Decision Processes,Expectations,and Adoption of Strategies in Zero-Sum Games

Abstract

To examine the possibility that expectations and related psychological variables interact with the direction of payoff to determine strategies in zero-sum games, an experiment by Lieberman (1962) was replicated and extended. Subjects played 300 trials on matrixes without saddle points against an opponent's minimax strategy or strategies that increased or decreased payoffs. Findings showed that subjects who received decreased payoffs shifted to minimax strategies but subjects who received increased payoffs exploited the game beyond the values established by the manipulation. Findings of post-experimental interviews indicated that increased payoffs led to relatively accurate expectations and judgments of the game, and two separate individual decision processes are proposed to account for the adoption of mixed strategies.

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References

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