Crisis Management by Military Cooperation with a Small Ally: American-Israeli Cooperation in the Syrian- Jordanian Crisis,September 1970

Abstract

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. Crisis Management by Military Cooperation with a Small Ally: American-Israeli Cooperation in the Syrian-Jordanian Crisis, September 1970. Cooperation and Conflict, XVII, 1982, 151-162.

The aim of this study is to examine the American—Israeli military cooperation in the Jordanian-Syrian crisis of September 1970, as an illustrative case of crisis management by military cooperation with a small ally, in a situation where there are inadequate conditions for the effective employment of direct coercive diplomacy by the major power. The U.S. role in the resolution of the crisis became effective only when it demonstrated clearly that it had a credible means to manage the crisis. The military cooperation with Israel increased tremendously the American credibility and therefore its coercive diplomacy bargaining position in the crisis. The U.S. succeeded in employ ing its military cooperation with Israel as an effective means of crisis management. because the preliminary conditions for that strategy were present. The U.S. had a local ally with its own interests, motivation and capability to act as a 'crisis manager assistant'. The main negative result of the crisis for the U.S. was Israel's increased bargaining power. When a superpower is unable to protect its vital interests by use of its own direct coercive diplomacy and needs to rely on the assistance of an ally, it has no choice other than to accept the increased bargaining power of the ally.