Abstract
Introduction
Indian politics has seen a clear centralising tendency that could have serious implications for India’s federal character. Though centralisation was the hallmark of the Congress party’s dominance, it was seen challenged by the regional parties through their enhanced role in the coalitional governments at the Centre since the 1990s. What marks the present phase of centralisation is its being articulated by a grand unitarian and homogenising narrative of Hindu nationalism. The multi-dimensional tension between diversity and equality, one of the principal aspects of India’s democratic journey, when informed by the logic of centralisation could not only be seen impacting the Centre-State relations but also the political economy of development and policy regimes across the States. Through an analysis of the shift in the nationalist articulation and resultant process of centralisation reflects the challenges to and possibilities of democratic resolution of the federal question in India.
The question of federal character of Indian State has once again come under scanner for there is a widely shared apprehension that it is again manifesting a centralising tendency much serious than what was witnessed earlier in Indian politics. The symptoms of this are seen in the present political dispensation at the Centre in terms of persona of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, style of governance, political rhetoric, policy regime, and functioning of institutions.
Though the centralising tendencies in Indian polity apparently seem reflecting a strong sense of déjà vu—in the fashion of ‘history repeating itself’—any sense of history would definitely not render us oblivious to the changes in the context, ideology and logic that inform the present development. Thus, the resultant contestation, macro narratives of nation and nationalism and the hegemonic shift in the narratives should make us reflect on the centralising logic in the present politics that deserves to be theorised afresh (Nandy, 1970, 1989). Thus we need to pay attention to the significant shifts—political, ideological, party-related and even institutional changes that form the context of the dynamics of federalism in India today. What forms the foundation of this change undoubtedly is the decisive macro shift in the political economy of India from a State-planned economy to a liberalised market economy that generated its own dynamics, tensions, and uneven patterns of development in social and economic spatiality resulting in and manifesting as fault lines in terms of regions, classes, communities and so on (Bardhan, 1998; Chatterjee & McCartney, 2020).
This presentation is thus concerned with the interplay of region–nation/State–Centre and trajectory of continuity and change is sought to be mapped through the history of Indian federal democratic journey.
The argument is presented in five parts. First, we seek to map the macro context of Indian politics at the centre of which is the idea of nation and the contestations related to it; second, we attempt a periodisation of Centre–State relations to understand the tension between the logic of centralisation and assertion of autonomy by the States in the shaping of federal politics in India; third, examine the politico-ideological and electoral-party bases of the regional assertions in the post-Emergency period by reflecting on the dialectic of regionalisation of national parties and ‘nationisation’ of regional parties; fourth, how this is controverted in the recent years by a renewed trend of centralisation widely recognised and commented on; and finally, we make an attempt to reflect on the challenges and possibilities of a balanced and democratic resolution of the federal question in India.
Ideas of Nation and Contestations
At the centre of contemporary Indian politics is the question of identity. Indian political discourse has seen many clichés. One of them relevant to the present context is the spatial relation implicit in ‘unity in diversity’. The question is what characterises the process of identity formation in India. Is it unity or diversity/difference? Is the accent on the region or Nation, State or Centre? If the accent is on region/difference then does it pose problems to the national unity? Is it not possible to talk about ‘unity with difference’? The pan-Indian identity accommodating/co-existing/living well with assertion of regional linguistic political identities. Are these identities—(pan-) Indian and different regional identities mere spatial identities or identities informed by historical, political economic and deeper social/cultural symbolic factors, resources and investments?
The question of identity is intrinsically related to and deeply informed by the politics of hegemony and contestations forming the context. The recent debate on nationalism has brought the crisis of politics of Indian identity formation in the post-Independence period to the fore. There could be identified two phases in the structure of hegemonic politics centred on nationalism in India. One is that which was championed by the Congress and its brand of nationalism that claims its legacy traced back to the anti-colonial nationalist movement; and two, the idea of Hindutva nationalism. Apart from them there could be identified a third strand that sought to articulate Indian identity by highlighting the difference without compromising on unity and integrity and the formation and assertion of regional identities. This strand, as we shall see later, could become influential in the 1990s but not hegemonic.
Since critical to this discussion is the notion of nation and nationalism, it would be instructive to take a brief theoretical detour of nationalism as an idea and reality. The political theorist Anderson (1983) proposes that a sense of an ‘imagined community’ is crucial to the making of nationalism - the political-cultural-ideological formation that forges national identity. The act of imagining, he argues, is the basis on which ‘a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together’ (ibid., p. 40). This is made possible because of ‘print capitalism’ which created an ‘explosive interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity’ (ibid., p. 46). Anderson emphasises the role of print capitalism in creating the possibility of a vast market and ‘unified fields of exchange and communication’ cutting across ‘spoken vernaculars’ (ibid., p. 47) in which certain dialects played a dominant part in communication through printing. Anderson credits print capitalism of making it possible for ‘growing number of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways’ (ibid., p. 40), so that they can imagine themselves as a community on the basis of which modern national identity becomes possible. Thus, going by the Andersonian perspective, print-capitalism and linguistic standardisation are necessary conditions for the creation of an imagined community.
There is no denying of the pertinence of the theoretical insight of the Andersonian conceptualisation to the largely homogenous context of the European nation-state formations. Its relevance to the understanding of nation-formation in the colonial, late-modern, multi-lingual, cultural contexts becomes problematic. The transitional specificities of these societies need to be borne in mind for they bring in historical and sociological complexities that defy simplifications and generalisations. The conceptualisation of the idea of India as a nation that is inclusive, heterogeneous and plural constitutes a historical experiment/ experience that cannot be fitted in the Andersonian frame and thus needs to be understood and theorised differently (Srinivasulu, 2011).
The Indian nationalist movement and the post-colonial Indian State and the constitutional framework were premised on and valued the diversity, plurality and multiplicity not as contradictory but as complementary and harmonious (Singh & Saxena, 2021). This does not mean that one could be complacent about the contrary possibilities. But vigilance cannot and should not lead to distrust and division. The hope of the nationalist leadership and their efforts to forge a united and democratic India, seen in contrast to other post-colonial experiences, have largely been successful (Brown, 1994).
Despite the stated inclusiveness of secular nationalism as the framework in the post-independence period there could be seen serious tensions between the States and the Centre and even among the States. The logic of uneven development that was conspicuous during the colonial period became explicit and even volatile as evident in the statehood movements and discursive articulations and political agitations against centralisation after Independence. This assumed movement, organisational and party forms of articulation, in various regional contexts. The rise of the non-Congress governments since the late 1960s and later problematised the unquestioned national claims of the Congress.
The Congress at the Centre, especially under Indira Gandhi, sought to denounce and delegitimise these regional aspirations and articulations for autonomy as ‘fissiparous’ tendencies thereby underplaying the historical and socio-economic basis of these expressions. As these formations became widespread and more articulate and shaped up as anti-Congress, so became their discrediting more vigorous. If these articulations seen in the rise of regional parties became pronounced in the post-Emergency period, their imprint on national politics was undeniable during the 1990s and later. Though this experience brought new dynamics to Centre–State relations, it is unfortunate that it did not attract enough theoretical attention and reflection.
The present context of debate on Indian nationalism, informed by the unitarian Hindutva view as against the pluralist nationalist views, calls into question the importance and place of spatial political and cultural identities which renders the federal question, the question of Centre-State relations, problematic. This can be best understood by locating it in the historical trajectory of the post-Independence India’s democratic politics.
One of the principal aspects of India’s democratic journey can be identified in terms of the tension between diversity and equality. If diversity can be understood not merely as physical territoriality but as socio-cultural spatiality, then the equality claims can be seen assuming a variety of forms of class, caste, gender, ethnicity and so on, depending on space and time. In spite of the conceptual distinctions, they have not been exclusive but mutually influential and enhancing.
Any inquiry into India’s federal question must keep the historical fact of there being different trajectories of modernity in the political and social spheres in the colonial British India and native princely India which had a significant bearing on politics at the time of India being constituted as a republic, and later developments. For this, historical specificity has been quite visible in the demands for linguistic States and later demands for separate States like Telangana and Marathwada, which are articulated in terms of cultural diversity and developmental disparities despite linguistic commonality.
Keeping these historical and conceptual preliminaries in view, we can identify a periodisation in the federal democratic journey of India to make sense of the importance and urgency of addressing the challenges that the Indian federal state faces today and what they mean to states––small and big, new and old. The basis of evaluation of the federal sojourn obviously is power—its dynamics, structure, location, its flow and direction—its circulation and distribution. In other words, federalism is about Centre-State relations—that is, relations of power, and the resultant competition, conflict, cooperation, adjustments and so on.
Periodisation of Indian Federalism
To map the trajectory of Indian federalism and electoral democracy, we need to factor in the changes in the party system, the terms of discourse and their differential social base and appeal and even social movements which are indicators of the changing peoples’ perceptions and aspirations. It is pertinent to note the importance of political and policy regimes in shaping and reinforcing identities, and therefore representing different physiognomy of political and electoral mobilisation. When we examine and seek to map this mosaic, we see definite shifts and crystallisation with clear temporal and spatial delineations (Srinivasulu, 2009).
Thus, the periodisation of the Indian federalism based on changing political economy, fluctuating/ uneven institutional maps and shifting social and political trajectories can be understood in terms of three broad phases, discussed below.
1947–1977: The High Point of Centralisation
The first two decades after Independence was a period of Congress dominance during which the Congress acted more as a ‘system’ a la Kothari (1964), rather than as a party. Despite its defeat in seven States in 1967 State elections, Congress continued to exercise a centralised control. This was a period which saw a prioritisation of nation-building and state-building as challenges before the country. The most daunting challenge was to forge among the population a sense of participation and ownership in the process of nation-making. The dominant narrative of this phase could be termed as ‘Nationisation of Indian politics’. The study of Indian politics of this period by scholars like Morris-Jones (1971) and Kothari (2012) viewed India from above with all-India, nation/Centre as the primary or principal vantage point, and the region, province and State seen as secondary and derivative in terms of methodological premise, also as an ontological priority.
This was also a period when India was discovering its own political self as an electoral democracy. To achieve this, it was necessary to see to it that people participated in the electoral process enthusiastically and with a sense of ownership. It was a daunting task for the political parties, their cadre and leaders to mobilise electoral support given the fact that traditional social structures of dominance like caste, tribe, religion which were acting as barriers to the process of democratisation. It is a play of the contradiction between formal political equality informing the principle of ‘one man, one vote’ granted by the Constitution and the gross social and economic inequality structured by the caste society that denied the possibility of ‘one man, one value’ that Dr Ambedkar spoke emphatically about in his last address on ‘life of contradictions’ to the Constituent Assembly (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1949, p. 979).
Despite this caution, political parties cutting across ideological spectrum found the existing structures like caste, tribe and religion to be convenient instruments for the mobilisation of popular electoral support. Due to the long term political and electoral use these structures in fact have acquired centrality in the political processes thus becoming formidable impediments to the political freedom and choices of the subaltern castes. This proved to be clearly in contravention to Dr. Ambedkar’s prescient forewarning in the above speech.
1977–1989: The Transitional Period
Despite its symbolic significance, the Janata Party rule (1977–1980), due to its internal bickerings, could not consolidate the historic anti-Congress mandate; it instead only proved to be a brief interlude. The Congress came back in 1980 and its continuing in power till 1989 did not make it status quo ante. As American political scientists Rudolph and Rudolph (1981) argued, the 1980 Congress victory was not the ‘restoration’ of the party but was a consequence or effect of the Janata Party’s disaster. What is historic about the Janata Party experiment is that in spite it being a short interregnum, it could be seen as reflecting significant changes in the history of Indian federal trajectory driven by the anti-Emergency political spirit as a reaction to the centralising logic of the Congress High Command. It demolished the invincibility of the Congress party in Indian politics in particular and problematised the myth of the one-party dominance or one-dominant party system in general.
In the backdrop of the Emergency and Congress debacle, we can see a structural shift in Indian politics in terms of the emergence, rise and stabilisation of regional parties. The rise to power of the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh (AP) in the early 1980s for instance can be seen as the locus classicus of this process.
Another significant change in sociological terms was the expansion of civil and subaltern society spheres as evident in the rise of grassroots movements like those of the adivasis, Dalits, women, farmers, students, civil rights and environmental movements. These movements inspired by a variety of ideological sources like Ambedkar, Lohia, Gandhi sought to bring people’s aspirations, and demands to the fore against the tendency of centralisation implicit in state actions, political economy of development and dominant structures. The regional parties, being closer to the ground, had to respond to these demands. One decisive change that could be seen in the post-Emergency period is the rise of subaltern participation in the electoral process and openings for their engagement in the political processes.
What is remarkable about the post-Emergency political landscape is not only the increasing demand for democratic decentralisation and efforts at the renegotiation of Centre–State relations with the autonomy of the States in view but also its organic relation with efflorescence of popular aspirations and the rise of subaltern activism. Thus, Centre–State relations could be seen acquiring social depth and political seriousness in the post-Emergency period. Needless to state, this was a gradual process that had its ups and downs and intermittent hitches.
1989–2014: Coalitional Phase
Since the late 1980s, we see the rise of multi-party coalitional governments at the Centre. One significant shift seen during this period in Indian politics is the moving of the regional parties to the centre of Indian politics as partners in the governments and decision-making. Irrespective of their numbers in the national legislature, these parties, small and large, could see themselves as partners in the governance process. It is interesting to note, that as a mark of their national presence and importance some regional parties, like for instance, the TDP, spelt out their foreign policy perspective in their election manifestoes, which was unthinkable during the period of Congress dominance at the Centre (Shatrugna, 1983, p. 333).
In all these government formations, policymaking and governance, the regional parties played a central role. Some of these governments were led by the leaders of regional and small parties. There is an influential view that because of the large presence of small parties, these coalitional governments were in an unstable state impacting the quality of governance and continuity of policy regimes.
This period saw four coalitional governments, which are as follows:
What is remarkable about this period is that it could pave the way for the centrality of the political spatial diversity and regional specificities in the national governance as never before. Equally importantly, the absence of central imposition, which was quite conspicuous in the period of a strong one-party rule, could give ample scope for the regional governments to shape their own developmental and welfare policy regimes and governance models, keeping the state specificities in view. This had not only empowered the States in a symbolic sense but could also be seen resulting in the enhancement of their policy and governance capabilities.
Further in the context of economic liberalisation, what was required was the need to evolve and put in place a new relationship between the State and the Market so that private capital investments could find it investor-friendly and attractive. Forging a competitive market economy that could win the investors’ confidence required a pro-active governmental intervention and facilitating of capital by moving away from the overbearing dirigiste policy regime of the State command economy by easing the investment atmosphere. It was not enough to initiate such reforms at the national level alone.
Given the size and complexity of India, what was required was an active participation of the States in the opening up of the economy. An accommodative Centre could alone provide space to the States to chalk out their own strategies of coming to grips with the changing dynamics of liberalising market economy. This period of multi-party coalitions at the Centre, in fact, could provide ample space to the regional governments to evolve their own policy mechanisms and interventions. This was evident in the increasing competition among the States for investments. The experience of undivided AP under Chandrababu Naidu was a clear example of this.
Logic of Regionalisation of Indian Politics
The political assertion of regionality in Indian politics could be said to have started with the coming to power of the non-Congress governments in the states in the late 1960s. Interestingly, the regional assertion had taken anti-Congress format as the Congress by virtue of its dominance at the Centre became the counterpoint to the demands for regional autonomy and power devolution The Emergency in a significant sense gave a further fillip to the assertion and consolidation of regional identities. This was evident from the rise of regional party formations in almost all the States and that they assumed such a prominence that even the Congress coming back to power at the Centre in 1980 could not be read as the reassertion of a national party riding over the regional assertions. In fact, the story of Indian federal experience clearly demonstrated that there was no contradiction between strong regional aspirations and national unity.
This is proved by the coalitional experience in which the regional parties came to play a central strategic role in the government formation at the Centre regardless of pre-poll or post-poll alliances. The formation of NF, UF, NDA-I and UPA during the 1990s and 2010s, or later the talk of a ‘federal front’ (or a third front), highlights the criticality of regional parties in Indian politics and government formation at the national level.
The centrality of regional parties in Indian politics can also be seen to be evident from the following patterns of electoral–political contestations in different states (Srinivasulu, 2020):
States where there was a direct contest between the Congress and the BJP (e.g., Gujarat, Rajasthan, MP) the Congress and the CPI(M) (Kerala) States where there was a contest between the Congress and a regional party (e.g., Telangana) States where there was a contest between the BJP and a regional party (e.g., North East) States where there was a contest between two or more regional parties (e.g., AP) States where there was a contest with the national parties in alliance with regional parties (e.g., Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra) States where there was a multi-cornered contest involving both national and regional parties (e.g., Karnataka)
Thus the logic of regionalisation of Indian politics given its impact on the nature of competition, polarisation and opposition had an important bearing on the electoral politics and mobilisational strategies of parties, including the national parties.
What is analytically useful is to unravel the deeper logic underlying India’s post-Independence political history. As evident from the above analysis, it is at one level, a conflict between the view of India ‘from above’ that is the macro—all-India/Centre as the point of reference and the vision of India as a nation of multiple and diverse linguistic cultural regions. It would be no exaggeration to state that the journey of Indian politics has been underlined by the move away from the spirit of overt centralisation the acme of which was the Emergency, to what can meaningfully called regionalisation or federalisation of Indian politics. This is being recognised by the parties concerned unfortunately only as a matter of real politik not as the spirit of Indian politics as evident from the following developments. Firstly, as a recognition of the regionalisation process the so-called national parties have shown their reconciliation to the fact of presence and strength of regional parties and need for alliances with them. Secondly, reconfiguration of the political–electoral contestation not in terms of two national parties but of two major coalitions.
In spite of the compulsions of the body politic the resistance to this ground reality and reluctance to reconcile to its dynamics was initially evident in the national parties. This is quite often to their detriment. In the case of the Congress which because of its structure, tradition and dynastic impulses was resistant to the bottom-up demand for decentralisation and continued to adhere to High Command system. This had paved the way to the splits in the Congress with the influential regional leaders moving away from the party and forming their own separate parties. The Trinamool Congress in Bengal, the Nationalist Congress Party in Maharashtra and the Yuvajana Shramika Rythu Congress Party in AP are the reactions to the Congress style of inner party over-centralisation.
The BJP, on the other hand, curiously contrary to the projection of being an all-India party with internal ideological homogeneity and organisational uniformity, is deeply regional and in fact tactfully accommodative of social-cultural symbolic spatial heterogeneity. BJP’s political and electoral spread and success lies in the fact that it has its eyes and ears to the ground-swell of regional diversity and resultantly has displayed ideological-organisational flexibility. This is in contrast to the repugnant rigidity of the Congress.
The physiognomy of the BJP presents a strong regionalised manifestation in terms of persona, form, ideology, political and symbolic imagery, social base, alliances, etc. The BJP, thus, displays differential character in each region and thereby has benefited from its sensitivity to regional specificities. The BJP in Rajasthan (which for instance, political scientist Rob Jenkins called ‘Rajput’ Hindutva (Jenkins, 1994) is different from the BJP in Karnataka, and the BJP in Gujarat is different from the BJP in MP.
Two important aspects of the decentralisation logic of this phase could be identified:
Regionalisation/federalisation of the so-called national parties if not openly at least tacitly keeping the compulsions of practical electoral politics in view; thus we see national parties recognising and tuning themselves to the regional identity assertions in political, ideological, and linguistic-cultural terms. ‘Nation’-isation of the regional parties—regional parties harbouring national ambitions and thereby demanding share in power at the Centre.
Logic of Re-centralisation
As suggested in the beginning, it is widely recognised that there is a revert to the process of centralisation in Indian politics after a couple of decades of efforts by different stakeholders armed at keeping the Centre–State relations in a state of balance. This tendency at centralisation can be traced back to the victory of the BJP-led NDA in the 2014 elections and said to have consummated with the BJP emerging as the largest party on its own in the 2019 elections. This raises the questions of why and how this became possible in spite the long duree and larger dynamics prevailing to the contrary.
The answer to these questions can be catalogued around four axes: immediate contextual, politico-ideological and persona-related. To begin with, elections in India in general have increasingly been assuming plebiscitary character, especially in the State contexts with regional political parties becoming supremo-centric. The morphology of Indian party system shows that a majority of them, especially the regional parties, have a supremo in the lead with his family exercising control and banking on the support and resources of a caste or closely related caste-cluster. With total control of the leader, whose endorsement is a mere periodic ritual meant to meet a formal statutory requirement, over the party organisation and legislative wing, the individual members have hardly any freedom to exercise. In this structure, there is a general tendency towards iconisation of the leader on whose image and charisma elections are fought.
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the rise of one of the regional/State leaders, Narendra Modi, to the central leadership of the party and his subsequent emergence as its Prime Ministerial candidate is a clear indication of the acceptance of the forces of federalisation in Indian politics. Curiously herein lies the paradox: how could a State-level leader of a national party rising from the level of a regional leader to fight the national elections signify re-centralisation in the party and government?
The answer to this question is complex and has to be multi-variant. Part of the answer lies in the plebiscitary character that Indian elections have increasingly assumed. The elections to the national legislature in 2014 were played from the campaign stage itself on the persona of Narendra Modi projected as the prime ministerial candidate. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that, after Indira Gandhi, it is Modi who assumed an iconic status in the 2014 election campaign and his role in leading the BJP to power strengthened his image both in the party and in popular perception. In fact, the 2014 elections were clearly bestowed with a plebiscitary character. The 2018 elections reinforced this trend.
At a deeper ideological level, the Hindutva notion of nationalism emphasising on homogeneity and singularity emphasises and justifies unitarian character of India in its imagination of the nation. This idea of nation as a unity naturally assumes, in fact, gets predicated on centralisation. Needless to say, this view has huge implications for difference, heterogeneity and plurality based on region, language, culture and religion.
The undermining of the necessity and desirability of balanced Centre–State relations has to be seen in the ideological context of underplaying of political and cultural character of regional identities and attempt to supersede their specificities by projecting national identity as a homogeneous and monolithic one. This is what informs the slogan of ‘One Nation, One Election, ……’ and so on. The question is: is it possible, and in fact desirable, to aim at such a singular uniformity in the name of nationalism when these are the matters of statecraft and governance?
On the political policy level, a series of policy measures initiated since 2014 clearly show the centralising direction of the present ruling dispensation. The policy of demonetisation has come under criticism as an instance of the interventionist propensity of the regime (Reddy, 2017). The dormancy of the Inter-State Council which is provided for in the Constitution by Article 263 as the platform for the Centre–State government policy formulation and also for resolution of inter-governmental disputes. Recognising its importance for the healthy Centre–State relations the Sarkaria Commission on Central State Relations and later the M.M. Punchhi Commission also recommended the strengthening of the Inter-State Council (Singh, 2001–2002; Singh & Saxena, 2021, pp. 190–192).
The institutional changes and interference are sure indicators of the tendency at political centralisation. The Planning Commission had played a pivotal role in enforcing fiscal federalism in India. It had also played a commendable part in the process of planning for development with social welfare thrust. With the replacement of it by the National Institution for Transforming India Aayog, perceived as a neo-liberal think-tank, the view that the State has distanced itself from its social welfare commitment got credence (Patnaik, 2015). Any disturbance in the institutional edifice that is a basis of good governance would have unsettling impact on the Centre–State relations.
The above analysis, in fact, suggests that the present NDA rule is marked by a tendency at centralisation of powers. This is visible in the domain of policymaking, institutional functioning and political posturing. The idea of coalition dharma that was considered to be central to the Vajpayee government, which accorded due respect and participation to the alliance partners, is said to have been undermined in the NDA-II. This means that, through the marginalisation of the members of the coalition the representation of the state aspirations and regional diversity have been sidelined and the scenario for centralisation is reinforced.
The Way Forward
The present exercise of evaluating the trajectory of India’s federal journey, and especially of assessing the twists and turns in the federal spirit, identifies that the check to the present centralising dispensation lies in the strength of the regional parties/ regimes in the States. It is also necessary to map and identify the positive energies, potentialities and resources that would re-energise the federal spirit and democratic impulses in the Indian society and politics as decentralisation and democracy are inseparable processes.
It is instructive to reflect on the political and social basis of neo-centralising tendencies, especially seen in the background of a long history of demand and collective efforts at federal decentralisation.
Historically every centralising tendency has attracted the counter-processes, articulating the deep-seated desire for identity and autonomy. To cite one instance, in the 1980s, when the Indira Gandhi regime through the office of the Governor, dislodged N. T. Rama Rao (NTR) as the CM of AP, NTR, then a novice in politics, reacted by asserting the authenticity of the State autonomy through active mobilisation of popular support.
This further ignited NTR to play a key role in putting together a non-Congress NF in the 1980s. Its success in forming a government at the Centre (1989–1991) sprang up from the view that it is the States, not the Centre, which should be the vantage point from which Indian politics must be viewed and decided.
Now this raises a crucial question: why is there a conspicuous non-response or response not commensurate to the challenge from the regional parties? Of course, with few exceptions apart, when they draw their inspiration from the political spirit of the 1980s, to the above discussed policies and interventions that adversely impact not only the interests of the States but also undermine the autonomy and identity of the federating units.
Interestingly, in the absence of formal institutional political party responses, it is likely that the reactions could come from unexpected quarters—it could be the civil society or the youth and students or new political outfits (Srinivasulu, 2019).
In a significant sense the Jallikattu Marina Occupy Movement in Chennai could be read as a cultural-symbolic response to the centralising tendency that is seen as imposing a homogeneous view of India. Jallikattu is a way of asserting the difference, heterogeneity and distinct identity. This is not a far-fetched reading when one factors in the strong anti-Centre and anti-Hindi historical background of Tamil Nadu (Rajasekaran & Sankar, 2017).
The point to be noted is that if formal institutions that are meant to take care, safeguard and maintain healthy Centre–State relations are interfered with and rendered ineffective and the mechanisms and processes of articulating difference, dissent and opposite points of view are blocked, then the differences could seek to find a plethora of modes and ways, sometimes possibly undesirable, to ventilate the frustrations emerging from the denial.
It is instructive to note that given the diversity and complexity of a country like India, any attempt to impose a unitarian model of nation, development and politics could not only be counterproductive but also put democracy in peril. The States should be facilitated to be partners in the nation-building and development processes on the basis of mutual recognition, respect, reciprocity and responsibility. A healthy and critical discursive interaction between various stakeholders, including the States and the Centre, would alone lead to democratic expansion and to the evolving of appropriate models of development.
For the development of a country of India’s vastness and diversity, it needs to be emphasized, harmony and cooperation between the Centre and the States are essential.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article