Using data on Pennsylvania public schools for the period 1978–84, the authors investigate the effects of bargainer experience on the frequency and duration of strikes. They find that increases in the negotiation experience of the chief or principal bargainer on either side, as well as increases in the experience of the two bargainers combined, reduce both the frequency and duration of strikes, suggesting that experienced bargainers are more adept than inexperienced bargainers at learning the minimum payoffs demanded by their opponents and conveying their own true positions. Also, strikes are less likely to occur the more equal the experience levels of the two chief bargainers.
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