Challenges Faced by Independent Regulatory Agencies in India

Abstract

This article examines the challenges faced by independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in India today. It scrutinises the working of some trust-based self-regulating institutions, which the Government of India (GoI) is in the process of converting into a non-trust-based IRA framework. The article then reviews the functioning of the non-trust-based regulatory institutions through the lens of the electricity sector. It does this by examining the performance of these institutions against a ‘4CA’ framework: Capture, Capacity, Commitment, Communication and Accountability. It then attempts to draw generic lessons for regulators across all sectors. The article further examines additional challenges sectoral regulators will face arising from three areas: first, data privacy concerns and the requirements the proposed data regulator may impose; second, the interface with cross-sectoral regulators like the Competition Commission of India (CCI) which have jurisdiction across sectors; and third, interaction between sectoral regulators themselves.

Keywords

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs)trust-based or non-trust-based regulation 4CA structure of regulation interface between sectoral regulators and cross-sectoral regulators

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