...And Then They Were 15:

Abstract

The starting point of this article is a dual paradox: despite the fact that enlargement has been a recurrent phenomenon which has had a great impact on the integration process, we are endowed with neither a theoretical conceptualization of enlargement nor an in-depth understanding of how accession deals are negotiated in practice. The goal of this article is to contribute to the process of removing this dual paradox, first of all by conceptualizing any enlargement as a negotiation. By focusing on negotiations the article equips us with the tools to comprehend how the EU negotiates and what determines the outcome of enlargement negotiations. In order to clarify whether the enlargement-negotiation model does indeed capture the key factors which determine an enlargement negotiation, the article also ventures into the empirical field, analysing the EU's enlargement negotiations with the EFTA countries. On the basis of the theoretical model and the EFTA case, the article concludes that enlargement does not necessarily trigger more integration. Precisely because any enlargement is a negotiation, where the present member states have to leave the negotiation table `satisfied', less integration (spillback) is just as likely.