The Consensus Rule in Two International Conferences

Abstract

The principle of consensus is often used as a basis for the rules of procedure in modem multilateral conferences. It has been argued that this may lead to a practice which is identical to the requirement of unanimity prevailing on the international scene before the UN system introduced majority-based decisions. It has also been pointed out that the consensus rule tends to give the great powers a "real" veto while the smaller states tend to lack this possibility. The article is an inquiry into the process of joint decision- making by consensus in two fora, with a particular emphasis on the above-mentioned aspects. It is shown that the consensus rule does not have exactly the same meaning and implications in the CD in Geneva as it did in the part of the CSCE process known as the Stockholm Conference. There are indications that the two propositions are more relevant and valid in the former case than in the latter. This difference can perhaps be explained by the membership and composition of the conferences, the level of ambition of the respective agendas or the basic approaches to arms control that are pursued — a "structural" approach in Geneva vs. an "operational" approach in the CSCE and in Stockholm.