Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Abstract

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 new states on its territory have raised the issue of the remaining in force of East-West security agreements. This article analyses the evolution of four major arms control and reduction regimes since the end of 1991. It seeks to determine how robust these regimes have proved under the impact of the Soviet collapse and whether the developments have tended to confirm Realist or Institutionalist assumptions about the stability of international institutions. The investigation shows that regimes regulating conventional arms control have proved fairly strong, whereas those regulating nuclear arms control have turned out to be weak. It is argued that no single factor claimed by Realism or Institutionalism can account for this outcome. There is ample evidence for the independent authority of international norms. However, the factors `power' and `relative gains orientation' emphasized by Realism are necessary to explain the translation of normative authority into regime robustness and the differences in robustness among the investigated cases.