Focused on deterrence popular model to address community-level violence, however little research has examined the individual-level effect of deterrent messaging on subsequent offending. To answer this question, we utilize data on 254 gang- and group-involved probationers and parolees who attended offender “call-in” meetings as part of the Detroit Ceasefire. We employ inverse-probability weighting to construct a counterfactual comparison group from a sample of gang-involved young adults who were not subject to the Ceasefire call-in. We then use a Cox regression to estimate time to re-arrest. We find that individuals who were delivered a deterrent message at a call-in meeting had a longer time to re-arrest compared to a weighted comparison group for up to 3 years following the meeting.
AgnewR. (2005). Why do criminals offend? A general theory of crime and delinquency. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
2.
AgnewR. (2016). A theory of crime resistance and susceptibility. Criminology, 54, 181-211.
3.
AustinP. C. (2009). Balance diagnostics for comparing the distribution of baseline covariates between treatment groups in propensity—Score matched samples. Statistics in Medicine, 28, 3083-3107.
4.
BangH.RobinsJ. M. (2005). Doubly robust estimation in missing data and causal inference models. Biometrics, 61, 962-973.
5.
BragaA. A.ApelR.WelshB. C. (2013). The spillover effects of focused deterrence on gang violence. Evaluation Review, 37, 314-342.
6.
BragaA. A.HureauD. M.PapachristosA. V. (2013). Deterring gang-involved gun violence: Measuring the impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on street gang behavior. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 30, 113-139.
7.
BragaA. A.KennedyD. M.WaringE. J.PiehlA. M. (2001). Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: An evaluation of Boston’s operation ceasefire. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 38, 195-225.
8.
BragaA. A.WeisburdD. L. (2012). The effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical evidence. Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency, 49, 323-358.
9.
BragaA. A.WeisburdD. L.TurchanB. (2018). Focused deterrence strategies and crime control. Criminology & Public Policy, 17, 205-250.
10.
ChermakS. (2008). Reducing violent crime and firearms violence: The Indianapolis lever-pulling experiment (United States Department of Justice Final Report). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.
11.
ChermakS.McGarrellE. (2004). Problem-solving approaches to homicide: An evaluation of the Indianapolis violence reduction partnership. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 15, 161-192.
12.
Clark-MoormanK.RydbergJ.McGarrellE. F. (2019). Impact evaluation of a parolee-based focused deterrence program on community-level violence. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 30, 1408-1430.
13.
CorsaroN.BrunsonR. K.McGarrellE. F. (2010). Evaluating a policing strategy intended to disrupt an illicit street-level drug market. Evaluation Review, 34, 513-548.
14.
CorsaroN.BrunsonR. K.McGarrellE. F. (2013). Problem-oriented policing and open-air drug markets: Examining the Rockford pulling levers deterrence strategy. Crime & Delinquency, 59, 1085-1107.
15.
CorsaroN.EngelR. S. (2015). Most challenging of contexts assessing the impact of focused deterrence on serious violence in New Orleans. Criminology & Public Policy, 14(3), 1-35.
16.
CorsaroN.HuntE. D.Kroovand HippleN.McGarrellE. F. (2012). The impact of drug market pulling levers policing on neighborhood violence: An evaluation of the High Point drug market intervention. Criminology & Public Policy, 11, 167-199.
17.
CorsaroN.McGarrellE. F. (2009). Testing a promising homicide reduction strategy: Re-assessing the impact of the Indianapolis “pulling levers” intervention. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 5, 63-82.
18.
CorsaroN.McGarrellE. F. (2010). Reducing homicide risk in Indianapolis between 1997 and 2000. Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine, 87, 851-864.
19.
CrandallV.WongS. L. (2012). Group violence reduction strategy: Call-in preparation and execution. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Strategies.
20.
CullenF. T. (1994). Social support as an organizing concept for criminology: Presidential address to the academy of criminal justice sciences. Justice Quarterly, 11, 527-559.
21.
CunninghamS. (2018). Causal Inference: The Mixtape.
22.
EngelR. S.TillyerM. S.CorsaroN. (2013). Reducing gang violence using focused deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). Justice Quarterly, 30, 403-439.
ImbensG. W.RubinD. B. (2015). Causal inference in statistics, social, and biomedical sciences. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
27.
KennedyD. M. (1997). Pulling levers: Chronic offenders, high-crime settings, and a theory of prevention. Valparaiso University Law Review, 31, 449-484.
28.
KennedyD. M. (2009). Deterrence and crime prevention: Reconsidering the prospect of sanction. New York, NY: Routledge.
29.
KingG.NielsenR. (2019). Why propensity scores should not be used for matching. Political Analysis, 27, 435-454.
30.
LakensD.AdolfiF. G.AlbersC. J.AnvariF.AppsM. A.ArgamonS. E.. . . BuchananE. M. (2018). Justify your alpha. Nature Human Behaviour, 2, 168-171.
31.
MatsudaK. N.MeldeC.TaylorT. J.FrengA.EsbensenF. A. (2013). Gang membership and adherence to the “code of the street.”Justice Quarterly, 30, 440-468.
32.
MatzaD. (1964). Delinquency and drift. New York, NY: John Wiley.
33.
McDevittJ.DeckerS. H.KroovandN. K.McGarrellE. F.KlofasJ.BynumT. (2006). Offender notification meetings: A Project Safe Neighborhoods strategic intervention. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.
34.
McGarrellE. F.BanksD.HippleN. (2003). Community meetings as a tool in inmate reentry. Justice Research and Policy, 5(2), 5-32.
35.
McGarrellE. F.ChermakS.WilsonJ.CorsaroN. (2006). Reducing homicide through a “lever-pulling” strategy. Justice Quarterly, 23, 214-231.
36.
MeldeC.EsbensenF. A. (2013). Gangs and violence: Disentangling the impact of gang membership on the level and nature of offending. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 29, 143-166.
37.
PapachristosA. V.KirkD. S. (2015). Changing the street dynamic: Evaluating Chicago’s group violence reduction strategy. Criminology & Public Policy, 14, 525-558.
38.
PapachristosA. V.MearesT. L.FaganJ. (2007). Attention felons: Evaluating project safe neighborhoods in Chicago. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4, 223-272.
39.
PapachristosA. V.WildemanC.RobertoE. (2015). Tragic, but not random: The social contagion of nonfatal gunshot injuries. Social Science & Medicine, 125, 139-150.
40.
PezziA.CavoM.BiggeriA.ZamagniE.NanniO. (2016). Inverse probability weighting to estimate causal effect of a singular phase in a multiphase randomized clinical trial for multiple myeloma. BMC Medical Research Methodology, 16, Article 150.
41.
SaundersJ.KilmerB.OberA. J. (2015). A comprehensive evaluation of a drug market intervention training cohort. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
SechristS. M.WeilJ. D. (2018). Assessing the impact of a focused deterrence strategy to combat intimate partner domestic violence. Violence Against Women, 24, 243-265.
44.
ShadishW.CookT. D.CampbellD. T. (2002). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
45.
ShermanL. W. (2007). The power few: Experimental criminology and the reduction of harm. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 3, 299-321.
46.
SousaW.KellingG. (2006). Of “broken windows,” criminology, and criminal justice. In WeisburdD.BragaA. (Eds.), Police Innovation (pp. 77-97). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
47.
TaylorR. (2006). Incivilities reduction policing, zero tolerance, and the retreat from coproduction: Weak foundations and strong pressures. In WeisburdD.BragaA. (Eds.), Police Innovation (pp. 98-114). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
48.
TylerT. R. (2006). Why people obey the law (2nd ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
49.
UchidaC. D.SwattM.Schnobrich-DavisJ.ConnorC.ShutinyaM.WagnerD. (2019). A randomized control trial of a targeted high-risk offender program across three jurisdictions. Police Quarterly, 22, 192-216.
50.
WallaceD.PapachristosA. V.MearesT.FaganJ. (2016). Desistance and legitimacy: The impact of offender notification meetings on recidivism among high risk offenders. Justice Quarterly, 33, 1237-1264.
51.
WarrM. (1998). Life course transitions and desistance from crime. Criminology, 36, 183-216.
52.
WheelerA. P.McLeanS. J.BeckerK. J.WordenR. E. (2019). Choosing representatives to deliver the message in a group violence intervention. Justice Evaluation Journal, 2, 90-117.
