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Abstract

What role do extra-legal factors play in whether defendants plead guilty to a criminal offense? In this study, we provide qualitative evidence that pretrial detention is a contributing factor in adjudication outcomes. Many of our subjects reported that the prospect of being held in unsanitary and unsafe jails was sufficient to induce their acceptance of a plea, even when they maintained their innocence. Others worried that being held pre-trial would have a negative impact on employment and family responsibilities, and so chose to plead. Our quantitative analyses bolster these self-reports: in a national sample, defendants held in custody pre-trial are significantly more likely to enter a guilty plea, all else equal. These findings have important implications for individual outcomes, but also for the accountability of the criminal justice system as a whole.

Keywords

criminal justice plea bargaining courts pre-trial detention jails

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Pleading for Justice: Bullpen Therapy,Pre-Trial Detention,and Plea Bargains in American Courts

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