This article deals with small industrial states in the international political economy, with emphasis on their policies under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). According to derivations from variants of hegemonic stability theory, small states are predicted to pursue mercantilist free-rider policies, i.e. implementing protection at home with impunity while enjoying free trade abroad. Since the trade policies of small industrial states are often very open, this prediction is inaccurate. The failure of the traditional theories may be explained by their neglect of the coercive nature of international leadership. Under coercive leadership small states become forced riders, i.e. they are forced to give up the mercantilist policy option. However, the systemic opportunities to free ride still affect the trade policies of small industrial states, even though more indirectly than traditionally assumed. Throughout the article, cases drawn from Swedish trade policy are used for illustrative purposes.
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