The author uses monthly, individual-level data collected from two units within a large U.S. financial corporation to estimate employees' response to the introduction of a group incentive plan. The findings indicate that the incentive plan caused performance to converge to a standard: the initially least productive workers improved greatly, whereas the performance of the initially most productive workers did not change. However, the evidence suggests that the incentive plan was successful in increasing the average level of productivity across the work group.
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