Abstract
This is a study of the complex problems faced by the authorities when coping with the first major submarine chase in Sweden during the 1980s. The incident was to establish a disturbing pattern for Swedish territorial defence that lasted for the rest of the decade. Having experienced a major `success' in the submarine defence area a year earlier in the so-called `whisky-on-the-rocks' crisis, the Swedish military and political leadership was caught in a credibility trap that closed forcefully as over 400 journalists reported the unsuccessful search-and-surface mission in the small bay of Hårsfjärden. This operative incident turned political crisis was the beginning (and perhaps the trigger) of what would become the number one security issue during the decade. It highlights the consequential interaction between organizations and different government levels in a high-profile security crisis. The framing of the problem confronting the decisionmakers was dominated by the incident handled a year previously.
The study takes a cognitive-institutional approach to the decision-making process. The nexus between individual actors, groups and organizations is the focus of analysis, which is conducted taking a sequential view of the decision-making process, the larger picture of the problem being split into decision occasions. This captures best the environment where vital choices were made and shows how the process of analogical reasoning becomes important for the under-standing of the crisis management effort and its consequential results.
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