This study examines the influence on CEO pay practices of four corporate control perspectives: managerial control, class hegemony, external control, and efficient market. The results indicate the influence of both market and extra-market controls on the determination of CEO pay levels and criteria. Implications for the governance of firms and the study of corporate control are drawn.
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