This paper examines the degrees of cooperation and conflict between the Socialist countries from January 1962 until the end of August 1968. The study is an experiment in the analysis of international interaction events. The sources of data are rather exceptional news media: the relevant editorials of five Finnish newspapers and the Chronology of Current History. However, the method is not a content analysis but an event analysis. The concept of actional distance is used to measure and combine (both explicitly and implicitly) cooperation and conflict. Actional distance between A and B includes both direct interaction between them and the behavior of A and B toward some object X. The distances among the Socialist countries are described in regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict. The bloc is found to be divided into two subgroups with the exception of five countries which do not belong to either of them. The theory tested is the Simmel/Coser cohesion hypothesis, which is strongly supported by the results. The results are compared with two content analysis studies and one transaction flow study; the comparison confirms the validity of the results of this paper. The validity problem is also discussed.
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References
1.
I also intend to research into the development of cohesiveness in the Western bloc (including Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam). The data will be gathered from various sources, e.g., the New York Times Index, Kalendarium, The Facts on File, the Current History, and some Soviet and Chinese news sources. It will be some time before this study is finished, however, some reports will be published during 1971. See HarleV., ‘International Events Data Sources: Are They Reliable?’, in Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 2, 1971, pp. 64–77.
2.
This paper is a revised version of the pro gradu study of my own. See HarleV., Political Relations between the Socialist Countries in the 1960's. Unpublished B. A. thesis, University of Tampere, 1969. (In Finnish, mimeo.)
3.
The political relations between the Socialist countries are discussed in many books and articles. See, e.g., TriskaJ.FinlayD., Soviet Foreign Policy. New York1968; ZagoriaD. S., The Sino-Soviet Conflict1956–1961, Princeton 1902.
4.
SimmelG., Conflict, Glencoe1955.
5.
CoserL., The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe1956.
6.
Simmel, op. cit., 1955, pp. 92–93.
7.
Coser, op. cit., 1956, p. 92.
8.
Small group studies are reviewed thoroughly elsewhere, see GuttentagM., ‘Group Cohesiveness, Ethnic Organization and Poverty’, in Journal of Social Issues, 1970, 26,2, pp. 105–32. Cohesiveness in simulated international systems has been studied by BrodyR., in ‘Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future’, in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1963, 7, 4 (whole number). The cohesion of the Socialist group is studied in two cases, see HolstiO. R., ‘External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case’, in General Inquirer by Stone (Ed.) M.I.T. Press1966; and HopmannP. T., ‘International Conflict and Cohesion in the Communist System’, International Studies Quarterly, 1967, 11, 3, pp. 212–36.
9.
See VäyrynenR., ‘A Case Study of Sanctions: Finland—The Soviet Union in 1958–59’, Cooperation and Conflict, 1969, No. 3, 205–33.
10.
E.g., CohenA. R., ‘Ethnic Group Differences in Israel’, Race, 1968, 9, 3, pp. 303–10 and LottA. J.LottB. E., ‘Group Cohesiveness as Interpersonal Attraction: A Review of Relationships with Antecedent and Consequent Variables’, Psychological Bulletin, 1965, 64, pp. 259–309.
11.
GuttentagM., op. cit., 1970, p. 111.
12.
This hypothesis was presented in HolstiO. R., op. cit., 1965 and HopmannP. T., op. cit., 1967. These studies confirmed the hypothesis rather clearly.
13.
SondermannF. A., ‘The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Polities’, in RosenauJ. N. (Ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York1967.
14.
See BalesR. E., Interaction Process Analysis, Cambridge1951.
15.
McClellandC., ‘The Access to Berlin: The Quantity and Variety of Events, 1948–1963’, in SingerJ. D. (Ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, New York1968; and McClellandC.HoggardG., ‘Conflict Patterns in the Interactions among Nations’, in RosenauJ. N. (Ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd edition, New York1969.
16.
See, e.g. McClellandHoggard op. cit., 1969, p. 713.
17.
See HolstiO. R., op. cit, 1965.
18.
See HolstiO. R., op. cit., 1965 and HopmannP. T., op. cit., 1967.
19.
HughesB.VolgyT. in ‘Distance in Foreign Policy Behavior: A Comparative Study of Eastern Europe’, Midwest Journal of Political Science1970, 14, 3, pp. 459–92, have presented a rather similar definition of inter-State distances.
20.
I have used rather similar reasoning to that of Ole Holsti and Terry Hopmann. They, however, only speak about attitudes and differences between attitudes, whereas I go on to measure activities and differences between activities. The basic model is the same, with the exception of direct activities.
21.
If one measures the direction of activities within dyads, one has six variables to measure Actional distance. And if one uses the variables in different combinations, many various measures can be obtained (I present one combination measure in Appendix B).
22.
I have used the approximations by Holsti (op. cit., 1965) and Hopmann (op. cit.). I have based some of my estimates on significant East-West interaction events.
23.
I gathered 170 editorials from the US, 91 from the Sm, 190 from the HS, 75 from the SS, and 119 from the KU; plus 454 news items from CH.
24.
This distribution is very similar to the one presented by McClelland & Hoggard (op. cit., 1969), which hints that there is clear objectivity in the material I used, if we can suppose (and I think so) that the distribution represents ‘the reality’ of interaction events.
25.
See also HughesB.VolgyT., op. cit., 1970 where some comparable results/are presented.
Table 7 indicates some interesting findings, but because of space limitations, it is not possible to comment on them in this article. Briefly, the first group is based on basic consensus; the third one on the two subsystem cleavage: The other groups indicate clearly some kind of individuality in behavior by Mongolia, Cuba, the USSR, China, Rumania and Yugoslavia (possibly the latter two states behave in a rather similar way).
28.
See GuttentagM., op. cit, 1970.
29.
E.g., CasstevensT. W., ‘Linear Algebra and Legislative Voting Behavior: Rice's Indices’, The Journal of Politics, 1970, 32, 769–83.
30.
HolstiO. R., op. cit., 1965 and HopmannP. T., op. cit., 1967.
31.
HughesB.VolgyT., op. cit., 1970.
32.
Ibid., pp. 459–68; Hughes & Volgy operationally define and measure distance by foreign trade, total state visits and total embassies and legations maintained by East European nations. Distance means differences in this behavior between the East European countries.
