Abstract
The effects of (J) information about the distribution of subunit influence, (2) information about the subunit's standing on various dimensions, and (3) the effects of advocating that allocations be based on dimensions favoring the subunit were examined for a sample of academic departments in a large state university. Advocating the use of criteria favorable to the subunit was positively related to allocations, particularly for more powerful subunits and less critical and scarce resources. Knowledge about the organization's political structure primarily benefitted the allocations of less powerful de-partments. These results heldfor resources allocated through committees of department representatives. However, for general fund allocations, made through an administrative decision process, advocacy tended to decrease re-source allocations, with this effect observed more for high power depart-ments. The results are discussed in terms of the liaison role of the administrator, employing the conceptualization of the organization as a political economy.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
