not yet in definition phase, and does not have a budget. Driven by strategic concerns about increased Russian activity in the north, America’s own Enhanced Polar System of two satellites in highly elliptical orbit became fully operational in 2019. ⁴⁸ Rather than pursue its own polar system, Canada would more logically focus on negotiating access to America’s system as it did with AEHF (as it may already be doing). In addition, Canada should turn to new low Earth orbit satellite communications systems, especially that of Telesat.

Enter LEO satcom

LEO satcom systems will play a growing role in global communications in the coming years and decades. The commercial satellite communications story, which started with the non-synchronous satellites Telstar 1 and 2 before moving to the geostationary orbit, is now moving rapidly to include low Earth orbit. As revolutionary as was the advent of geostationary satellites, they are not a panacea when it comes to global communications. They are especially well suited to broadcasting information—the one-way transmission of information to a wide audience such as television—and less suited to interactive situations, where information needs to be updated immediately such as financial transactions on the stock exchange or even a voice conversation between two people. Latency, the round-trip data transmission time between point A and point B on Earth via a satellite (and often a gateway/ground station) causes a delay. At almost 36,000 kilometres up, geostationary satellites produce an average latency of nearly 600 milliseconds, a small but salient figure, with the result that the demand for geostationary satellite communications is sometimes less than what one would expect given the early enthusiasm around their arrival. Those areas of the planet that are more heavily populated have better and faster data transmission options, including microwave towers and fibre-optic cables. Today, notwithstanding the many geostationary communications satellites in orbit, 90 per cent of Internet traffic travels around the world by fibre-optic cable under the sea. ⁴⁹

An obvious solution to latency is to place communications satellites much closer to Earth, but such systems are far more complex and thus costly. Because they are so high up, three properly positioned geostationary satellites can continuously cover the entire world, less the extreme poles, sending their information to a relatively small number of fixed ground stations with large antennas. By contrast, for a low Earth orbit system to provide continuous communications coverage requires hundreds of satellites. Circling the Earth in less than two hours, each satellite must “hand off” transmission to the next satellite as it approaches the horizon. The requirement is for a dramatically increased number of satellites and, absent inter-satellite links, ground stations, along with advanced technology for smaller antennas.

In the late 1990s, several companies attempted to put in place LEO satellite communications systems, including Iridium, Globalstar, Odyssey, and Teledesic. But a combination of the high cost of fielding such systems and low consumer demand meant that all filed for bankruptcy within a few years. Only Iridium continued, under new ownership. ⁵⁰ Its sixty-six satellites service relatively costly (from a commercial consumer perspective) “satellite phones” for niche customers who absolutely need connectivity in remote locations, such as military units.

A convergence of forces has sparked renewed interest in establishing LEO satcom systems. Over the past twenty years, the demand for bandwidth, key to high-speed Internet access, has escalated dramatically and shows no sign of stopping. Indeed, such is the exponential growth in its broadband requirements that the US military is the largest customer of commercial satellite operators today—despite developing its own satellite communications systems. ⁵¹ Meanwhile, satellite technology has advanced. LEO satellites can offer higher bandwidth per user than geostationary satellites and even cable. ⁵² Recent advances in analytics, improved computing power and artificial intelligence algorithms are, in turn, driving technological advances in antennas and ground stations, enabling ground equipment to track multiple fast-moving satellites. ⁵³ Finally, launch costs are also starting to come down, with the advent of reusable rockets demonstrated in recent years by Elon Musk’s SpaceX.

Technological advances are making the whole cycle of building, launching, and tracking satellites a more feasible and less expensive endeavour. When combined with the fact that the latency of a LEO satellite (between 10 and 30 milliseconds) is at least twenty times lower than a geostationary satellite, and even rivals the speed that information travels through fibre-optic cables, these new supply and demand factors are leading to a renaissance in LEO systems. Key contenders, already being deployed, are SpaceX’s Starlink system, initially to comprise about 12,000 satellites operating in Ku and Ka band, 500 to 600 kilometres above the Earth; Telesat’s LEO satellite system of initially 298 satellites operating in Ka band, 1000 kilometres up; and OneWeb, which is owned by the British government and an Indian telecommunications company and already has dozens of satellites in orbit. Amazon also has plans to launch a LEO system of several thousand satellites.

A driving factor behind LEO satcom systems is the opportunity for enhanced global connectivity. Such systems can provide high-speed Internet access to places where fibre-optic cables are not economically viable, like emerging markets in Africa and Central Asia, and even remote spots in developed countries like the US and Canada. They can provide low-latency, high-bandwidth communication connectively to the most isolated areas of the world, such as polar regions that are outside the coverage area of geostationary satellites and the open stretches of the Pacific Ocean which, due to lack of commercial customers, are not well covered by commercial communications satellites. In this regard, potential customers include oil rigs and cargo ships at sea. ⁵⁴

The prospect of low-latency high bandwidth in remote areas of the world has also sparked the interest of military users. By accessing these systems, navies could better operate in the Pacific, while land, sea, and air forces could enhance their operations in the far north. The Telesat LEO system, for example, includes satellites in polar orbit and would fit the Canadian military requirement, stated in its most recent defence policy, to acquire space-based systems that will enhance and improve tactical narrow and wideband communications globally, including throughout Canada’s Arctic region. ⁵⁵ Already, the US military is conducting polar communications experiments in cooperation with SpaceX’s Starlink and OneWeb satellites. ⁵⁶

LEO satcom may also be able to address the critical military requirement for “satcom on the move.” Traditional geostationary satellites provide fixed satellite service, meaning their transponders relay information back to an Earth station with a large fixed antenna pointed at the satellite. But the highly mobile fighting forces of today need direct satellite connectivity to ships, vehicles, and airplanes. A mobile Earth station, known within the industry as an Earth station in motion (ESIM), has antennas that track satellites to maintain connectivity. For decades there have been maritime ESIMs on large naval vessels. But only with recent advances in antenna technology has it been possible to install an Earth station on smaller vessels, aircraft, and especially vehicles. Canada has recently negotiated the acquisition of a satcom-on-the-move capability for its light armoured vehicles, using an ESIM system that will access WGS satellites. ⁵⁷ LEO satcom terminals are now being developed for land-mobile, aeronautical, and maritime platforms, with the goal of providing high-speed, low-latency (equal to fibre-optic cables) Internet connectivity to such platforms even in the most remote areas of the world.

There are important national security implications for the arrival of commercial LEO satcom constellations, which are being built with the military customer in mind. ⁵⁸ LEO systems offer Canada and its allies a degree of resiliency in their national security architectures. Adversaries such as Russia and China see Western military forces’ dependence on space for their operations to be a key vulnerability that can be targeted using a variety of anti-satellite measures, including electronic warfare, cyber-attack, or even physical destruction. LEO satcom is less at risk from these measures because of the redundancy associated with having hundreds or thousands of satellites in their system. For an adversary, the task of disabling the system kinetically with anti-satellite weapons would be costly due to numbers and more difficult because of the speed with which LEO satellites travel around the Earth.

There are risks associated commercial LEO satcom systems. Because they involve hundreds or thousands of satellites in orbit, there is a chance of collision, the creation of orbital debris in low Earth orbit, and therefore the likelihood of more collisions. If taken to its logical conclusion, this cascading effect—known as the Kessler syndrome—could render low Earth orbit unusable. Existing research and modelling around SpaceX and OneWeb are more sanguine, however, stating only that “Additional measures may be required to ensure the safe and sustainable operation of [LEO] constellations, including but not limited to reducing the size and number of satellites launched.” ⁵⁹

A second risk centres on the fact that commercial satellite communications are not protected against electromagnetic warfare, in the same manner as are Milstar and AEHF satellites. This poses a threat to the military forces who are dependent on reliable, secure communications, and to the commercial networks themselves. Hence, the US military has launched its own satellite communications systems over the years, despite the availability of commercial alternatives. Most recently, the Department of Defense began developing its own LEO satcom system, with plans to have hundreds of satellites in orbit by 2026. ⁶⁰ Yet commercial satcom providers are adding greater cyber protection and using more resilient frequencies to make their systems harder to attack. ⁶¹ Travelling faster than geostationary satellites, and using the most advanced technology like small spot beams, LEO satellites would also be less vulnerable to electronic warfare because the geographic area in which an adversary jammer could operate would be significantly reduced. ⁶² An additional factor to consider is that because government procurement programs move so slowly, they often do not reflect the latest technological innovation seen in the commercial industry (for example, some of the new spot beaming technologies). ⁶³ Overall, supplementing traditional satellite communications architectures with (civilian) LEO satcom systems can help guarantee uninterrupted satellite communications during conflicts.

Conclusion

Dramatic change is underway in satellite communications. Early in the space age, Canada recognized the potential such communications held for tying together a vast and sparsely populated country, and thereby upholding its sovereignty—the first responsibility of any Canadian federal government. Yet although a civilian domestic satellite system advanced, military space systems in support of Canadian Forces missions abroad languished. Canada relied on a mix of landline, radio, and commercial satellite communications services, ⁶⁴ along with access to US systems when available. The overall approach worked during the Cold War, but exploded as the myth that it was when long simmering hot wars broke out in the 1990s. Even as the defence budget was slashed, Canadian military forces were heavily engaged in places like Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Canada’s need for assured secure military satellite communications during overseas operations became apparent and prompted it to negotiate access to US military systems. This requirement only escalated in the 2000s and 2010s, with operations in Afghanistan, Libya, the Baltics, and elsewhere.

Today the world is changing again. The Arctic is melting, bringing threats closer to our shores. The pace of Canadian military operations in the Arctic will only grow, and with it the imperative of being able to communicate effectively throughout the northern reaches of our territory and territorial waters. Canada should follow a two-fold effort to meet this most central of sovereignty concerns. Rounding out (along with AEHF) the Canadian military’s access to assured military satellite communications will be important, whether through its own polar communication system or, more feasibly, negotiating access to America’s polar satcom system. But a second and key part of the equation will be LEO satcom, and the obvious contender is Telesat, Canada’s original satellite communications company for promoting Canadian sovereignty. Already the government has announced a future investment in Telesat of more than half a billion dollars. ⁶⁵ The Canadian Forces and Department of National Defence will want to work closely and expeditiously with Telesat to help meet future satellite communications needs, including secure and resilient satellite communications in its polar region. Canada's “orbital CN Rail” is making its polar debut.