Abstract
The article discusses recent anti-racist and migrant rights activism in Finland with the help of Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology and the concept of the established-outsiders figuration. The mobilisation of ‘outsiders’ (racialised minorities and migrants) has reordered the contemporary field and challenged the ‘established’ majority activists to reflect on their own practices. Through combining figurational and cultural perspectives, I compare the extent to which established liberal and left-libertarian activists, with their distinct ideological positions, have succeeded in transforming the power ratio between themselves and the outsiders. This article advances the use of the established-outsiders conceptualisation in cases where the established support, in principle, the outsiders’ inclusion. This helps to shed light on both the more covert and subtle ways through which the established reproduce their power as well as their agency in dismantling the power disparity.
Introduction
As in many European countries, immigration and race have been notable political issues in Finland over the past decade. After campaigning on an anti-immigration platform, the radical right Finns Party won nearly 18% of the votes in the 2015 parliamentary elections and entered the government for the first time. In the fall of the same year, following the record number of asylum seekers arriving in Finland as well during ‘the long summer of migration’, several pro- and anti-migrant mobilisations took place and new groups were formed on both sides of the ideological divide. Also, around the middle of the decade, activists of colour entered the fray in an unprecedented manner, drawing attention to the deeply rooted racism in the Finnish society and also reclaiming their right to define racism and how it should be combatted. Consequently, white activists have been urged to reflect on their own dominant social position and how it affects their political practices (see, e.g. Ahmed, 2019).
In this article, taking the lead on the previous point, I will look into anti-racist and migrant rights activism in Finland in the late 2010s, focussing on the question of how the activists with greater power chances (being white, ethnic majority members and native-born citizens) addressed their dominance and whether they succeeded in eradicating the power disparity between themselves and the racialised minorities and migrants. Theorywise, I draw heuristically on Norbert Elias’ figurational sociology and especially on the concept of established-outsiders figuration (Elias and Scotson, 2008). Seeking to overcome the individual-society and structure-agency binaries dominant in sociology, Elias deployed the concept of figuration to capture the interdependent relations, both constitutive and constraining, that exist among people and the groups they form (Elias, 2012: 7–12, 67–68). The task of sociologists is to explain why particular figurations emerge and how they evolve and change (Elias and Scotson, 2008: 50). In the case of the established-outsiders figuration, it is characterised by ‘the exclusion of a group from chances of power and status by another group which is able to monopolise access to these chances of power and status’ (Elias, 2008b: 224–225).
With concepts such as interdependence and power ratio, figurational theory portrays power struggles as dynamic and processual rather than as static and one-sided: the established and the outsiders as groups exist in relation to one another as long as the figuration remains in place, but the nature of their interdependence as well the balance of power between them is likely to vary over time (Elias, 2008a: 16–17, 20). Regarding activism, when the outsiders mobilise, they do not only seek to ameliorate their position in the overall society, but they also challenge the legitimacy of the established activists to lead and represent the movement. Thus, the inequality of dependence that exists between the groups in the society at large (as the outsiders are more dependent on the actions of the established than vice versa) is contested in activism and there is an effort to reverse the power ratio. As a recent article on advantaged movement allies shows, movement ‘beneficiaries’ generally expect them to express high levels of reliability but low levels of influence (Park et al., 2022).
The question addressed in this article is why even progressive members of the established may struggle to change and eventually reproduce the power differentials between themselves and the outsiders in their own activities, despite their good intentions. Conversely, it needs to be examined what circumstances facilitate change. Exploring such questions helps to broaden the study of established-outsiders figurations outside cases of deliberate exclusion and enable the use of the conceptualisation as a tool to elucidate cases where ‘outsidering’ is more subtle, even unintentional. As critical race scholars, for instance, have noted, discrimination can take rather insidious forms: contemporary racism often operates through the modalities of colourblindness (Bonilla-Silva, 2014) and postracialism (Goldberg, 2015) rather than blatantly racist discourses and practices.
My analysis emphasises political ideologies and their role in affecting the perceptions and choices of the established. The article is based on 14 interviews with anti-racist and migrant rights activists residing in Finland. The analysis concentrates on the ‘established’, that is, white native-born activists, as they are the dominant group and therefore crucial in the reproduction or dissolution of the power disparity. 1 The ‘outsiders’, racialised 2 minority and migrant activists, are mainly quoted for their views on the former. Based on their individual political views and the ideological commitments of the organisations they represent, the established interviewees have been classified into two groups: liberal activists promoting human rights and non-discrimination; and left-libertarian activists motivated by the ideals of autonomy and non-domination. In general, the former have struggled to include different outsider groups in their activities as peers, even less so as dominant actors; whereas the latter make conscious efforts to dismantle the power asymmetry between themselves and the outsiders (in my interview material, asylum seekers in particular). I show how these groups’ diverging ideological positions shape the activists’ understanding of how anti-racism and migrant rights should be advanced and by whom, as well as the ways the activists position themselves in relation to other overlapping figurations, especially the one between the state and civil society.
How culture, for instance in the form of political ideologies, affects and interferes with figurational dynamics is passingly acknowledged in Elias’ writings, for example when he discusses the generational established-outsider relations in post-war Germany and the allure of Marxism among the middle-class youth (Elias, 2013: 331–407). Yet there would be more room to combine figurational and cultural perspectives when studying established-outsider dynamics (see Bucholc, 2013) or figurations more generally, and undertaking such analysis has been one of the underlying objectives of this article.
The established and the outsiders: theoretical and contextual reflections
Before proceeding to the empirical section, it is crucial to take a closer look at the concept of the established-outsiders figuration and elaborate how it can be interpreted in the Finnish context. Moreover, I will discuss the established concerned in this article in more detail, that is, the progressive activists and their distinctive ideologies.
Conceptualising the established-outsiders figuration
The concept of established-outsiders figuration originates from Elias and John L. Scotson’s study on a suburban community in Leicester in the early 1960s (the study was first published in 1965). The community, which they named Winston Parva, consisted of three neighbourhoods: the first was a predominantly a middle-class residential area, while the other two were working class. Elias and Scotson were interested in the fact that despite being so similar socio-economically and ethnically, a barrier existed between the two working-class neighbourhoods. The decisive factor seemed to be the length of residence: the people in the older working-class neighbourhood had been living there a long time and ‘felt that they belonged there and that the place belonged to them’ (Elias and Scotson, 2008: 44).
The residents in the older neighbourhoods formed a tight-knit community with high levels of cohesion. The bonds and networks between ‘the old families’ were crucial for the successful closing of the ranks vis-à-vis the newcomers, for example shutting them out of local associational life. The newcomers, in turn, lacked such cohesion, as they had moved to the location from various places and did not possess any particular ties to one and another (Elias and Scotson, 2008). In his theoretical essay on established-outsiders relations, Elias writes that ‘[d]ifferentials of cohesion and integration as an aspect of power differentials have probably not received the attention they deserve’ (Elias, 2008a: 7).
Underlying the exclusion of the newcomers was the belief that the new arrivals were people of lesser worth. Elias considers this to be very typical of established-outsiders figurations: ‘One can observe again and again that members of groups which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of themselves in human terms as better than the others’ (Elias, 2008a: 1; original emphasis). Moreover, when the outsiders do not abide to the norms of the established, this makes them appear as anomic rather than just dissimilar. For the established, differentiation from the outsiders amplifies the relevance of their group-specific norms and how they express these norms in conduct (Elias, 2008a: 9, 35). 3
Regarding the issues of immigration and race that are of interest here, the Eliasian perspective stresses, first, that to understand the struggles migrants may face in establishing themselves in their new country, one needs to turn their attention to the already established and how they, willingly or unwillingly, exclude migrants. In other words, it is not the characteristics of the newcomers (e.g. lack of language skills or cultural know-how) that are decisive but rather the relational dynamic, both in terms of how the established relate to the newcomers and how the established are bound together.
As for race, Elias noted how race is one historically constituted bases for established-outsiders figurations, instituted in the times of colonisation and slavery and reproduced in various forms ever since. It is through this long process of dominant-subordinate dynamic that physical features have become markers of social groups. In this case as well, the uneven balance of power is the crucial factor: for those with more power, differences in physical appearance (whether skin colour or any other visible quality) can act as an objectified sign of the inferiority of the less powerful groups, even though the power disparity is the reason why such differences are considered significant in the first place (Elias, 2008a: 20, 31–32). 4 The Eliasian framework has been used to demonstrate how certain racialised groups have faced durable obstacles for rising to the ranks of the established but also how and why there have been gradual changes in the balance of power between whites and people of colour in Western countries (Dunning, 2004; Lacassagne, 2016; Powell and Lever, 2017).
The established and the outsiders in Finland
In the following, I will briefly discuss established-outsiders dynamics in Finland in relation to both immigration and race. Concerning immigration, post-war era Finland has had a fairly low number of people from a foreign background (meaning those whose parents have been born abroad), but the situation has changed gradually since the early 1990s. In 1990, there were less than 50,000 Finnish residents from a foreign background, whereas in 2020, the figure was approximately 444,000, making 8% of the population. The largest group of people with foreign background in Finland are of Russian origin, followed by Estonians, Iraqis and Somalis (Statistics Finland, n.d.).
Consistent with Elias and Scotson’s analysis, increased immigration has spurred hostile reactions, epitomised in the electoral success of the nativist Finns Party in the 2010s. In Finland, as in other Nordic countries, the assumed cultural homogeneity of the population is weaponised as an argument against immigration. Thus, it is not so much the actual fact of cohesion that Elias highlighted but rather the image of it, combined with racist imaginaries, that posits racialised migrants and minorities as a threat to national wellbeing and security. In addition, even though welfare state policies have traditionally been regarded as means to alleviate social differences and promote cohesion within the population, in the aftermath of the 2008 recession there has been an increasing tendency towards welfare chauvinism, that is, drawing the line between the deserving majority and the undeserving migrants and minorities (Keskinen et al., 2019).
Echoing the fairly recent increase of immigration to Finland, the Finnish public debate has framed racism as a novel and immigration-related phenomenon, while white antiracists have also contributed to this narrative (Seikkula, 2017, 2019). Yet, racialisation and oppression of the Roma, a long-standing ethnic minority in Finland, as well as the Sámi, the indigenous people whose homeland stretches over northern parts of Finland, have long been instrumental in the construction of the white Finnish nation (see, e.g. Helakorpi, 2019; Siivikko, 2019). The new anti-racist movement, led by racialised activists, has highlighted these histories as examples of the persistent, yet unacknowledged, racism in Finnish society. To phrase the same issue in the terms of Elias, they have argued that racism is a crucial factor in determining who can become established in Finland, both in terms of status (who is regarded as a rightful member of society) and actual chances of power (whether political, economic or symbolic), instead of the length of time one has resided in the county.
Several studies show that racism is a considerable social problem in Finland. For example, a recent EU survey shows that among the 12 EU countries studied, Finland features at the top (with Luxembourg) when it comes to discrimination and harassment reported by people from Sub-Saharan African backgrounds (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 29). Moreover, concerning discrimination in employment, a newly published study reveals how having a foreign name and foreign first language, especially non-European ones, greatly diminishes a person’s chances of being called for job interviews (Ahmad, 2020).
In sum, one can identify two kinds of established-outsiders figurations, one built around immigration and the other around race, and their intersections as well as their divergences merit attention. Both these figurations are addressed in the interview material, and I have chiefly followed the discourses used by the interviewees themselves. Moreover, even though the differences between these two figurations are relevant, the generality of the theoretical framework directs the focus on their similarities, namely on the uneven power ratio and how it is reproduced or reduced.
The progressive established
As mentioned, of particular interest in this article are those members of the established who oppose the exclusion of the outsiders. In ideological terms, left-leaning liberals tend to express the most positive views towards immigration and racial equality (Flemmen and Savage, 2017; Mannerström et al., 2020). However, it is relevant to note that these actors are not a homogeneous group but there exist different beliefs and views of social reality among this demographic. I have pinned the established interviewees in my data into the broad categories of liberals and left-libertarians. When it comes to the liberals, their liberalism is best understood as social liberalism. While social liberalism nurtures general liberal ideals such as rationality, universalism and progress, it does not assign a negative conception of liberty, unlike classical liberalism, but instead considers state-granted rights as requisite for positive freedom and human flourishing. The advocacy of human rights is a key element of this framework (Freeden, 2008). For its part, left-libertarian ideologies (such as anarchism and libertarian Marxism) are critical of the rights discourse and instead profess concepts such as autonomy and non-domination. The adherence to these principles in manifested in opposition to hierarchical and centralised social organisations, from the state to political parties, as well as to relations of domination in general (Wennerhag, 2018).
Even though each group of actors is obviously confronted with a complex mix of cultural influences, this type of ideological demarcation nonetheless helps to explain what kinds of values and beliefs likely play a greater role in their activities. Regarding established-outsiders figurations, these values and beliefs can have an impact on whether the power differentials are strengthened or reduced in action and whether the actors even become aware that they are caught in a relational power dynamic in the first place (see Oliver and Johnston, 2000 on the role of ideologies in social movements).
Data and methods
My data consist of 14 interviews, carried out between October 2017 and June 2019. The data were collected in the context of a project that examines the interplay between anti-racist activists (including migrant rights activists), politicians and civil servants. In total, I have interviewed 28 individuals representing these three groups. All interviewees have been given pseudonyms, and I have omitted the names of the organisations to protect the anonymity of the research participants.
The ‘established’ interviewees include three advocacy workers from two human rights organisations. Moreover, two former presidents of a political youth organisation were also interviewed, because they initiated an anti-racist campaign in 2016 (discussed further in detail in the empirical part). Regarding autonomous actors, I have interviewed an activist from a grassroots Free Movement Network (FMN) that, as the name suggests, promotes the freedom of movement and migrant rights. Furthermore, two prominent ‘ally’ participants involved in a 2017 pro-asylum demonstration called Right to Live were interviewed. I have not anonymised these two groups as their singularity makes doing so difficult and as there is also already prior research published on them in which their real names are used.
Regarding the ‘outsider’ interviewees, one key asylum seeker participant in the Right to Live demonstration was interviewed as well a FMN activist from an asylum seeker background (who also participated in the demonstration). Moreover, I interviewed a board member from a multicultural organisation and three activists from two new anti-racist organisations that are led by racialised activists. Both of these new organisations seek to advance a more critical and knowledgeable discourse on racism in Finland, such as highlighting institutional racism, and aim to empower racialised minorities.
The semi-structured interviews, which I personally conducted, lasted between 1 and 2 hours. The interviewees have been given the opportunity to comment on the article. The interview quotes have been selected based on their relevance for the analysis and the desire to feature the interviews broadly in the text.
The interview questions dealt with cooperation among activists as well as the interviewees’ interactions with politicians and civil servants. When discussing figurational sociology from a methodological point of view, Nina Baur and Stefanie Ernst write that open-ended data, such as ethnography and interviews, are best suited for exploring the ‘the individual’s placement within, perception of, and ability to change the figuration’ (Baur and Ernst, 2011: 134). Analysing the data from this perspective, the main point of interest has lain in utterances where the interviewees have reflected on their position, explained their choices vis-à-vis other actors and described possible constraints and dependencies informing their actions.
Liberal anti-racist and migrant rights activism: partnering among the established
The social liberal framework was apparent in the interviews carried out with the established activists working in the more institutionalised organisations. How they defined the problem and what solutions they proposed were largely derived from their underlying ideological propositions: a lack or violation of rights is the main problem, and new and better legislation and administrative policies are needed to improve the current situation. Such emphasis on the law does not always allow room for the aggrieved to take the lead in defining neither the grievance nor how it should be combatted, as will be discussed in the following.
For example, in 2016, a party political youth organisation initiated a campaign for criminalising organised racism. Specifically, they sought to change both the criminal code and the association and assembly acts so that they would more clearly prevent racist groups from organising. The campaign was led by the organisation’s two co-presidents, Laura and Marko. The campaign exemplifies the kind of anti-racism, often carried out by white activists, which perceives anti-racism as action ‘against racists’, rather than as attempts to, for instance, dismantle racist discourses (see Seikkula, 2019).
When I asked Marko what kind of role racialised minorities had in the campaign, he replied that they had consulted one of the leading figures of the new anti-racist movement and that they had ‘employed’ racialised people on the campaign webpage to reflect on this issue. In general, however, they did not feature in the campaign very widely. This is how he explained the reason for this: This [campaign] was grounded on the pursuit of legislative change, in which we kind of had the ‘end product’ established from the beginning. – If the campaign had started from the question of how racism should be fought in Finland, then it would have looked quite different, and it would have been done very differently. But because the starting point was so technical, overall, we had limited discussions with racialised [actors] or immigrant organisations.
In this case, it was the universal character of the law that left the outsiders on the sidelines from the start: as laws are, in a manner, collective property, pursuing changes in them can appear as everyone’s task, even as a mere ‘technicality’, to paraphrase the interviewee.
To take another example, when reforms are sought in the human rights framework, this means that the claims need to match with the juridical definitions of human rights. Voicing broader social critique is difficult within this approach, and this also has an effect on how disadvantaged groups are able promote their cause. As Tuuli, an employee in a human rights organisation, phrased it regarding refugee rights: We are a legalist human rights organisation; our work is not based on what is morally or ethically right but what is legally right according to the human rights convention. Amongst the asylum seekers, there are those who do not meet the criteria for refugee status or subsidiary protection, so it can be difficult for us to give a platform to someone who wants to stay in the country but does not have the legal right to do so.
Aside from the problems inherent in operating within the legal framework, another issue relates to the choices made in the pursuit to influence state authorities, such as politicians and civil servants, in relation to whom even the established activists are in a subordinate position. I focus on two features in the actions of the established activists in which the quest to exert influence on the authorities is intertwined with the exclusion of the outsiders: reliance on expertise and building alliances among the established.
Respect for expertise reflects the liberal ideals of reason and rationality, but this is also a feature of Finnish political culture: even citizen groups customarily rely on expert knowledge in their claims-making (Luhtakallio, 2012). The emphasis given to expertise is evident in my own data as well. For example, Laura from the political youth organisation explained how she had consulted two constitutional law professors when planning the campaign for criminalising organised racism. She recounted: ‘As I have a background as a jurist, for me these things were very clear. I discussed with these professors how this [the initiative] should be formulated and what we could do’. The significance of expertise was also highlighted by Tuuli when she applauded the tradition in Finland where ‘expert organisations are being heard and incorporated in the [legislative] processes’, thus alluding that the human rights organisation she works for merits this label as well.
Considering the prevalence of racial and ethnic discrimination in education and employment, combined with the language and cultural barriers migrants may face, prioritising expertise as an influence-wielding asset risks producing an obstacle for equal participation in civic activism for racialised minorities and migrants as they face greater challenges in achieving the required expertise. Moreover, whose expertise is acknowledged and recognised in Finland is also part of the problem. As Mai from a minority-led anti-racist organisation stated, drawing from her own experience working in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector, racialised people are often given the role of ‘experience expert’ (kokemusasiantuntija) when it comes to the issue of racism and discrimination, whereas their professional expertise (acquired through education and employment history) is frequently overlooked.
Besides this being a question of racial bias or in Elias’ terms ‘group charisma’, that is, the positive self-image the established hold of themselves (Elias, 2008a: 8), Mai noted the relation aspect in the matter as well, resonating with Elias and Scotson’s analysis on the bonds between the ‘old families’: A lot of the time getting jobs and positions is about who you know, so if there is already this kind of informal network of people just drawing from the same pool of people who are like them, then nothing is going to change, and the structures are just going to keep reproducing themselves.
The tight connections between the NGOs were also mentioned by the established interviewees, who recalled long-standing collaborations and joint campaigns and how resources are shared between the organisations. The rationale for the networking is having better chances to influence politicians and civil servants. However, beside the sheer logic of numbers, one can also see the logic of prestige and respectability at play. Instead of turning to minority
For instance, in the campaign for criminalising organised racism, the partner organisations included other political youth organisations, student organisations and some large progressive NGOs. The main beneficiaries, that is, potential victims of racism, did not figure in the coalition. Considering that the campaign was run by a political youth organisation that has good access to politicians, their campaign could have bridged outsider groups to the political institutions. As Paula from a minority-led anti-racist organisation stated, it would be important for the white antiracists to act as a sort of ‘gate openers’ vis-à-vis the political authorities, as the racialised outsiders, by and large, lack this access: ‘maybe this would be the greatest anti-racist gesture they could make, to form these links with the power-holders’.
Admittedly, there are reasons for the small number of outsider organisations in the coalitions that are beyond the established activists’ control. Interviewees from the two human rights organisations stated that what hampers closer collaboration with what they termed as immigrant organisations is that these organisations tend to be small, poorly funded and more focussed on providing services for their constituencies rather than engaging in advocacy work.
What one can construe from such answers is that not only are the outsider organisations’ financial resources limited, but also that the various minority groups are scattered and lack a collective identity and group cohesion. The need for such cohesion-building was noted in the interviews. For example, Nuradin from the multicultural organisation stated that when they fund projects, an important criterion for them is that the project includes cooperation between a number of associations representing different nationalities or ethnicities. In a similar fashion, although more from an anti-racist rather than a multicultural perspective, Rina from an anti-racist organisation led by racialised actors used the term ‘interest promoting organisation’ when defining its purpose. According to her, the founders of the association had felt that ‘there is perhaps no organisation that would speak about these issues with a united front’.
Through organising and networking, minority groups are better equipped to contest their subordination in the country. In the realm of social activism, these measures help them to partner with the majority-led organisations and make use of the latter’s resources. In previous research on immigrant activism, both of these factors – intra-group bonding and bridging with dominant social groups – have been found important for immigrants’ greater political influence (see Nicholls, 2013: 613 for a brief overview). To paraphrase, using the language of Elias, bridging is something the outsiders can do with the progressive members of the established, whereas intra-group bonding builds cohesion, which Elias considered to be a notable power resource. Eventually, outsider-led organisations can even contest the dominance of the established-led organisations and claim a stronger representative role for themselves. This would further erode the established-outsiders figuration in this sector of society.
Autonomous migrant rights activism: the outsiders as protagonists
In my data, it is in the context of grassroots, autonomous migrant rights activism where one can find the most apparent efforts to transform the power ratio between the established and the outsiders (for similar results, see Cappiali, 2016). The case that I am mainly focussing on here is the 2017 Right to Live demonstration in Helsinki. Iraqi and Afghan asylum seekers, together with a diverse group of allies, initiated the protest as a reaction to the tightening of asylum policies in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015. My analysis underlines the role of left-libertarian activists in assuring that the power disparity between the established activists and the asylum seekers was lessened as much as possible during the protest.
Lauri, an anti-authoritarian activist with a long history in migrant solidarity activism, recalled that the protest’s Finnish participants were a heterogeneous group, consisting of FMN activists, anarchists, antifascists, leftists as well as church-based and NGO actors. Lauri recounted how the first Finnish participants shared the understanding that the asylum seekers are the ones who make the decisions. Farid – a former asylum seeker and FMN activist – stated that the interaction among the protesters generally worked well, but not all Finns were cognisant of the fact that the asylum seekers were supposed to be the protagonists in the protest. The protest was about self-organisation and emancipation not only about asylum rights (see also Haavisto, 2020; Näre, 2020). He explained the crux of the matter in the following way (as a response to my question on racial dynamic in the protest): Of course, the whites know better how things work [in Finland]; then some think that it is too laborious to explain everything to the asylum seekers and therefore they can just make the decisions on their own. This may be effective for a while, but in the long run, the asylum seekers continue to lack relevant knowledge, which will impede them from getting active and mobilised.
He also pondered that perhaps the larger NGOs were not willing to participate in the protest (although some gave support behind the scenes) because the Finnish activists were not in charge: ‘bigger NGOs trust the Finns more, therefore at least demonstrations and events should be in their hands’.
Such responses show how in this setting as well, no self-evident dynamic appeared between the established and the outsiders; instead, there were several potential choices available for both parties in terms of how to position themselves vis-à-vis each other. Even though the asylum seekers’ pursuit to establish themselves in the Finnish society in the minimal sense of having the right to stay was supported by the established actors, not all of them regarded the demonstration as a site where the asylum seekers could assert the authority that they were otherwise lacking.
The FMN has played a crucial role in introducing the kind of migrant rights activism to Finland in which the established play only a supporting role. Joona, who has been an activist in the network from the beginning, stressed that their guiding principle has always been to assist and facilitate the self-organisation of migrants: ‘We have done very little of anything that had not included some self-organised group of migrants’. Also, Farid stated that he had chosen the network as his political platform because ‘the goal there is to mobilise the minorities themselves and not decide on their behalf, which is the problem in many other organisations’.
Reflecting on the autumn of 2015 and the following years, Joona recalled that their activism has not really changed but more and more people have started to operate in a manner similar to them. This testifies to the harbinger role they have played in migrant solidarity activism in Finland. FMN activists also had a significant influence on the way in which the Right to Live demonstration was carried out. Hashim, an asylum seeker active in the protest, voiced this when saying that ‘FMN has been very vocal in terms of how solidarity should be done, so they made sure in the beginning [of the demonstration] that it is an asylum seekers’ demo run by asylum seekers for asylum seekers’ (see also Haavisto, 2020: 176).
FMN’s repertoire of action has included demonstrations, discussion and press events as well as lobbying politicians and civil servants. These political practices and the activists’ efforts to alter the power differentials between the established and the outsiders stem from a particular kind of enactment of their ideological underpinnings. According to Joona, the network was born out of Amnesty’s refugee group and No Border activism. The founders were of the opinion that the problem with the former had been the stagnation and reformism typical of a large organisation, whereas the latter was considered to be too focussed on the actual borders between countries, rather than on the governance of migration in general. The initial FMN activists had wanted to start something new, using their own agenda and framework. Ideologically, they had, in Joona’s words, drawn from autonomous Marxism and reflected on ‘capitalism and the relationship between border control and the exploitation of workers’.
As described, in practice the network has adjusted its politics to the needs of migrants. Joona phrased this in the following: ‘In a way, our thinking sprang from independent leftist and anarchist movements, but in reality we have focussed on acting together with certain migrant groups and our argumentation has been rights-based’. The quote illustrates an awareness of group’s ideological foundations and how different courses of actions could result from them. The group has downplayed the left-libertarian preference for not engaging with the state and other elements of the ideological standpoint, namely the ideas of self-emancipation and autonomous organising by the disenfranchised, to which the more privileged actors join only as allies, have been prioritised. 5
In the case of the Right to Live demonstration, the precedence of the needs of the asylum seekers was seen in the way in which protesters tried to reach out to the authorities. The protesters issued several claims to the government and the Immigration Services, including the entitlement to legal aid in asylum hearings (this right was withdrawn in 2016), having negative asylum decisions reprocessed (due to inexperienced employees being recruited since 2015 and the use of inaccurate country profiles), and terminating forceful removals from the country until the legality of the asylum decisions was guaranteed (Näre, 2020: 3). To this end, politicians and civil servants were invited to the protest site and lobbying efforts took place behind the scenes. When interviewing Ulla, a long-time activist in progressive movements, I asked her if even the anarchist protest participants had been in agreement with such interaction with the power-holders. She answered: They have all definitely understood the significance of lobbying. Because the principles in this movement have been co-operation and non-violence on the terms of the asylum seekers, so everybody does realise that things do not move forward without lobbying.
Overall, if liberal antiracists’ efforts to appear worthy in the eyes of authorities is prioritised over transforming the established-outsiders power disparity in their own campaigns, the latter takes priority in the migrant rights mobilisations. It is from this vantage point that policy-oriented goals are being sought, and therefore the campaigning is carried out in a more inclusive and empowering manner. The outsiders in question have been active in the matter as well, as seen in the Right to Live’s case: through protesting, the asylum seekers affirmed their own agency and demanded justice from the established. In other words, it took certain kinds of outsiders and established to change the balance of power in this particular social setting.
Evidently, there are limits to how thoroughly the power ratio can be changed in asylum rights activism. The various resources of the established (expertise, networks) are still needed as the outsiders in question often lack contextually relevant resources. This gives authority to the established, whether they endorse it or not (for the Right to Live demonstration, see Haavisto, 2020: 176; for similar criticism, see Nicholls, 2013: 615). Moreover, as grassroots autonomous organising takes place outside of institutional arenas, it has limited capacity to transform power differentials in and through those authoritative societal arenas. In general, the challenge is centred on how all the positive changes that are created in the relative freedom of autonomous activist spaces could be spread throughout wider society. I will return to this question below.
Conclusion
The article has utilised the figurational theory for studying power asymmetries in the context of activism. The advantages of this theory, with its concepts of interdependence and balance of powers, lie in its capacity to highlight the relative strengths of interdependent groups and their processual development. The mobilisation of outsiders is an attempt to transform the power differentials both in the wider society and in the context of civil society. Despite the established activists’ support of the outsiders’ cause in principle, the willingness and ability of the established to abandon their power superiority and their greater independence varies. In the analysis presented here, the liberal standpoint did not allow for equally transformative action as the left-libertarian one did in relation to the power disparity, because principles such as human rights and legal protection directed the focus so strongly towards the state that other goals were surmounted by it. This led the established activists to partner among themselves and draw from the resources guaranteed them due to their position as the established, rather than focus on the power asymmetry between the white majority and the racialised minorities and migrants.
I want to conclude with two remarks. First, how the established interpret and make sense of their social position depends on their cultural reference points, as has been argued here. This has an effect both on whether they care about the dissolution of the power disparity in the first place, and if they do, what kinds of actions they take to actualise that goal. Thus, motivating action is one way through which culture interferes with figurational dynamics, but evidently other types of interplay between culture and figurations could be identified in a more systematic examination on the topic.
Second, even though the analysis presented in this article might be interpreted as a validation of the radical left’s suspicion of liberal state-oriented politics, there are other conclusions that can be reached. Namely, the figurational approach can be used as a tool to examine what kinds of relational restraints or conditions exist in different social settings and how political actors need to find ways to manoeuvre this ‘relational environment’ to implement change. As discussed above, autonomous activist spaces enable many kinds of transformative actions because the relations therein are less rule-bound and established than they are in more institutionalised settings. However, eradicating diverse established-outsiders figurations also requires institutional changes, and thus even the left-libertarians are confronted with the question raised above, that is, how to diffuse the positive changes forged in activist milieus across society at large.
Footnotes
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by The Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies.
