This study explored the causes and effects of defecting from a stable coalition. Vulnerability and the relative power of the defectors were the primary independent variables. Results showed that defectors were obtaining higher payoffs than nondefectors prior to their defection. Defection from stable coalitions in the four coalition games studied here led to reduced benefits for both the defectors and the nondefectors. At the same time defectors fared better than nondefectors, with vulnerability reducing the defectors' benefits. Relative power, over all conditions, led to significantly more positive outcomes than relative equality or weakness. The data also suggested that vulnerable defectors may fare more poorly than their nondefecting partners. The use of coalitions as models of a variety of interactions and the social contexts that facilitate or block defections are also discussed.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
ARONSON, E.The theory of cognitive dissonance: A current perspective. in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 4). New York: Academic Press, 1969.
2.
AUMANN, R. J., & MASCHLER, M.The bargaining set for cooperative games. In M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Advances in game theory. Princeton: University Press, 1964.
3.
CAPLOW, T.Principles of organization. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964.
4.
CASTORE, C. H., & MURNIGHAN, J. K.Determinants of support for group decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1978, 22, 75-92.
5.
CHERTKOFF, J. M.Social psychological theories and research on coalition formation. In S. Groennings, E. W. Kelley, & M. Leiserson (Eds.) The study of coalition behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970.
6.
COLEMAN, J. S.A theory of revolt within an authority structure. Paper presented at the meetings of the Public Choice Society, Charleston, S.C., 1979.
7.
DAVIS, K. W., & JONES, E. E.Changes in interpersonal perception as a means of reducing cognitive dissonance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 402-410.
8.
DAWES, R. M., MCTAVISH, J., & SHAKLEE, H.Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a common dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1977, 35, 1-11.
9.
GAMSON, W. A.A theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Review, 1961, 26, 271-280.
10.
GAMSON, W. A.Power and discontent. Homewodd, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1968.
11.
HIRSCHMAN, A. O.Exit, voice, and loyalty. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard university Press, 1970.
12.
JENNINGS, E. E.Routes to the executive suite. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
13.
KOMORITA, S. S.A weighted probability model of coalition formation, Psychological Bulletin, 1974, 81, 242-256.
14.
KOMORITA, S. S., & CHERTKOFF, J. M.A bargaining theory of coalition formation. Psychological Review, 1973, 80, 149-162.
15.
LEWIN, K.Field theory in social science. New York: Harper and Row, 1951.
16.
MCDONALD, J. D.The game of business. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1975.
17.
MURNIGHAN, J. K.Models of coalition behavior: Game theoretic, social psychological, and political perspectives. Psychological Bulletin, 1978, 85, 1130-1153. (a)
18.
MURNIGHAN, J. K.Strength and weakness in four coalition situations. Behavioral Science, 1978, 23, 195-208. (b)
19.
MURNIGHAN, J. K., & LEUNG, T. K.The effects of leadership involvement and the importance of the task on subordinates' performance. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1976, 17, 299-310.
20.
RAPOPORT, A., & CHAMMAH, A. M.Prisoner's dilemma. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965.
21.
ROTH, A. E., & MURNIGHAN, J. K.Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1978, 17, 189-198.
22.
SALANCIK, G. R.Commitment and the control of organizational behavior and belief. In B. M. Staw and G. R. Salancik (Eds.), New directions in organizational behavior. Chicago: St. Clair Press, 1977.
23.
SHAPLEY, L. S.A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games (Vol. 2). Princeton; Princeton university Press, 1953.
24.
STRYKER, S.Coalition behavior. In C. G. McClintock (Ed.), Experimental social psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972.
25.
THIBAUT, J. W., & KELLEY, H. H.The social psychology of groups. New York: John Wiley, 1959.
26.
VON NEUMANN, J., & MORGENSTERN, O.The theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
27.
WEICK, K. E.The social psychology of organizing (2nd ed.). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
28.
WEICK, K. E., & PENNER, D. D.Triads: A laboratory analogue, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1966, 1, 191-211.
