This article considers how Schwartz's norm-activation model has been applied in the context of individual contributions to public goods, and how it might be extended to better reflect the full gamut of behavioral determinants in such situations. A review of literature in political economy, psychology, and sociology suggests that the translation of Schwartz's model from situations of isolated individual helping to the public goods context requires the role of organizations, policy initiatives, and notions of justice to be more explicitly incorporated within the model. Existing elements of the model also need to be broadened to encompass some of the unique characteristics of public good contributions, such as shared (as opposed to diffused) responsibility, and lower levels of individual decisiveness. A qualitative environmental case study illustrates some of the required extensions.
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