Do Individual and Group Beliefs Matter?

Abstract

The adoption of cognitive variables at the individual and group level serves in accounting for British decision-making during the 1956 Suez crisis, thus contradicting explanations which are framed in terms of rational actor models. An analysis in terms of cognitive variables, however, requires the formulation of a relevant empirical puzzle which sets rational explanations against cognitive ones. It is shown how the so-called process tracing method, developed by Alexander George, proves useful in identifying the role of such variables. The Operational Code construct and Irving Janis's Groupthink thesis are employed to help our understanding of the British decision-making process and to solve the empirical puzzle of why British decision-makers decided to resort to force despite the unlikelihood that US support, deemed essential, would be forthcoming. Groupthink analysis, however, would benefit from an interest in explaining the outcome of decision-making rather than concentrating on a description of the process. Due regard to cognitive beliefs previously held by members of the small group may well explain the contents of prematurely reached consensus.