Developing countries are often characterized by a mix of bad governance and development initiatives seeking to accelerate modernization. When inevitable cracks in the modernization process appear, they create opportunities for informalities to seep in where the influence of power relations and culture can lead to new forms of predation or allow governance compromises to emerge. The article explores this at the national and local levels of the Pakistani electrical power sector, with each level conceptualized as a field of strategic action. The aim is to recognize the importance of emergent compromises for producing workable accommodations of competing interests, improving access to services, and addressing questions of social justice. Flexibility in responding to these cracks in the modernization process is not always a failing, but can be desirable and possibly necessary.
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