Notes on Bureaucratic Politics in National Security Policy

Abstract

A new approach to the study of international politics - the Bureaucratic Politics Ap proach (BPA) - is examined. The main assertion of the BPA is that 'events involving the actions of two or more nations can best be explained and predicted in terms of the actions of two or more national bureaucracies ...' and that the foreign policy process is influenced less by the events in the International System than by the bureau cratic game. The first part of the article is a brief presentation of the BPA. The origins are discussed, the basic points of view are presented and a comparison with a more traditional approach to the role of the national bureaucracy is carried out. Different conceptions in favour of and against the BPA are identified. The second part is a simple 'test' of a BPA-model drawn from the works of Morton H. Halperin. The empirical basis is derived from the ABM case ending up with the Treaty of May 1972. The conclusion is that the BPA does not explain the US accept of the ABM treaty adequately. The bureaucratic game played only a minor role in the ABM case. The stronger part was the Ultimate Decision Center around the President, which was strongly influenced by the possibilities and the conditions in the International System.