The author aims at defining the parameters of Danish security policy in the seventies, both in its external aspects (alliance policy, etc.) and in its internal aspects (defence policy). The study is based upon the public debate and – in particular – recent official reports on security policy which are presented in some detail. After analysing the historical background, the study sets out to present official Danish views of the international environment, both at the global, regional and sub-regional levels, and in more detail, of its implications for Danish national security. The study then goes on to analyse trends in Denmark's external security policy, and it concludes that there is not much prospect of significant departures from present policy. Finally, the current debate on defence policy is presented with special attention to the analysis of the new Defence Act of 1973 and its formulation.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
ScaveniusErik, Forhandlingspolitikken under Besœttelsen (The Policy of Negotiation during the Occupation), Copenhagen1948, p. 9.
2.
These terms are suggested by Harold and Margaret Sprout in The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, Princeton1965, pp. 25 ff.
3.
For a description of Danish NATO policy, see ÖrvikNilsHaagerupNiels J.: The Scandinavian Members of Nato, Adelphi Papers, No. 23 (Dec. 1965).
4.
Reprinted in OlesenKjeld (Ed.) Forsvaret til debat (Defence Policy: A Reappraisal), Copenhagen1970, pp. 110–21. The book consists of background papers to the proposal; the most interesting ones are those by the Editor (now Defence Minister) and the then Prime Minister J. 0. Krag. An extract of the proposal is given in Appendix 2.
5.
A small secretariat with the task of making political and economic background analyses was set up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1961, but was abolished in 1909/70.
6.
Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1948–1966.1–11 (Danish Security Policy 1948–1966), Copenhagen1968.
7.
BjølErling, Danmark og NATO (Denmark and NATO), Copenhagen1968.
8.
Unnumbered introduction to the Seidenfaden Report (see Note 9).
9.
Problemeromkring dansk sikkerhedspolitik. En redegørelse fra det sagkyndige udvalg under regeringsudvalget vedrørende dansk sikkerhedspolitik. I—II (Problems of Danish Security Policy. A Report by the Expert Subcommittee of the Government Committee on Danish Security Policy), Copenhagen1970. Hereafter referred to as the Seidenfaden Report. Unless otherwise stated, references are to Vol. I.
10.
Beretning fra Forsvarskommissionen af 1969 (Report of the 1969 Defence Commission), Copenhagen1972. Hereafter referred to as the Defence Commission Report.
11.
Defence Commission Report, pp. 93–166. Hereafter referred to as Defence Staff Study.
12.
While we are here interested in the ‘data generating’ function of these studies, their function as political instruments should not be overlooked. Both studies published in 1968 were meant to enter the ‘grand debate’ over NATO which was expected for 1968/69 but which for various reasons never came. At least implicitly both studies argue for status quo in security policy. This is also the case with the report of the Seidenfaden Committee which was set up at least partly to accommodate the Radical party's demand for a frank and unprejudiced analysis of security policy alternatives, partly to evade any immediate public debate of the issue. Much the same can be said about the 1969 Defence Commission one of whose functions undoubtedly was to place the potentially disruptive defence problem in cold storage during at least the first term of the bourgeois coalition Government.
13.
The implications of the generation gap in foreign policy attitudes are discussed by Niels Jørgen Haagerup in BirnbaumKarl E. (Ed.): Nordiska framtidsperspektiv (Nordic Perspectives of the Future), Stockholm1970, pp. 22–23.
14.
See Note 8.
15.
Seidenfaden Report, p. 193.
16.
Ibid., pp. 182–84.
17.
Ibid., pp. 45 ff., 70–71.
18.
Ibid., pp. 73–75.
19.
Text in Fællesmarkedet og Danmark (The Common Market and Denmark), No. 5, Copenhagen1971. Pamphlet issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
20.
Official text.
21.
Politiken, 17 Nov. 1971.
22.
Prime Minister J. O. Krag, 16 Dec. 1971. Folketingstidende (Parliamentary Records)1971–72, col. 1748.
23.
Berlingske Tidende, 13 Nov. 1971.
24.
Udenrigsministeriet: Dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1948–1966, Vol. I, p. 172. My translation.
25.
Seidenfaden Report, p. 232.
26.
Cf. LauxJeanne Kirk, ‘Small States and Inter-European Relations: An Analysis of the Group of Nine’, Journal of Peace? Research, 1972, No. 2, pp. 147–60. According to the Seidenfaden Report, Danish expectations in relation to the group have not been fulfilled (p. 250).
Folketingstidende 1970–71, col. 4823 (18 March 1971).
30.
Ibid., cols. 4851, 4870.
31.
Berlingske Tidende, 5 Dec. 1971.
32.
See Appendix 1.
33.
See Appendix 1.
34.
See, e.g., former Foreign Minister Per Hækkerup, Danmarks udenrigspolitik (Denmark's Foreign Policy), Copenhagen1965, pp. 99–100. The theory is also discussed in the Seidenfaden Report, pp. 282–84.
35.
Seidenfaden Report, p. 82.
36.
Ibid., pp. 270–71.
37.
In a commentary of August 1970 the Defence Command has pointed out that a realization of the proposal might reduce the present faith that the southern approaches to Norway arc reasonably well covered (Defence Commission Report, p. 407). Similarly the chief of NATO's Northern Region (CINCNORTH) has remarked that ‘if Denmark were unable to shoulder its part of the burden of common defence, Norway, Germany, and even Britain would be exposed … The situation would be especially difficult for Norway, who might not be able to send reinforcements from Southern Norway in case of an attack upon Northern Norway’ (ibid., p. 396. My translation).
38.
Seidenfaden Report, p. 82.
39.
Ibid., Vol. II, p. 76.
40.
Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 80–81.
41.
Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 81–83.
42.
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 277.
43.
Ibid., cf. Defence Staff Study, loc. cit., p. 99.
44.
Seidenfaden Report, p. 278.
45.
Ibid., pp. 265–66.
46.
Defence Staff Study, loc. cit., p. 101.
47.
Ibid., p. 100.
48.
Ibid.
49.
Ibid., pp. 266, 267.
50.
Seidenfaden Report, pp. 266–67.
51.
Politiken, 16 Aug. 1970.
52.
Cited in Jyllands-Posten, 1 Nov. 1971.
53.
Seidenfaden Report, pp. 278–81.
54.
Ibid., p. 284.
55.
Defence Staff Study, loc. cit., p. 109.
56.
Seidenfaden Report, pp. 268–69.
57.
Ibid., pp. 292–99.
58.
See Appendix 5.
59.
The Seidenfaden Report, pp. 307–09.
60.
Ibid., pp. 309–10.
61.
Politiken, 23 July 1971; Berlingske Tidende, 4 Aug. 1971.
62.
See, inter alia, the then Foreign Minister Poul Hartling in the Folketing, 18 March 1971 (Folketingstidende 1970–71, col. 4818), the present Foreign Minister, K. B. Andersen in the Folketing, 19 April 1972 (see Appendix 1) and in 'Dansk udenrigspolitik 1972 (Danish Foreign Policy, 1972), Fremtiden, 1972, No. 3, p. 8.
63.
Loc. cit., p. 105.
64.
See Appendix 2.
65.
Defence Staff Study, loc. cit., pp. 101–02.
66.
Ibid., pp. 104–05, 132, 158.
67.
Ibid., p. 158.
68.
See Appendix 2.
69.
Sec, e.g., Kjeld Olesen in his Forsvaret til debat, pp. 60, 61.
70.
See Defence Command comments dated 31 Aug. 1970, in Defence Commission Report, pp. 403–32, esp. pp. 406–07, 410–13.
71.
Seidenfaden Report, pp. 328–29, 341.
72.
Ibid., pp. 330–31.
73.
Ibid., pp. 332–39; the quotation is from p. 339. The BALTAP Command comprises the southern part of NATO's Northern Region (AFNORTH), i.e. NATO forces in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. Its HQ are at Karup, Jutland. The commander of BALTAP is permanently a Danish officer. BALTAP has four sub-commands: LANDJUT (land forces in Jutland and Schleswig-Holstein; the command rotates between Denmark and Germany), NAVBALTAP (naval forces in the entire BALTAP area; command rotates between Denmark and Germany), AIRBALTAP (air forces in BALTAP area; command permanently Danish), and LANDZEALAND (land forces in Eastern Denmark; permanent Danish command).
74.
Defence Staff Study, loc. cit., p. 113.
75.
Ibid., p. 115.
76.
Seidenfaden Report, pp. 341–51.
77.
Ibid., p. 353.
78.
Ibid., pp. 354–55.
79.
Ibid., p. 356.
80.
Ibid., p. 357.
81.
Ibid., pp. 231–32, cf. pp. 336–37.
82.
Defence Commission Report, p. 401. My translation.
83.
Comment by Defence Command, see Note 70, Loc. cit., p. 427.
84.
Jyllands-Posten, 25 April 1972.
85.
Appendix 3 to report by the parliamentary defence committee of 14 March 1973, see note 102 below.
86.
Berlingske Tidende, 24. Jan. 1972.
87.
Berlingske Aftenavis, 18–19 July 1970; Jyllands-Posten, 22 Aug. 1970.
88.
Official remarks (‘bemærkninger’) to De. fence Bill.
89.
Cf. Kjeld Olesen in his Forsvaret til debat p. 60.
90.
Figure given by Preben Steen Nielsen official Social Democratic spokesman on defence, in the Folketing (2 Feb. 1972), Folketingstidende 1971–72, col. 2537.
91.
Cf. comment by Defence Command in Defence Commission Report, pp. 415–20.
92.
E.g. ØstergaardKristen, Official Liberal spokesman on defence. Folketingstidende 1971–72, col. 2554 (2 Feb. 1972).
The proposal was issued by the party in 1970 as a ‘basis for debate’, but it has never been endorsed by the party. It is printed in Defence Commission Report, pp. 439–54.
100.
Ibid., p. 163.
101.
See Appendix 4a.
102.
See Appendix 4b.
103.
Betænkning over I. forslag til lov om ændring af lov om forsvarets organisation m.v. og II …. om forsvarets personel. Folketingstidende1972–73, Tillæg B. (Blad nr. 471).
104.
Ibid.
105.
Ibid.
106.
The serving period of civilian conscripts is likely to be reduced from the present 16 to 12 months.
