We identify limits of ‘reflexive governance’ by examining the UK Code of Corporate Governance that is celebrated for its ‘reflexivity’. By placing the historical genesis of the Code within its politico-economic context, it is shown how its scope and penetration is impeded by a shallow, ‘single loop’ of reflexivity. Legitimized by agency theory, the Code is infused by a ‘cultural grammar’ that perpetuates relations of shareholder primacy as it restricts accountability to narrow forms of information disclosure directed exclusively at shareholders. Engagement of a deeper, ‘double loop’ reflexivity allows account to be taken of the historical conditions and theoretical conceptions that shape practices and outcomes of corporate governance. Only then is it possible to disclose, challenge and reform narrow conceptions, boundaries and workings of ‘reflexive governance’.
AbbottKWSnidalD (2000) Hard and soft law in international governance. International Organization54(3): 421–456.
2.
AgliettaMRebériouxA (2005) Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder Value. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
3.
AilonG (2011) Mapping the cultural grammar of reflexivity: The case of the Enron scandal. Economy and Society40(1): 141–166.
4.
AllenWT (1992) Our schizophrenic conception of the business corporation. Cardozo Law Review14(2): 261–281.
5.
ArcotSBrunoV (2006) In letter but not in spirit: An analysis of corporate governance in the UK. Available at: SSRN 819784.
6.
ArgyrisCSchönDA (1978) Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
7.
ArmourJDeakinSKonzelmannSJ (2003) Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of UK corporate governance. British Journal of Industrial Relations41(3): 531–555.
BerkGSchneibergM (2005) Varieties in capitalism, varieties of association: Collaborative learning in American industry, 1900 to 1925. Politics & Society33(1): 46–87.
10.
BerleAAMeansGC (2007 [1932]) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, revised edn. New Brunswick, NJ; London: Transaction.
11.
BiondiYCanzianiAKiratT (2007) The Firm as an Entity: Implications for Economics, Accounting and the Law. Abingdon: Routledge.
12.
BlairMM (1995) Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
13.
BoltanskiLChiapelloE (2007) The New Spirit of Capitalism. London: Verso.
14.
BowdenS (2000) Corporate governance in a political climate: The impact of public policy regimes on corporate governance in the UK. In: ParkinsonJEGambleAKellyG (eds) The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 175–194.
15.
BrattonWWJr (1989) The ‘nexus of contracts’ corporation: A critical appraisal. Cornell Law Review74(2): 407–465.
CankarNKDeakinSSimonetiM (2010) The reflexive properties of corporate governance codes: The reception of the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach in Slovenia. Journal of Law and Society37(3): 501–525.
18.
ChorevNBabbS (2009) The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO. Theory and Society38(5): 459–484.
19.
CliftBGambleAHarrisM (2000) The Labour Party and the company. In: ParkinsonJEGambleAKellyG (eds) The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 51–82.
20.
CollisonDCrossSFergusonJ (2014) Financialization and company law: A study of the UK Company Law Review. Critical Perspectives on Accounting25(1): 5–16.
21.
CousinsJMitchellASikkaP (1991) Towards Corporate Accountability: A Submission to the Cadbury Committee on Corporate Governance.
22.
CrouchC (2011) The Strange Non-Death of Neo-Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity.
23.
DailyCMJohnsonJL (1997) Sources of CEO power and firm financial performance: A longitudinal assessment. Journal of Management23(2): 97–117.
24.
DailyCMDaltonDRCannellaAA (2003) Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Academy of Management Review28(3): 371–382.
25.
DavisGF (2009) Managed by the Markets: How Finance Re-Shaped America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26.
De SchutterODeakinS (2003) Reflexive governance and the Dilemmas of social Regulation. European Law Review28: 814.
27.
DeakinS (2009) Reflexive governance and European company law. European Law Journal15(2): 224–245.
28.
DeetzS (1992) Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonization: Developments in Communication and the Politics of Everyday Life. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
29.
DuménilGLévyD (2001) Costs and benefits of neoliberalism. A class analysis. Review of International Political Economy8(4): 578–607.
30.
EzzamelMReedM (2008) Governance: A code of multiple colours. Human Relations61(5): 597–615.
31.
EzzamelMWatsonR (1997) Wearing two hats: The conflicting control and management roles of non-executive directors. In: KeaseyKThompsonSWrightM (eds) Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues: Economic and Financial Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 54–79.
32.
EzzamelMWillmottHWorthingtonF (2008) Manufacturing shareholder value: The role of accounting in organizational transformation. Accounting, Organizations and Society33(2–3): 107–140.
33.
GarrattB (forthcoming) Valuing corporate governance as a national leadership asset: Changing the leadership focus to behaviours and values rather than codes and compliance. Governance Directions Journal.
34.
GlynosJKlimeckiRWillmottH (forthcoming) Logics in policy and practice: A critical nodal analysis of the UK banking reform process. Critical Policy Studies.
35.
GoergenMMallinCMitleton-KellyEAl-HawamdehAChiuIH (2010) Corporate Governance and Complexity Theory. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
GospelHPendletonA (2003) Finance, corporate governance and the management of labour: A conceptual and comparative analysis. British Journal of Industrial Relations41(3): 557–582.
38.
HarveyD (2009) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
39.
HenryA (2008) Understanding Strategic Management. New York: Oxford University Press.
40.
HornL (2012) Corporate governance in crisis? The politics of EU corporate governance regulation. European Law Journal18(1): 83–107.
41.
IrelandP (2000) Defending the Rentier: Corporate theory and the reprivatization of the public company. In: ParkinsonJEGambleAKellyG (eds) The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
42.
IrelandP (2005) Shareholder primacy and the distribution of wealth. The Modern Law Review68(1): 49–81.
43.
IrelandP (2010) Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate irresponsibility. Cambridge Journal of Economics34(5): 837–856.
44.
JacksonG (2000) Comparative corporate governance: Sociological perspectives. In: ParkinsonJEGambleAKellyG (eds) The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 265–288.
45.
JensenMCMecklingWH (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics3(4): 305–360.
46.
JonesIPollittM (2004) Understanding how issues in corporate governance develop: Cadbury Report to Higgs Review. Corporate Governance: An International Review12(2): 162–171.
47.
JonesM (1995) Whatever happened to the Corporate Report?Management Accounting73: 52–54.
48.
JonesVPierceC (2013) Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom. Orpington: Global Governance Services.
49.
JordanC (2013) Cadbury twenty years on. Villanova Law Review58(1): 1–24.
50.
KeayA (2014) Comply or explain in corporate governance codes: In need of greater regulatory oversight?Legal Studies34(2): 279–304.
51.
KhuranaR (2007) From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
LazonickWO’SullivanM (2000) Maximizing shareholder value: A new ideology for corporate governance. Economy and Society29(1): 13–35.
54.
LounsburyMHirschP (2010) Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the US Financial Crisis. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
55.
MorganG (2008) Market formation and governance in international financial markets: The case of OTC derivatives. Human Relations61(5): 637–660.
56.
ParkinsonJ (2000) Evolution and policy in company law: The non-executive director. In: ParkinsonJEGambleAKellyG (eds) The Political Economy of the Company. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 233–263.
57.
ParkinsonJKellyG (1999) The combined code on corporate governance. The Political Quarterly70(1): 101–107.
58.
PerrowC (2002) Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
59.
PikettyT (2014) Capital in the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
60.
PyeA (2001) Corporate boards, investors and their relationships: Accounts of accountability and corporate governing in action. Corporate Governance: An International Review9(3): 186–195.
61.
PyeA (2002) The changing power of ‘explanations’: Directors, academics and their sensemaking from 1989 to 2000. Journal of Management Studies39(7): 907–925.
62.
PyeA (2013) Boards and governance: 25 years of qualitative research with directors of FTSE companies. In: WrightMSiegelDSKeaseyKFilatotchevI (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 135–162.
63.
RobéJP (2011) The legal structure of the firm. Accounting, Economics, and Law1: 1–86.
64.
RobertsJ (2012) Between the letter and the spirit: Defensive and extensive modes of compliance with the UK Code of Corporate Governance. In: ClarkeTBransonD (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Corporate Governance. London: SAGE, 196–217.
65.
RobertsJMcNultyTStilesP (2005) Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of Management16(suppl. 1): S5–S26.
66.
ScottC (2008) Reflexive governance, meta-regulation and corporate social responsibility: The ‘Heineken effect’. In: BoegerNMurrayRVilliersC (eds) Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 170–185.
67.
SpiraLFSlinnJ (2013) The Cadbury Committee: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ThompsonGF (2012) The Constitutionalization of the Global Corporate Sphere?Oxford: Oxford University Press.
70.
ToseyPVisserMSaundersMN (2012) The origins and conceptualizations of ‘triple-loop’ learning: A critical review. Management Learning43(3): 291–307.
71.
TsukD (2003) Corporations without labor: The politics of progressive corporate law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review151(6): 1861–1912.
72.
Van ApeldoornBNölkeAOverbeekH (2007) The Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation. New York: Routledge.
73.
VeldmanJWillmottH (2013) What is the corporation and why does it matter?M@n@gement16: 605–620.
74.
VossJBornemannB (2011) The politics of reflexive governance: Challenges for designing adaptive management and transition management. Ecology and Society16(2): 9.
75.
VossJKempR (2006) Sustainability and reflexive governance: Introduction. In: VossJBauknechtDKempR (eds) Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 3–30.
76.
ZingalesL (2000) In search of new foundations. The Journal of Finance55(4): 1623–1653.
