The authors hypothesize that in industries with relatively high levels of job-related injury risk, workers with longer job tenure will more clearly appreciate the degree of job risk than will newly hired workers, and will thus be more willing to accept lower wages in return for higher workers' compensation benefits. This hypothesis is confirmed by an analysis of quit behavior using 1981–83 data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics and 1981–85 data from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.
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