Although studies have shown that employer opposition negatively affects the likelihood of success at the certification and first-contract stages, there is little to no indication of what the long-term impact of such opposition might be for relationships that successfully conclude a first agreement. Using survival analysis on nearly three decades of data from Ontario, this article investigates whether relationships that experience early conflict encounter a “hangover”—a heightened likelihood of dissolution—that extends into the representation phase of the process, meaning beyond the settlement of the first agreement. Using unfair labor practice charges and first contract arbitration applications as proxies for conflict, the author finds evidence of a hangover for relationships that exhibit a turbulent start. Further, findings suggest that relationships that experience this early conflict also have a higher likelihood of dissolution throughout the entire relationship.
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