TRIPS and the Balance between Private Rights and Public Well-being

Abstract

Adherence to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has had varied impacts across the world, and concerns of adverse effects on public well-being, especially in the context of the pharmaceutical sector, are largely debated. In this article, we analyze the effects of TRIPS on public well-being in the context of the pharmaceutical sector. We look at the policies of China, India and Brazil (three major players in the global pharmaceutical industry) and their usage of the TRIPS flexibilities. China, which has not used the TRIPS flexibilities, has benefited from technology transfer and foreign direct investment (FDI) in research & development (R&D). The need for FDI in R&D in India and Brazil as potential destinations for research on neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) is brought out. We conclude that the effects of TRIPS on public well-being are critical for countries which do not have the ability to use the flexibilities. At a time when trade and investment treaties are mostly aimed at stricter commitments on intellectual property rights (IPR) than TRIPS, such countries need to negotiate appropriate investment and knowledge-sharing commitments from their developed counterparts so as not to be adversely affected by agreeing to demands on bending IPR laws.

Keywords

Intellectual property rights pharmaceutical sector emerging economies

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