Transnational veto players in conflict negotiations: Cross-border coalitions and constraints

Abstract

This study analyzes how cross-border (transnational) groups constrain state’s commitments in international mediation and argues they serve as “transnational veto players” whose incentive and cost structures fall out of alignment with the negotiating state during mediation. This creates opportunities and incentives to veto policy change. Their influence is most evident when mediators use leverage against states to reorder preferences, but transnational groups do not receive comparable inducements. Agreements that create veto points such as implementation requirements or plebiscites endow transnational groups with veto power to undermine agreements and prevent changes to the status quo, while passing the costs of reneging onto the negotiating state. States seek to avoid the costs incurred by transnational veto players by reducing their opportunities and capabilities to act autonomously and align their incentives with their own. This argument is developed and tested in a single case study of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo constraining Serbian commitments, and Serbian attempts to manage their opportunities and capabilities to veto commitments.