This paper presents a classification scheme to be used as a starting point for comparing and integrating the multitude of bargaining models that have been developed. Additionally, in tabularform the strengths, limitation, and selected examples for each model type are presented. Unlike most taxon-omies, the categories are presented in pictorial form. This unique mode of presentation helps the reader more easily undserstand the given classifica-tion scheme as well as point to areas for possible future research and integration.
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